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Abstract
Except for the traditional threat that candidates may want to cheat, exams
have historically not been seen like a serious security problem. That threat is
routinely thwarted by having invigilators ensure that candidates do not misbe-
have during testing. However, as recent exam scandals confirm, also invigilators
and exam authorities may have interest in frauds, hence they may pose secu-
rity threats as well. Moreover, new security issues arise from the recent use of
computers, which can facilitate the exam experience for example by allowing
candidates to register from home. Thus, exams must be designed with the care
normally devoted to security protocols.
This dissertation studies exam protocol security and provides an in-depth
understanding that can be also useful for the study of the security of similar
systems, such as public tenders, personnel selections, project reviews, and con-
ference management systems. It introduces an unambiguous terminology that
leads to the specification of a taxonomy of various exam types, depending on
the level of computer assistance. It then establishes a theoretical framework
for the formal analysis of exams. The framework defines several authentication,
privacy, and verifiability requirements that modern exams should meet, and en-
ables the security of exam protocols to be studied. Using the framework, we
formally analyse traditional, computer-assisted, and Internet-based exam proto-
cols. We find some security issues and propose modifications to partially achieve
the desired requirements.
This dissertation also designs three exam protocols that guarantee a wide
set of security requirements. It introduces a novel protocol for Internet-based
exams to thwart a malicious exam authority with minimal trust assumptions.
Then, it proposes secure protocols suitable for both computer-assisted and tra-
ditional pen-and-paper exams. A combination of oblivious transfer and visual
cryptography schemes allows us to overcome the constraint of face-to-face test-
ing and to remove the need of a trusted third party. Moreover, the protocols
ensure accountability as they support the identification of the principal that
is responsible for their failure. We evaluate the security of our protocols by a
formal analysis in ProVerif.
Finally, this dissertation looks at exams as carried out through a modern
browser, Safe Exam Browser (SEB). It was specifically designed to carry out
Internet-based exams securely, and we confirm it immune to the security issues
of certificate validation. Using UML and CSP, we advance a formal analysis of
its requirements that are not only logically conditioned on the technology but
also on user actions. By extending this analysis onto other browsers, we state
general best-practice recommendations to browser vendors.
i
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Oxford English Dictionary defines an exam as the process of testing the
knowledge or ability of pupils, or of candidates for office, degrees, etc. Although
the definition of exam is pivoted on individuals, exams assume a key role in
fostering meritocracy in modern societies. On the individual side, exams are
important as they help people understand their skills and knowledge in a par-
ticular subject. On the societal side, exams are indispensable to select most
appropriate people through an objective evaluation.
The use of exams is widespread, with various examples derivable from the
education sector (e.g., admissions, coursework, and final qualifications) as well
as from the work sector (e.g., recruitment, progression, and professional qual-
ifications). France is one of the countries that extensively use exams, some of
which are very competitive: the “Concours Ge´ne´ral” is the most prestigious
academic exam, which is taken by about 15,000 French students, and typically
bears a success rate of less than 2% [Min14]; the exam to enter medicine studies
attracts every year more than 50,000 candidates with a success rate of less than
15% [Fig14]. Exam meritocracy is one of the guiding principles in Singapore
and is deemed to have contributed to the rapid growth of the country [Gop07].
High populated countries, such as China and India, resort on tough exams for
the recruitment of various administrative officers. In particular, China has an
old tradition in administering civil service exams, which dates back to the Han
dynasty (206 BC - AD 220). It is worth noting that the idea to promote people
based on exams came to West only in the 17th century, when the British Empire
began to hire employees using competitive exams to eliminate favouritism and
corruption [KER09].
Exams fulfil the goal of testing knowledge and abilities of candidates only in
absence of misbehaviour of the involved parties, and normally employ different
methods to face possible threats. For example, threats ascribed to candidate
cheating are normally mitigated by invigilation and anti-plagiarism methods.
Moreover, an exam requires people to follow many procedures to make sure
that as few things as possible go wrong. For example, to ensure that only eligi-
ble candidates attend the exam, the invigilator checks their identity documents
before allowing them to take the exam. To guarantee fair marking, each candi-
date may use a special number that replaces her name on the test so that the
examiner can mark the test while ignoring its author. The author of a test is
revealed only after the examiner marked the tests.
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The procedures outlined above help people’s confidence that everything
works as expected, provided that people can observe the procedures or trust
the exam system. The latter means that people have to trust that the candi-
date’s ID is properly checked, that special numbers are correctly employed, and
that authorities do not reveal the author of a test before the examiner marks
it. People have to trust authorities.
However, authorities and examiners may be corrupted, and so they may
commit misconducts that are hard to eradicate. In the scandal known as Atlanta
Cheating [Cop13], about 35 people among school administrators, educators, and
superintendents manipulated ranks and scores with the goal of gaining more
school governmental funds. In early 2014, the BBC revealed a fraud on the UK
visa system, in which the invigilator read out all the correct answers during the
exam of English proficiency [Wat14]. More recently, a medical school admission
exam scandal in India has turned into thousands of arrests [New15]. The police
revealed that candidates hired impersonators to take the written exam, and
examiners gave higher marks to colluded candidates. The U.S. Navy disclosed
cheating on the written exam that concerns the use of nuclear reactors that
power carriers and subs [Lip14]. It was found that questions and answers were
illegally taken from a Navy computer since 2007 [Pre14].
In fact, computers have been increasingly introduced in the main procedures
of exam systems. They can assist generation of questions or automatic marking
procedures; also, they can be employed for remote registration, remote notifi-
cation, and even remote testing, in which candidates can take the exam from
home. For example, the most popular Massive Online Open Courses (MOOC),
the education platforms that offer courses of study over the Internet, allow re-
mote testing [Cou15, Cou12]. Such exams provide a formal recognition of the
candidates’ achievements, and some universities already consider MOOC exams
eligible for university credits [Lew13].
The use of computers simplifies certain tasks occurring during an exam, but
does not necessarily make the exam more secure. For example, the registration
of a candidate for the exam and the notification of the mark via the Internet
should be at least as secure as they would be face-to-face. Hence, we shall
unfold the argument that an exam must be designed and analysed as carefully
as security protocols normally are.
This dissertation draws its main motivation from the observation that exams
raise more challenging security and privacy issues than one may think. This is
due to at least two main reasons. One is that threats may come from any of
the roles playing in an exam. In particular, candidates and authorities may be
corrupted to various extents. Exams then begin to look more balanced in terms
of threats or benefits their participants pose or seek. The other reason is that
there is no clear understanding of what the relevant security requirements for
exams are. We observe that the growth in the use of exam protocols has neither
been followed nor preceded by a rigorous definition and analysis of their security.
Such absence may lead to the design and the practical adoption of insecure exam
protocols, and makes people less confident of exam trustworthiness.
These concerns are relevant also for other domains, such as voting. Sig-
nificant parts of the related work in this dissertation highlight similarities and
differences between exams and voting. Intuitively, both domains share similar
security and privacy requirements. For example, only the answers originated by
eligible candidates should be marked in an exam. Similarly, only ballots cast by
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eligible voters should be recorded in a voting system. However, a closer inspec-
tion reveals a number of different security concerns between the two domains.
For example, the link between an answer and its author should be preserved
through the phases of an exam. Conversely, unlinkability between voter and
vote is a desired property of a voting system. In a nutshell, a fundamental
difference is that while fair elections aim to bring democracy, fair exams aim
to bring meritocracy to societies. We observe that democracy is not meritoc-
racy: in democracy, the selection of candidates is based on (people’s) choices; in
meritocracy, the selection of candidates is based on (the examiner’s) assessment
of their merit. Thus, understanding similarities and differences between exams
and voting becomes an additional motivation of this manuscript.
1.1 Aims and Objectives
This work aims to study the relevant security requirements for exam proto-
cols and to design and analyse exam protocols that meet the stated security
requirements. We intend to achieve those aims through four objectives.
1. To identify the relevant security requirements for exam proto-
cols. This is a fundamental objective as it provides the basics for further
research and determines the meaning of secure exam protocol. It requires
the specification of a coherent terminology for exams including their phases
and threat model. The desired outcome consists of a set of authentication,
privacy, and verifiability requirements.
2. To develop a formal framework for the specification of security
requirements and the analysis of exam protocols. This is a crucial
objective that provides a rigorous and formal description of the security
requirements for exams. It requires choosing a specific formalism in which
the security requirements identified in objective 1 can be expressed. The
desired outcome is to achieve a flexible framework that is suitable for the
modelling and analysis of exams.
3. To design new secure protocols for different types of exams. This
objective consists in proposing novel exam protocols that meet the se-
curity requirements according to the restrictions of the different exam
types, which depend on the level of computer assistance and span from
traditional to Internet-based exams. It requires combining secure cryp-
tographic schemes to guarantee the often contrasting requirements. The
desired outcome is a number of protocols that provide the same level of
security though they belong to different exam types.
4. To explore novel security aspects of the critical components of
exam protocols. This objective is to expand the formal analysis of
exams by considering also the user. In particular, it concerns the analysis
of one of the components that interacts with the user most. As we shall
see later, this component is the browser. This objective requires choosing
a suitable approach that includes the user in the formulation of security
requirements and in the analysis. The desired outcome is to understand
how user’s choices may influence the security of exam protocols.
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Objective 1
A clear description of the general building blocks of all ex-
ams, and the definition of the security requirements
Objective 2
Two formal frameworks for the security analysis of exam
protocols
Objective 3
Three new exam protocols that guarantee several security
requirements
Objective 4
A socio-technical formal analysis of browsers for Internet-
based exams
Figure 1.1: Overview of the contributions
1.2 Contributions
This dissertation addresses the four objectives outlined in the previous section.
It advances the state of the art in the design and analysis of secure exam pro-
tocols with at least four original contributions as reported in Figure 1.1.
The first contribution is a clear specification of the general building blocks
of all exams, in terms of tasks, roles, phases, and threats. This paves the
way for the definition of the security requirements for exams and facilitates the
description of exam protocols.
The second contribution consists of two formal frameworks for the security
analysis of exam protocols. The frameworks enable the study of five authentica-
tion, five privacy, and eleven verifiability requirements for exam protocols, and
support the specification of additional requirements. One framework formalises
authentication and privacy requirements in the applied pi-calculus [AF01], while
the other specifies verifiability requirements in a more abstract model . Both
frameworks are validated in ProVerif [Bla01] on traditional, computer-assisted,
and Internet-based exam protocols. We find that some protocols are flawed and
propose modifications on their designs.
The third contribution consists of three new exam protocols that guarantee a
set of security requirements. The first protocol is for Internet-based exams and
meets authentication, privacy, and verifiability requirements with minimal re-
liance on trusted parties. It distributes the trust across the servers that compose
an exponentiation mixnet. The second protocol is for computer-assisted exams
with face-to-face testing, and meets the requirements by means of lightweight
participation of a trusted third party (TTP). It exploits the use of signatures
and visual cryptography to ensure authentication and privacy in the presence
of corrupted authorities and candidates. The last protocol eliminates the need
of the TTP by combining oblivious transfer and visual cryptography schemes.
It still ensures the same security requirements as the previous protocol’s and
provides accountability without relying on a TTP. The proposed exam protocols
are formally analysed in ProVerif.
The last contribution is the formal analysis of six modern browsers for
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Internet-based exams. This analysis tackles yet another aspect of the problem
of secure exams as it concerns the human understanding of remote authentica-
tion, and in particular of certificate validation in browsers. Browsers are critical
components of an exam as they are the main application users normally interact
with. The list of analysed browsers includes Firefox, Chrome, Safari, Internet
Explorer, Opera Mini, and Secure Exam Browser (SEB), a kiosk browser that
enforces the security of remote testing in Internet-based exams. Using UML Ac-
tivity Diagrams and the CSP process algebra [Hoa78], we provide a systematic
approach to the security analysis of certificate validation in different scenarios,
all considering user interactions. Parts of this contribution are the Linear Tem-
poral Logic specification of five novel socio-technical requirements, each binding
elements like TLS session, certificates and user choices. We find that each
browser implements certificate validation differently, and some of them pose
more security risks to users than others do. We propose four recommendations
to improve the security of browsers’ certificate validations.
The results of this research offer the basis for the design and analysis of
secure protocols for traditional, computer-assisted, and Internet-based exams.
1.3 Outline
This dissertation is structured in eight chapters. Most of the contents of the
dissertation have been published as joint work with different co-authors in con-
ference papers or submitted to journal articles. In the following, we outline the
contents of each chapter.
Chapter 2: Terminology. This chapter introduces the basics of an exam.
It begins with the description of the tasks that occur during an exam. In
particular, it observes that levels of detail and abstraction of an exam spec-
ification constraint the number of tasks. The chapter continues discussing
the possible roles of an exam, possibly played by one or more principals.
It identifies the typical phases of an exam and the basic threats coming
from the main exam roles. The chapter concludes with a taxonomy that
classifies exams by types and categories.
The contents of this chapter have not been published. However, a paper
containing an earlier version of the chapter was accepted for publication
in a conference but not included in the proceedings.
Chapter 3: Formalising Authentication and Privacy. This chapter con-
tains the formal definitions of authentication and privacy requirements for
exams. It discusses different techniques to model security requirements
and presents tools for the automatic analysis of security protocols. Then,
it describes the applied pi-calculus, on which we rely to build the frame-
work. The framework consists of the formal model of an exam, five authen-
tication, and five privacy requirements. It is validated via the ProVerif
analysis of the Huszti-Petho˝ exam protocol. The chapter continues with
the results of the analysis and concludes with a proposal that enhances
the security of the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol.
Most of the contents of this chapter are based on different publications.
In particular, the informal definitions of authentication and privacy re-
quirements are based on a joint work with Giampaolo Bella and Gabriele
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Lenzini [BGL13c]. The formal framework and the analysis of the Huszti-
Petho˝ protocol have been co-authored with Jannik Dreier, Ali Kassem,
Pascal Lafourcade, Gabriele Lenzini, and Peter Y.A. Ryan [DGK+14b].
An extended version of this work that considers the fixes for the Huszti-
Petho˝ protocol has been submitted to a journal. The formalisation of the
authentication requirement of Candidate Authorisation and its verification
on the different protocols discussed in this dissertation are unpublished
work.
Chapter 4: Formalising Verifiability. This chapter proposes an abstract
framework in which an exam protocol and its verifiability requirements are
formalised via a set-theoretic approach. In this chapter, we distinguish the
notions of individual verifiability as verifiability from the point of view of
the candidate, and universal verifiability as verifiability from the point of
view of an external auditor. We propose six individual and five universal
verifiability requirements.
This chapter is based on joint work with Jannik Dreier, Ali Kassem, Pascal
Lafourcade, and Gabriele Lenzini [DGK+15].
Chapter 5: The Remark! Internet-based Exam Protocol. This chapter
details Remark!, a new protocol for Internet-based exams. It discusses the
cryptographic building blocks on which Remark! is based, with a partic-
ular focus on the exponentiation mixnet. The chapter continues with the
description of the protocol and the formal analysis in ProVerif of authen-
tication, privacy, and verifiability requirements. Notably, it discusses how
to map the abstract definitions of verifiability in ProVerif. The chapter
concludes with some security considerations of Remark!.
The paper that proposes Remark! has been co-authored with Gabriele
Lenzini and Peter Y.A. Ryan [GLR14]. The formal analysis of Remark! is
based on the papers that appears in [DGK+14b] and [DGK+15]. The
manual induction proofs that support the formal analysis of universal
verifiability in Remark! are based on [DGK+14a].
Chapter 6: Computer-assisted Exam Protocols. This chapter focuses
on WATA, a family of computer-assisted exams each employing some level
of computer assistance though keeping face-to-face testing. This chap-
ter first introduces the protocol versions of the existing WATA II and III
software and reviews their security. Then, it details WATA IV, a novel
exam protocol that meets more security requirements than the previous
ones with less reliance on a TTP. WATA IV is then redesigned to meet
the same security requirements without the need of any TTP. The chap-
ter presents a detailed description of the enhanced version and a formal
analysis in ProVerif, including the formalisation of an accountability re-
quirement (Dispute Resolution). It concludes with a brief review of the
protocols seen throughout the chapter.
This chapter is based on joint work with Giampaolo Bella, Gabriele Lenzini
and Peter Y.A. Ryan. The protocol versions of the WATA software and
their informal analyses are unpublished work. WATA IV has been pub-
lished in a conference paper [BGL14]. The enhanced version and its formal
analysis are based on [BGLR15].
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Chapter 7: Formal Analysis of Certificate Validation in SEB and
Modern Browsers. This chapter considers exams taking place via mod-
ern browsers and focuses on the socio-technical analysis of certificate val-
idation. It clarifies the basics of certificate validation and highlights the
user involvement in the process. Using UML Activity Diagrams, it de-
scribes the certificate validation of six different browsers, considering both
classic and private browsing modes. This chapter then introduces five
socio-technical requirements in Linear Temporal Logic and outlines the
translation of the UML diagrams to CSP# [SLDP09]. It discusses the
output of a model checker analysis, and concludes with four recommenda-
tions to browser vendors.
This chapter is based on joint work with Giampaolo Bella and Gabriele
Lenzini. A preliminary version appears in [BGL13b], while the full treat-
ment is based on [BGL13a]. The analysis of SEB, Safari, private browsing
modes, and the interleaving with classic browsing are based on a version
submitted to a journal.
Chapter 8: Conclusions. This chapter discusses the research presented
throughout the dissertation, outlines future work, and concludes the pre-
sentation.
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Chapter 2
Terminology
This chapter introduces the reader to the general building blocks of all exams.
In consequence, describing a specific exam becomes easier, at the sole price of
further expanding or specifying these general concepts. We view an exam as
a security protocol that involves various tasks defining roles played by various
principals through various phases. Hence, exam or exam protocol are used
interchangeably. With a security take, an exam is expected to withstand a
threat model meeting a number of security requirements.
Outline of the chapter. Section 2.1 discusses the levels of detail and ab-
straction to characterise tasks. Section 2.2 introduces possible roles for exams.
Section 2.3 outlines the principals that play the exam roles. Section 2.4 iden-
tifies the typical phases of an exam. Section 2.5 details the potential security
threats associated with the exam roles. Section 2.6 classifies exams by type and
category, and concludes the chapter.
2.1 Tasks
A number of tasks may occur during an exam, such as generating the set of
questions, building the tests and marking them. We observe that the number
of tasks that can be identified may change over two possible dimensions.
One is the required level of detail for the specification of the exam protocol,
establishing whether a task should be explicitly mentioned or not. For exam-
ple, classical security protocols often prescribed the task of using a nonce in
a message, yet omitting the task of fetching it. Experience teaches us that a
specification should make very clear (in)security assumptions about the protocol
environment, otherwise the analysis may yield debatable findings. In this vein,
Needham stated that the public-key Needham-Schro¨der protocol considered the
attacker as an outsider but never made this explicit [Nee02], a threat model
that would remove the opportunity for Lowe’s attack.
Another dimension is the level of abstraction for the specification, establish-
ing whether a task should be expanded into sub-tasks or not. For example, the
task of fetching a nonce may be expanded into accessing a random number gen-
erator, running it, and receiving its output securely, and these may be further
expanded in turn.
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From the security analysis standpoint, the levels of detail and of abstraction
must be chosen with care in order to limit the necessary assumptions to realism.
2.2 Roles
A role is a set of principals who perform a specific set, possibly of cardinality
one, of tasks. During exams, an obvious role is the candidate role, of taking the
exam to get a mark that may accord the candidate a goal — such as obtain-
ing a qualification, passing a periodical academic assessment, or being selected
through a public examination. Of course, the candidate role could be specified,
if needed, at a lower level of abstraction, and examples can be derived from
actual protocol specifications. Other possible roles, also called authority roles,
are as follows.
• The registrar role, of checking the eligibility of candidates who wish to take
an exam, and of populating a list of registered candidates accordingly.
• The question committee role, of building the tests and passing them to
invigilators, and of forming the test answers in case of multiple-choice
tests and passing them to the examiners.
• The moderator role, of liaising with the question committee to indepen-
dently ensure that the tests conform to pre-existing quality standards,
such as readability and appropriateness.
• The invigilator role, of distributing tests to candidates, of checking can-
didates’ identities, of following candidates while they take their test pre-
venting them from misbehaving.
• The collector role, of collecting the tests from the candidates at the end
of the exam time, and distributing the test answers to the examiners.
• The examiner role, of reading the test answers and of producing adequate
marks for them.
• The recorder role, of keeping records of what candidates received what
marks at the exam.
• The notifier role, of informing the candidates of the marks that their re-
spective tests received, and of storing this information with some recorders.
• The observer role, of watching everything.
It can be seen that each authority role clearly indicates its set of tasks,
demonstrating the levels of detail and of abstraction that we advocate. If an
exam features an additional task, then this could either extend an existing role
or form a new role. Also, in order to meet the security requirements, an exam
may allow two or more roles to merge into one, or may prescribe splitting a
role into two or more. For example, the role of question committee can be split
into exam convener, question setter, and question reviewer, as practised in some
universities. Typically, candidate and authority roles cannot be merged (and
still meet the security requirements), except with exams such as MOOC [YP13],
where homeworks are peer-reviewed, namely candidates mark each other.
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2.3 Principals
Exams see the participation of a number of principals, each playing one or more
of the roles defined above. Principals may change depending on the specific
exam, and various examples can be made.
At university, the candidate role is played by students, while the roles of
invigilator, collector and examiner are sometimes played by a single lecturer.
At an extreme, there are only two principals, with a student as a candidate and
a lecturer playing all authority roles. Today, ProctorU [Inc15] invigilates via
webcams the candidates who take exams from home. At public examinations,
the Police could take the invigilator role.
Principals are not necessarily humans. They may as well be pieces of software
playing various roles, such as invigilator, by filming candidates during testing,
or examiner, by marking multiple-choice tests mechanically.
Irrespectively or whether they are human or not, it must be assumed that
principals may act somewhat maliciously. We anticipate that such assumptions
are fundamental when considering corrupted principals in the formal definition
of our security requirements. In fact, they will define a threat model, as we shall
see below.
2.4 Phases
We identify the four main phases that typically take place sequentially during
an exam. They will be further detailed and specified by actual exams in the
sequel of this work.
• At preparation, certain authorities, typically registrars, file a new exam,
and check the standard eligibility criteria, such as correct payment of fees
and adequate previous qualifications, of candidates who wish to take the
exam. Only those who satisfy the criteria get successfully registered, and
the authorities ultimately produce a list of candidates registered for the
exam. Similarly, the authorities might produce a list of eligible examiners.
Most importantly, this phase includes the preparation of tests and all
the relevant material for the subsequent phase. For instance, creation of
questions, printing of tests, and generation of pseudonyms to anoymise
tests are tasks accomplished in this phase.
• At testing, each registered candidate gets a test containing a number
of questions, which were previously built by authorities, normally ques-
tion committee and moderators. Other authorities, typically invigilators,
watch candidates through this phase. Each candidate answers their test,
and may have to complete it with their personal details. The candidate
then submits their test answers to an authority, such as an invigilator.
• At marking, the test answers of all candidates reach the examiner authority
for evaluation. More precisely, the authority reads the test answers and
evaluates their adherence to the required knowledge, then forming a mark,
chosen on a given scale, for each test. Some real-world example scales are:
pass/fail, A to E, 60% to 100% and 18 to 30. With multiple-choice tests,
the examiner authority could be a computer program.
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• At notification, an authority, commonly a notifier, gives each candidate
the mark for the test answers the candidate submitted; either beforehand
or afterwards, the notifier also stores this information with a recorder,
commonly a server equipped with a DBMS.
Any subset of phases may either take place on site, with candidates meeting
the authorities face-to-face, or off site otherwise. Regulated by the specific
application requirements, these features will shape up the exam experience.
Moreover, any subset of these phases may take place either traditionally,
namely by pen and paper, or on computer. For example, we observed above that
marking can be easily computer assisted with multiple-choice tests; similarly,
notification could take place via dedicated workstations installed in the exam
site.
The specification of the exam phases clarifies the terminology that is used
coherently throughout this dissertation, but it may be useful to the reader if
we point out that various synonyms are used in the literature. For example,
“registration” or “setup” may refer to the preparation phase; “examination” is
often taken to indicate the testing phase; “evaluation” or “grading” may indicate
the marking phase; “exam”, “examination”, or “assessment” may sometimes
even refer to the full sequence of phases.
2.5 Threats
A number of threats could be envisaged against exams, and some basic threats
are enumerated here.
Threats may derive from each task. For example, even the task of printing
may invite the principal who performs it to alter the printout or not print at
all. We assume each principal to be rational in the sense that the principal does
not misbehave unless there is a clear benefit for them or, in case of collusion,
for another principal.
We conveniently define threats on a per-role basis. Therefore, augmenting
a role with additional tasks would require extending the role-specific threats;
adding new roles formed of new tasks would require extending the threats over
the role; merging roles would yield the union of the threats of the original roles;
splitting a role would partition its threats enabling each formed role to pose the
threats deriving from its tasks.
We define some basic threats coming from the preeminent roles used in the
sequel of this dissertation: the candidate, the authority, and the observer roles.
A specific protocol shall customise the list of the threats according its roles.
The threat model is the standard Dolev-Yao [DY83] over the roles (or their
portions) that are impersonated by computer programs. Additionally, the roles
(or their portions) that are impersonated by humans pose the threats detailed
below.
The corrupted candidate performs any tasks in order to:
• register for an exam without being eligible;
• register on behalf of someone else;
• answer their test with knowledge obtained by cheating;
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• get a higher mark than what the examiner assigns to their test.
These threats are significant. Eligibility criteria may be stringent, such as pay-
ment of fees and restricted participation to certain exam dates, hence the interest
in misbehaviour. Candidates’ attempts at cheating, for example by consulting
books, and at getting a better mark than theirs are well known. In particu-
lar, the latter may see a candidate send someone else, more knowledgeable than
them, to sit for the exam on the candidate’s behalf, or see a candidate swap their
mark with that of another candidate known to be very knowledgeable. Thus
candidates may collude each other to achieve their goal. It can be anticipated
that these threats demand effective authorisation, authentication, invigilation
and marking procedures.
The corrupted authority performs any tasks in order to:
• assign an unfair mark to a specific candidate, namely to over-mark or
under-mark her, or assign no mark at all.
This is the fundamental threat authorities may pose to candidates. This threat
may hinder students’ spontaneity during University lectures. This threat is
well known in academic conferences, and is partially addressed with blind re-
views. More seriously it has also brought corruption into public competitions.
Arguably, it calls for anonymous marking, verifiability, and accountability re-
quirements.
The observer performs any tasks in order to:
• gather any private information.
Observers may be allowed to watch parts of the exam, typically the candidates
while they take their tests, to raise public acceptance of the regularity of pro-
cedures. They may, however, have malicious intentions and seek out any form
of private information such as candidates’ questions and marks. If the exam is
somewhat assisted by computers or by the Internet, then this threat becomes a
digital one.
2.6 Taxonomy
Having seen the phases of an exam, we can specify the dictionary definition of
the word “exam” conveniently for our purposes.
Definition 1 (Exam) An exam is a formal test taken to show candidate’s
knowledge of a subject. It comprises the four sequential phases preparation,
testing, marking and notification.
Definition 1 only specifies the main functional requirement of an exam, that
candidates take the exam. It purposely omits additional functional requirements
that may depend on the application scenario, such as that candidates be allowed
to register from home.
2.6.1 Exam Types
Exams can be classified in various types according to the following definitions.
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Definition 2 (Computer-assisted exam) A computer-assisted exam is an
exam such that at least one of its phases receives some level of assistance from
computers or Information Technology.
At first glance, Definition 2 appears to be too wide to the extent that every
exam is a computer-assisted exam. For example, an exam that only requires
computers to edit the questions could be classified as computer-assisted. How-
ever, as observed in Section 2.1, the levels of detail and abstraction for the
specification of the protocol should be considered to find the correct classifica-
tion of the exam. Thus, if the way the questions are edited is not explicitly
mentioned in the description of the protocol, the exam should not be classi-
fied as computer-assisted. A qualifying example of a computer-assisted exam
is to allow candidates to register from home, but then continuing traditionally,
namely fully on paper and without the use of computers.
Definition 3 (Traditional exam or non-computer-assisted exam) A
traditional exam is an exam such that none of its phases receives any level of
assistance from computers or Information Technology in general. A traditional
exam is also said a non-computer-assisted exam to indicate the absence of com-
puter assistance.
Definitions 2 and 3 insist that exams can be partitioned between computer-
assisted and traditional exams depending on computer assistance. Having seen
the main partition within exams, various types of e-exams can be defined. For
brevity, it is useful to refer to the acronyms in Table 2.1.
NCA non-computer-assisted
CA computer-assisted
CB computer-based
IA Internet-assisted
IB Internet-based
Table 2.1: Acronyms for exam types
Definition 4 (Computer-based exam) A computer-based exam is an exam
whose testing phase takes place fully on computer.
We decide to pivot Definition 2 around the testing phase because an exam
is often somewhat simplistically understood as that phase alone in practice.
The definition insists that the testing phase of a CB exam takes place fully on
computer, ruling out exams where questions are given orally or are written on a
board, which would only be CA exams. Clearly, a CB exam also is a CA exam
but not vice versa.
Definition 5 (Internet-assisted exam) An Internet-assisted exam is an
exam such that at least one of its phases receives some level of assistance from
the Internet.
It is logical that Definition 2 and Definition 5 have the same structure,
and similar considerations about levels of detail and abstraction apply here.
Definition 5 requires some use of the Internet in some phases. For example, an
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NCA set of all NCA exams
CA set of all CA exams
CB set of all CB exams
IA set of all IA exams
IB set of all IB exams
Table 2.2: Sets of exam types
exam that only relies on the Internet to notify the candidates of their marks
would be an IA exam. Clearly, an IA exam also is a CA exam. An IA exam
may also be, but not necessarily, a CB exam. From a set-theory standpoint, if
CB is the set of all CB exams, and IA is the set of all IA exams, it follows that
CB and IA intersect but do not coincide.
Definition 6 (Internet-based exam) An Internet-based exam is an exam
whose testing phase takes place fully over the Internet.
The formulation of Definition 6 closely maps one of Definition 4. Clearly, an
IB exam is also an IA exam; an IB exam must also be a CB exam because the
testing phase could not happen fully over the Internet without happening fully
over some computer (or similar devices such as smartphones).
Also, Definition 5 and Definition 6 purposely omit the specification of the
venue where the exam phases happen, whether locally, at the hosting institu-
tion’s premises, or remotely from the candidate’s place. For example, even an
IB exam could happen locally.
Having defined the various types of exams, the main building blocks for our
taxonomy of exams are available. Still, for each exam type, it is useful to define
the set of all exams of that type, as Table 2.2 does in a self-explaining form.
Now, the exam taxonomy can be introduced using a set-theory notation; it is in
Figure 2.1, and demonstrates the relations discussed above between the various
exam types.
Figure 2.1: A set-theory representation of exams
As anticipated above, all roles span uniformly across the entire taxonomy
because principals can either be human or not. Other objects may have to be
re-interpreted depending on the exam type. For example, a test consists of some
paper (showing questions and, later, answers) for all exams in NCA, of some
file(s) for all exams in CB, of either some paper or some file(s) for all exams in
CA \ CB.
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The taxonomy in Figure 2.1 seems to bear potential to capture more general
scenarios than just exams, and precisely those commonly addressed as collabo-
rative working environment [FJ95]. However, one would need to map the exam
phases identified above to the main phases of other scenarios, and this exceeds
the aims of the present research.
2.6.2 Exam Categories
Exams can be categorised as written exams, oral exams, or performance exams,
as outlined below. Written exams are usually preferred when the number of can-
didates is high. Oral exams are considered the most effective practice to assess
knowledge, but examiners tend to mark candidates less objectively compared
to written exams. Performance exams are impractical when many candidates
need to be evaluated.
Our taxonomy was built to reflect written exams, where testing takes place
in writing, namely with questions and answers given using various combinations
of reading and (hand- or type-)writing on paper, boards, screens, etc. However,
our taxonomy can be stretched out to reflect also oral and performance exams as
explained in the following, although this exceeds the scope of this dissertation.
Oral exams see questions and answers given orally, either synchronously by
interviews or asynchronously by some proxying. Synchronous exams can be
represented by our taxonomy, as one can easily realise by looking at Figure 2.1
with synchronous oral exams in mind. For example, a synchronous oral exam
in IB may have the testing phase via videoconferencing; even one in the set
CB \ IA makes perfect sense if recording the interview is required.
Also asynchronous oral exams comply with our taxonomy. Through the
use of techniques of speech processing or audio sampling, asynchronous oral
exams could have the testing phase via voice chats. Also in this case exams in
CB\IA are valuable, by yielding the full chat history of the testing. Envisaging
an asynchronous oral exam that is NCA requires admitting the role of proxy
to be played by a human without any computer assistance. If this is deemed
impractical or implausible, then the taxonomy could be easily pruned of the
NCA part, only for the category of asynchronous oral exams.
Performance exams differ from oral exams because the former require a can-
didate to actually perform an activity, rather than answer questions orally. The
same techniques envisaged for synchronous and asynchronous oral exams (e.g.,
videoconferencing, audio sampling, speech processing) hold for performance ex-
ams as well as the considerations that regard the exam types.
There may also be hybrid exams, for instance where testing combines written
and oral means: a lecturer could dictate the questions for candidates to answer
in writing. Although it might be less popular than written or oral exams, we
argue that this category too could be represented with our taxonomy, perhaps
with minor adjustments.
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Chapter 3
Formalising Authentication
and Privacy
Security protocols are distributed algorithms that use cryptography to achieve
some security goals. The design of such protocols can be a difficult task that
might lead to serious security flaws. The literature is full of security proto-
cols and standards that have been demonstrated to be bugged [CJS+07, HM05,
BGW01], a trend that is unlikely to change [ACC+08, AMRR14]. Formal ap-
proaches for the analysis of security protocol have been successfully used to
discover security flaws, such as the famous one in the Needham-Schroeder Pub-
lic Key protocol [Low96], and eventually helped in fixing the protocols with
some level of guarantee. Experience shows that formal approaches are impor-
tant also in the design phase of protocols as they force designers to have a deep
understanding of their models and what they aim to achieve. With this belief,
we intend to formulate a formal framework for the design and analysis of secure
exam protocols.
Similar to other systems like voting and auction, exams have not been de-
signed with security in mind. This is problematic since the recent growth in
use of exam protocols has not been followed, nor preceded, by a rigorous under-
standing and analysis of their security. Although there are recent proposals for
exam protocols with a security-by-design approach [HP10, CRHJDJ06, HPC04,
BCCKR11], no formal analyses have been conducted against these proposals.
Since almost all the existing exam protocols normally assume trusted authori-
ties, only a small set of requirements, namely the ones concerning authentication
of candidates, are usually considered in the analysis. As already noted in the
previous chapter, exam authorities can be corrupted as well as can candidates,
and exam protocols should consider a larger set of requirements including pri-
vacy.
We identify and formalise a number of authentication and privacy require-
ments for exams. Although we find them highly desirable out of personal expe-
rience and discussions with colleagues, the list of requirements is not meant to
be universal or exhaustive. It means that certain exam protocols might demand
additional requirements. However, we consider our set of requirements to be
fundamental as similar requirements can be found in other independent works
[Wei05, FOK+98], still only informally.
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From the formalisation of the requirements, we build a framework for the
authentication and privacy analysis of exam protocols. The framework can be
used to analyse different types of exams as corroborated by the three protocols
analysed in this dissertation. The requirements are specified in the applied pi-
calculus [AF01], a process calculus that extends the pi-calculus with support for
a wide variety of cryptographic properties.
Outline of the chapter. Section 3.1 examines different formal approaches
for the analysis of security protocols. Section 3.2 outlines the basic constituents
of the applied pi–calculus. Section 3.3 introduces the formal framework by spec-
ifying the formal model of an exam. Section 3.4 continues the description of
the framework by specifying authentication and privacy requirements for exam
in the applied pi–calculus. Section 3.5 contains the description and analysis of
the Huszti-Petho˝ [HP10] exam protocol, which validates the framework. More-
over, the section discusses findings and proposes fixes to the protocol. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.1 Related Work
Security protocols have been historically analysed with two different approaches,
one based on symbolic model, and one based on computational complexity the-
ory. Symbolic analysis methods for protocol analysis find their root in the sem-
inal works of Needham and Schroeder [NS78] and Dolev and Yao [DY83], which
assume perfect cryptography and an unbounded active attacker who controls
the entire network. Formal logic and automated tools based on the symbolic
model have been used successfully to analyse security protocols.
Methods based on computational complexity theory have been initially de-
veloped by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84]. Analysis in the computational model
usually see the attacker as a polynomial probabilistic Turing machine. Such
analysis is deemed to be more realistic because avoids the perfect cryptography
assumption, thus provides more insights about vulnerabilities of security proto-
cols: an attack in the symbolic model leads to an attack in the computational
model, while the contrary is not true in general. However, methods based on
computational complexity theory are harder to mechanise (only recently mech-
anised tools have been proposed to assist manual proofs [Bla08, BGZB09]) and
are not suitable for automation. Proofs are mostly manual and difficult as they
involve to reason about probability and computational complexity, hence prone
to human errors. We thus choose to develop the formal framework for exam
using the symbolic model.
The symbolic model. Several symbolic techniques have been proposed over
the last 25 years. Merritt [Mer83] proposed to describe protocols by rewrite
rules. Burrows et al. [BAN90] introduced the so-called BAN logic to reason
about authentication goals. Meadows [Mea96] proposed a language based on
events for specifying security protocols, and introduced the NRL Analyzer, a
model checker capable to verify authentication and secrecy goals. Ryan and
Schneider [RS00] pioneered the idea of using process algebras for the analysis
of security protocols. In Hoare’s CSP [Hoa78, Sch98] the protocol’s principals
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are naturally modelled as processes, while security goals are modelled as reach-
ability properties. Paulson [Pau98] introduced the Inductive Approach wherein
principals are modelled as a set of rules that inductively define an unbounded
set of traces. A protocol guarantees a security goal if the goal inductively holds
for all possible traces. Thayer [F9´9] proposed the strand spaces approach, which
features an intuitive way to reason about traces generated by the security pro-
tocols: a strand is a sequence of events in which a protocol’s principal may
participate. Abadi and Gordon [AG97] introduced the spi-calculus, a process
algebra that extends the pi-calculus [MPW92] with explicit representation of
cryptographic operations. The next chapter extensively discusses the applied
pi–calculus [AF01], which extends further the spi-calculus with a richer algebra
for the modelling of cryptographic primitives.
Security requirements. The key requirements at the heart of information
security are authentication and privacy. The notion of authentication has found
different flavours in the literature. Gollmann [Gol96] argued that capturing the
notion of authentication is difficult. Lowe [Low97] taxomised authentication in
Aliveness, Weak agreement, Non-injective agreement, and Injective agreement.
Despite the different interpretations, most of the approaches agree that authen-
tication is a correspondence property: if the principal A accepts a message from
B, then the principal B has actually sent that message to A. Typically, authen-
tication can be captured by introducing events into the specification of protocol
roles. An event explicitly signals that a principal has completed part of a run
of the protocol, and what data has used in that run. The placement of events
into the protocol, the corresponding data, and the relationship between events
can thus capture a precise authentication goal.
Several definitions for privacy have been proposed in the literature, such as
secrecy, anonymity, unlinkability, and untraceability. Dolev and Yao [DY83]
specified secrecy as a reachability property, meaning that a secret is not made
available or disclosed to the attacker. Schneider and Sidiropoulos [SS96] for-
malised anonymity in CSP as the impossibility for an attacker to link a principal
with a message. Deursen et al. [vDMR08] clarified that unlinkability considers
whether links can be established between sender and receiver principals, while
untraceability considers whether different communications can be attributed
to the same principal. Ryan and Schneider [RS01] observed that the notion
of non-interference [GM82] and bisimulation can be used to express security
requirements. On this vein, several formal definitions of privacy have been pro-
posed as equivalence-based properties. For example, observational equivalence
states that an observer cannot distinguish any difference between two processes,
although they might perform different computations on different data.
Tools. There are several tools that support the automatic analysis of authen-
tication and privacy. FDR [Ros97] is the most popular model checker for CSP,
and contributed to the discovery of Lowe’s attack. AVISPA [ABB+05] combines
four techniques to analyse reachability properties (authentication and secrecy),
and recently a security flaw in Google implementation of SAML 2.0 Single Sign-
On Authentication was discovered [ACC+08] using that tool. ProVerif [Bla01]
is an automatic protocol analyser that can prove reachability and equivalence-
based properties. The input language of ProVerif is the applied pi–calculus,
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which the tool automatically translates to Horn clauses. ProVerif proved to be
one of the automatic analysers with the best performances [CLN09]. Moreover,
it allows user-defined equational theories that extend security models with al-
gebraic properties in order to weaken the perfect cryptography assumption. We
thus choose formalise our security requirements in the applied pi–calculus and
analyse the exam protocols with ProVerif.
Comparison with voting and auctions. Few works [Wei05, FOK+98] list
a number of security requirements for exams, still only informally. Similar do-
mains such as voting and auction have seen significant advances during the last
few years, mostly in formal definitions of privacy requirements. Novel voting
protocols [RS06, Adi08] have been formally analysed for a family of privacy
requirements, such as ballot privacy, receipt-freeness, and coercion-resistance
[DLL12, BHM08, DKR09], while auction protocols have been analysed for pri-
vacy and fairness requirements [DJP10, DLL13, DJL13]. It can be observed
that only a few of security requirement definitions proposed in voting and auc-
tion domains are similar to ones we introduce for exams. For example, answers
originated by eligible candidates should be marked in an exam. In the same
way, only ballots cast by eligible voters should be recorded in a voting system,
and only offers submitted by eligible bidders should be considered in an auction.
The requirement of mark privacy for exams is intuitively close to the defini-
tions of ballot privacy for voting and losing bid privacy for auctions. However,
it can be noticed a subtle difference: voting usually requires ballot privacy also
towards the voting authority, while a mark eventually needs to be associated to
the candidate usually by means of an exam authority.
Other requirements have fundamental differences. In exams, the association
between an answer and its author should be preserved — even in the presence
of colluding candidates. Conversely, vote authorship is not a requirement for
voting, in fact unlinkability between voter and vote is a desired property. A
peculiar requirement for exam is to keep the questions secret until the testing
phase. In voting, the list of candidates is public, while in auctions the list of
goods is normally known to bidders. Moreover, exams may require anonymous
marking, namely answers are marked while ignoring their authors. This signifies
a sort of fixed-term anonymity since each mark eventually needs to be assigned
to the corresponding candidate.
3.2 The Applied pi-calculus
The applied pi-calculus [AF01] is a formal language for the description and anal-
ysis of security protocols, in which principals are represented as processes. Its
syntax consists of names, variables, and signatures. The latter are function
symbols each with an arity. Names represent channels and data, while func-
tion symbols represent cryptographic primitives such as encryption, decryption,
digital signature, and hash functions. Function symbols applied to names and
variables generate terms. Tuples of arity l, such as n1, . . . , nl, can be abbreviated
in n˜.
Equational theories. Whereas the pi-calculus supports only a fixed set of
cryptographic primitives, the applied pi-calculus allows one to model user-defined
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primitives by means of equational theories. An equational theory E describes
the equations that hold on terms built from the signature. Terms are re-
lated by an equivalence relation = induced by E. For instance, the equation
dec(enc(m, pk(k)), k) = m models an asymmetric encryption scheme. The term
m is the message, the term k is the secret key, the function pk(k) models the
corresponding public key, the term enc models the encryption function, and the
term dec models the decryption function.
Processes. The grammar for plain processes is outlined in Figure 3.1. The
null process 0 does nothing; the process P |Q is the parallel composition of
processes P and Q; the process !P behaves as an unbounded number of copies
of processes P running in parallel; the process νn.P generates a new private
name n, then behaves like P ; the conditional process ‘if m = m′ then P else
Q’ behaves like the process P if m = m′ and like the process Q otherwise. For
brevity, one can omit sub-term ‘elseQ’ whenQ is 0; the process in(u, x).P awaits
for an input from channel u, then behaves as the process P with the received
message replacing the variable x; Finally, the process out(u,m).P outputs the
message m on the channel u, then behaves as the process P . For brevity, one
can omit .P when the process P is 0.
P,Q,R ::= plain processes
0 null process
P |Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction (new)
if m = m′ then P else Q conditional
in(u, x).P message input
out(u,m).P message output
Figure 3.1: The grammar for plain processes in the applied pi-calculus
The grammar for extended processes is outlined in Figure 3.2. Extended
processes model the knowledge exposed to the attacker. An active substitution
{m/x} is a process that replaces the variable x with the term m. We refer to
a substitution also with σ. We use mσ to refer to the result of applying σ to
m. The sets fv(A), bv(A), fn(A) and bn(A) respectively include free variables,
bound variables, free names, and bound names of the process A. An extended
process is closed if all variables are bound or defined by an active substitution.
The definition of corrupted process [DKR06] is useful to model corrupted
principals who actively collaborate with the attacker.
A,B,C ::= extended processes
P plain process
A|B parallel composition
!P replication
νn.A name restriction
νx.A variable restriction
{m/x} active substitution
Figure 3.2: The grammar for extended processes in the applied pi-calculus
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The definition outlined below specifies how to transform a process into a
corrupted process. This transformation is based on two channels c1 and c2,
which the process uses to receive and send data to the attacker.
Definition 7 (Corrupted process P c1,c2) Let P be a plain process and c1, c2
be two channel names such that c1, c2 /∈ fn(P ) ∪ bn(P ). The corrupted process
P c1,c2 is defined as follows:
• 0c1,c2 =ˆ 0,
• (P |Q)c1,c2 =ˆ P c1,c2 |Qc1,c2 ,
• (!P )c1,c2 =ˆ !P c1,c2 ,
• (νn.P )c1,c2 =ˆ νn.out(c1, n).P c1,c2 if n is a name of base type, otherwise
(νn.P )c1,c2 =ˆ νn.P c1,c2 ,
• (if m = m′ then P else Q)c1,c2 =ˆ in(c2, x).if x = true then P c1,c2 else
Qc1,c2 where x is a fresh variable and true is a constant,
• (in(u, x).P )c1,c2 =ˆ in(u, x).out(c1, x).P c1,c2 if x is a variable of base type,
otherwise (in(u, x).P )c1,c2 =ˆ in(u, x).P c1,c2 ,
• (out(u,m).P )c1,c2 =ˆ in(c2, x).out(u, x).P c1,c2 , where x is a fresh variable.
A frame is an extended process built from 0 and active substitutions of the
form {m/x} by parallel composition and restriction. We use Φ and Ψ to range
over frames. The domain dom(Φ) of a frame Φ is the set of the variables for
which Φ defines a substitution. Every extended process A can be mapped to a
frame Φ(A) by replacing every plain process in A with 0. The frame Φ(A) can
be seen as a representation of the knowledge of the process to its environment.
Finally, a context is an extended process C with a hole, written C[ ]. It can
be used to represent the environment in which the process is run.
Reachability and Correspondence properties
In the applied pi–calculus, secrecy can be modelled as a reachability property.
The secrecy of a term m is preserved if an attacker, defined as an arbitrary pro-
cess, cannot construct m from any run of the protocol. The definitions of name
distinct, and reachability-based secrecy [RS11] models secrecy. A name-distinct
process signifies that the names mentioned in a term appear unambiguously in
the process either as free or bound names. The definition of reachability-based
secrecy says that an attacker cannot build a process A that can output the
secret term m.
Definition 8 (name-distinct for m˜) A plain process P is name-distinct for
a set of names m˜ if m˜ ∩ fn(P ) ∩ bn(P ) = ∅ and for each name n ∈ m˜ ∩ bn(P )
there is exactly one restriction νn in P .
Definition 9 (Reachability-based secrecy) A plain process P that is name-
distinct for the names mentioned in the term m preserve reachability-based
secrecy if there is no plain process A such that (fn(A)∪bn(A))∩bn(P ) = ∅ and
P |A can output m.
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In the applied pi–calculus, authentication can be defined using correspon-
dence assertions [WL93]. An event e is a message emitted into a special channel
that is not under the control of the attacker. Events may contain arguments
M1, ...Mn, which are never revealed to the attacker. Events do not change the
behaviour of the process in which they are located, but normally flag important
steps in the execution of the protocol. To model correspondence assertions, we
annotate processes with events such as e〈M1, ...Mn〉 and reason about the re-
lationships ( ) between events and their arguments in the form “if an event
e〈M1, ...Mn〉 has been executed, then event e′〈N1, ...Nn〉 has been previously ex-
ecuted”, which is formalised as the following definition.
Definition 10 (Correspondence assertion) A correspondence assertion is
a formula of the form e〈M1, ...Mi〉 e′〈N1, ...Nj〉.
By adding the keyword inj, it is possible to model an injective correspondence
assertion, which signifies that “if an event e〈M1, ...Mn〉 has been executed, then
a distinct earlier occurrence of event e′〈N1, ...Nn〉 has been previously executed”.
Definition 11 (Injective correspondence assertion) An injective corre-
spondence assertion is a formula of the form e〈M1, ...Mi〉 inj e′〈N1, ...Nj〉.
Authentication is only one of the requirement that can be modelled by cor-
respondence assertions. Correspondence assertions can, for instance, capture
also verifiability requirements, as we shall see in chapter 4.
Observational Equivalence
The notion of observation equivalence can capture privacy requirements. Infor-
mally, two processes are observational equivalent if an observer cannot distin-
guish the processes despite they might handle different data or perform different
computations. To formalise observational equivalence, we first introduce the no-
tion of internal reduction (→), which captures the evolution of a process with
respect to communication and conditionals as:
• out(c, x).P |in(c, x).Q→ P |Q;
• if n = n then P else Q→ P ;
• if l = m then P else Q→ Q, where L and m are not equivalent.
Definition 12 (Observational Equivalence) Observational equivalence (≈)
is the largest symmetric relation R on extended processes such that A R B
implies:
1. if A→∗ C[out(c,M).P ], then B →∗ C[out(c,M).P ];
2. if A→∗ A′, then B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′;
3. C[A] R C[B] for all context C[ ].
The relation→∗ expresses the transitive and reflexive closure of the relation
→. Definition 12 says that two processes A and B are observational equivalent
if: 1. the process A evolves to a process that can output on channel c, also B
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can evolve to a similar process; 2. if A evolves to some process A′, also B can
evolve to some process B′, and A′ and B′ are observational equivalent; 3. for
all contexts, C[A] and C[B] are observational equivalent.
The definition of observational equivalence is impracticable because requires
the quantification over contexts. To avoid quantification over contexts, we first
introduce the definitions of equality of terms and static equivalence. The latter
captures the static part of observational equivalence as it only examines the
current state of the processes. Then, we formalise labelled bisimilarity, which
captures the dynamic behaviour of the processes and is equivalent to observa-
tional equivalence. In fact, Abadi and Fournet [AF01] proved that observational
equivalence and labelled bisimilarity coincide.
Definition 13 (Equality of Terms) Two terms m and m′ are equal in the
frame Φ, written (m = m′)Φ, if Φ ≡ νn˜.σ, mσ = m′σ and {n˜} ∩ (fn(m) ∪
fn(m′)) = ∅, for some names n˜ and some substitution σ.
Definition 14 (Static Equivalence) Two closed frames Φ and Ψ are stati-
cally equivalent, written Φ ≈s Ψ, if dom(Φ) = dom(Ψ), and for all terms m and
m′ we have that (m = m′)Φ if and only if (m = m′)Ψ. Two extended processes
A and B are statically equivalent, written A ≈s B if their frames are statically
equivalent.
In fact, two processes are statically equivalent if all their previous operations
gave the same results so that they cannot be distinguished from the messages
they exchange with the environment.
Definition 15 (Labelled Bisimilarity) Labelled bisimilarity (≈l) is the
largest symmetric relation R on extended processes, such that A R B implies:
1. A ≈s B
2. if A→∗ A′, then B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′
3. if A
α→ A′, fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅, then B →∗ α→→∗ B′
and A′RB′ for some B′.
The relation A→α A′ defines a labelled semantics that avoids the quantifi-
cation over the contexts. It signifies that A can evolve to A′ using a labelled
transition. This happens when A performs an input or an output due to some
interaction with the environment, and α is the label standing for the involved
action.
3.3 Modelling Exams
The roles of an exam can be modelled as processes in the applied pi-calculus.
These processes communicate via public or private channels, and can create
fresh random values, which can serve as key or nonce, for example. Processes
can perform tests and cryptographic operations, which are functions on terms
with respect to an equational theory describing some algebraic properties.
The threat model of an exam protocol consists of a Dolev-Yao attacker who
has full control of the network, namely of the public channels. The attacker
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can also inject messages of his choice into the public channels, and exploit the
algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives due to an equational theory.
Moreover, the ability of the attacker can be extended with corrupted principals
according to Definition 7. However, the attacker has no control of private chan-
nels, which are normally used to model out-of-band communications between
processes. The attacker cannot even know if any communication happens over
private channels. Thus, he can eavesdrop, drop, substitute, duplicate, and delay
messages that principals send one another over public channels.
Having seen the basic constituents of the applied pi–calculus, we can provide
the definition of exam protocol according the calculus.
Definition 16 (Exam protocol) An exam protocol is a tuple (C,E,Q,K,
A1, . . . , Al, n˜p), where C is the process executed by the candidates, E is the
process executed by the examiners, Q is the process executed by the question
committee, K is the process executed by the collector, A1, . . . , Al are the pro-
cesses executed by the remaining authorities, and n˜p is the set of private channel
names.
Note that we make explicit the examiner E, the question committee Q,
and the collector K among the authority processes although this is not strictly
necessary. However, it turns out to be convenient for the formalisation of our
security requirements.
All the principals playing the candidate role execute the same process C.
However, each principal is instantiated with different variable values, e.g., keys,
identities, and answers. Similarly, each principal playing any one of the au-
thority role (e.g., examiner, question committee, collector, etc.) executes the
respective processes with different values.
Definition 17 (Exam instance) An exam instance of an exam protocol given
by the tuple (C,A1, . . . , Al, n˜) is a closed process
EP = νn˜.(Cσid1σa1 | . . . | Cσidjσaj | Eσid′1σm1 | . . . | Eσid′kσmk | Qσq| Kσtest |
A1| . . . |Al), where
• n˜ is the set of all restricted names, including the private channels;
• Cσidiσai ’s are the processes run by the candidates, where the substitutions
σidi and σai specify the identity and the answers associated with the i
th
candidate;
• Eσid′iσmi ’s are the processes run by the examiner authorities, where the
substitution σid′i and σmi specify the identity and the mark associated with
the ith examiner;
• Qσq is the process run by the question committee authority, where the
substitution σq specifies the exam questions;
• Kσtest is the process run by the collector authority, where the substitution
σtest associates a test with an examiner for marking;
• Ai’s are the processes run by the remaining exam authorities.
26 CHAPTER 3. FORMALISING AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVACY
Definitions 16 and 17 capture the levels of detail and abstraction advocated
in chapter 2. The instance of an exam protocol can be customised by making
processes Ai explicit. For example, the exam instance can be expanded with
processes that model a mixnet for the generation of test pseudonyms (see chapter
5), or a bulletin board that publishes the results of an exam (see chapter 6).
As we shall see later, Definition 17 allows us to specify a considerable number
of security requirements and is suitable for different types of exam protocols.
Moreover, it equally supports either machine or human examiners as principals
that mark answers.
3.4 Security Requirements
We identify and formalise a set of fundamental authentication and privacy re-
quirements in the applied pi-calculus. This set is not meant to be comprehensive,
but it includes the basic security requirements that an exam protocol is nor-
mally expected to guarantee as corroborated in the literature [Wei05, BGL13c,
FOK+98]. However, our set can be extended with additional security require-
ments.
We introduce five authentication and five privacy requirements. The authen-
tication requirements capture the associations between the candidate’s identity,
the answer, and the mark being preserved through all the exam phases. When
authentication holds there is no loss, no injection, and in general no manip-
ulation of the exam tests from preparation to notification. The five privacy
requirements aim to capture secrecy of marks, and anonymity of tests and ex-
aminers.
3.4.1 Authentication
To model authentication requirements as correspondence properties, it is neces-
sary to define a number of relevant events. Events normally need to agree with
some arguments to capture authentication. Thus, we introduce the terms that
serve as arguments in our events as follows.
• id c refers to the identity of the candidate;
• ques denotes the question(s) of the test;
• ans denotes the answer of a test;
• mark denotes the mark assigned to the test;
• id e refers to the identity of the examiner;
• id test refers to the identifier of the test.
The terms outlined above intuitively relates to the substitutions introduced in
Definition 17. Their definitions are abstract enough to capture different exams.
For example, the term id test may coincide with the identity of the candidate
if the exam requires no blind marking, or may be a pseudonym to if the exam
requires anonymous marking.
We define a list of six events that allow to specify five fundamental authen-
tication requirements for exams. We stress that the list can be further extended
to accommodate any additional requirements.
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• registered〈id c〉 means that the authority considers the candidate id c
registered for the exam. The event is inserted into the process of authority
at the location where the registration of the candidate id c concludes.
• submitted〈id c, ques, ans, id test〉 means that the candidate id c consid-
ers the test id test , which consists of question ques and answer ans, sub-
mitted for the exam. The event is inserted into the process of the candidate
at the location where the test is sent to the collector.
• collected〈id c, ques, ans, id test〉 means that the collector accepts the
test id test , which originates from the candidate id c. The event is in-
serted into the process of the collector at the location where the test is
considered as accepted.
• distributed〈id c, ques, ans, id test , id e〉 means that the collector con-
siders the test id test , which originates from the candidate id c, associ-
ated with the examiner id e for marking. The event is inserted into the
process of the collector at the location where the test is distributed to the
examiner.
• marked〈ques, ans,mark , id test , id e〉 means that the examiner id e con-
siders the test id test , which consists of question ques and answer ans,
evaluated with mark . The event is inserted into the process of the exam-
iner at the location where the test is marked.
• notified〈id c,mark〉: means that the candidate id c accepts the mark
mark . The event is inserted into the process of the candidate at the
location where the mark is considered as accepted.
These events mark important steps of an exam protocol, and some can be as-
sociated with the phases of an exam. The event registered normally concludes
the preparation phase, while collected concludes the testing phase. The event
distributed begins the marking phase, which the event marking concludes. Fi-
nally, the event notified concludes the notification phase and the exam. Note
that these events implicitly refer to the same exam session. However, one might
want to parameterise all the events with a common term in order to distinguish
among exam sessions.
The first authentication requirement we consider is Candidate Authorisation,
which concerns preparation and testing. Informally, we want to capture the re-
quirement that only registered candidates can take the exam. More specifically,
the requirement says that if a candidate submits her test, then the candidate
was correctly registered for the exam. This can be formalised as:
Definition 18 (Candidate Authorisation) An exam protocol ensures Can-
didate Authorisation if for every exam process EP
submitted〈id c, ques, ans, id test〉  injregistered〈id c〉
on every execution trace.
This requirement is modelled as injective correspondence assertion because the
exam should consider only one submission per registered candidate.
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The second authentication requirement that we advance is Answer Authen-
ticity, which concerns testing. This requirement states that the collector should
consider only answers that candidates actually submitted, and that the con-
tents of each collected test are not modified after submission. It says that a
test must be bound to a candidate identity. A way to enforce this would be to
only give a test to a candidate after she inserts in the test the same details that
authenticated her. This candidate becomes the test assignee. With exams that
are not computer assisted, for example, an authority can check that the candi-
date writes down the right details on the test, or the authority can write them
down personally. The requirement implies that two candidates will be unable to
get tested on each other’s questions, something that could be desirable if they
found their respective questions too difficult. Moreover, it should be consid-
ered only one test from each candidate, namely every time the collector process
emits collected, there is a distinct earlier occurrence of the event submitted
that satisfies the relationship between their arguments. This is enforced by the
injective formula:
Definition 19 (Answer Authenticity) An exam protocol ensures Answer
Authenticity if for every exam process EP
collected〈id c, ques, ans, id test〉  injsubmitted〈id c, ques, ans, id test〉
on every execution trace.
The third requirement is Test Origin Authentication and concerns prepara-
tion and testing. Informally, it says that the collector should accept only tests
that originate from registered candidates. This requirement should be modelled
as an injective agreement to enforce that only one test from each registered
candidate is actually collected. This can be formalised as:
Definition 20 (Test Origin Authentication) An exam protocol ensures
Test Origin Authentication if for every exam process EP
collected〈id c, ques, ans, id test〉  injregistered〈id c〉
on every execution trace.
The forth authentication requirement is Test Authenticity and concerns test-
ing and marking. Since the collector distributes the tests possibly among dif-
ferent examiners, Test Authenticity insists that the examiner only marks the
tests intended for him. Moreover, the contents of each test should not be mod-
ified until after the tests are marked by the examiner. This requirement can be
modelled as injective agreement:
Definition 21 (Test Authenticity) An exam protocol ensures Test Authen-
ticity if for every exam process EP
marked〈ques, ans,mark , id test , id e〉  
injcollected〈id c, ques, ans, id test〉 ∪
injdistributed〈id c, ques, ans, id test , id e〉
on every execution trace.
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Figure 3.3: A general view of authentication requirements for exams
The last requirement is Mark Authenticity, which concerns marking and
notification. It prescribes that the candidate should receive the mark assigned
to her test by the examiner. Moreover, the examiner who evaluated the test
should be the one chosen by the collector. In other words, if the candidate
accepts the mark, then the examiner, which was appointed by the collector to
evaluate the candidate’s test, assigned that mark. This can be formalised as:
Definition 22 (Mark Authenticity) An exam protocol ensures Mark Au-
thenticity if for every exam process EP
notified〈id c,mark〉  
injdistributed〈id c, ques, ans, id test , id e〉 ∪
injmarked〈ques, ans,mark , id test , id e〉
on every execution trace.
Remark. It can be observed that the combination of these requirements pro-
duce novel requirements. If an exam protocol guarantees Candidate Authori-
sation and Answer Authenticity, then the protocol also guarantees Test Origin
Authentication, namely the tests submitted by registered candidates are actu-
ally collected. Conversely, a protocol that guarantees Test Origin Authentica-
tion may guarantee neither Candidate Authorisation nor Answer Authenticity.
If we consider a requirement in a certain phase of the exam, we cannot infer
anything about other phases. For example, Mark Authenticity signifies that
the candidate is notified with the mark delivered by the examiner on the test
provided by the collector. However, the test provided by the collector may con-
tain a different answer with respect to the answer the candidate submitted at
testing. Only if the exam protocol also guarantees Answer Authenticity and
Test Authenticity, then the contents of the tests are identical. Moreover, Mark
Authenticity does not signify that a mark is computed correctly.
In summary, an exam protocol that ensures all the requirements outlined
above preserves the association between candidate identity, mark, and test,
including question and answer, through all the phases of the exam. The re-
lationships between authentication requirements with respect to exam run and
principals are outlined in Figure 3.3. By looking at this figure, it can be seen that
the stated requirements produce an ordered sequence of events. It can be noted
that there is no requirement that relates directly the events collected and
distributed. We have not specified the requirement “the collector distributes
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the accepted tests”. Such requirement is usually enforced by the sequential ex-
ecution of the collector process, since both events belong to the same process.
Moreover, it always holds if the common arguments of the two events are de-
rived from the same source, for example, if the common arguments are build
from the same message input. In general, this and other requirements get more
interesting if events reflect tasks that are executed by different roles, according
to the levels of detail and abstraction of the exam protocol. Hence, an exam
protocol that specifies a huge number of tasks, might allow to express more
events thus novel authentication requirements.
3.4.2 Privacy
To model privacy requirements as equivalence properties, we use the definition
of labelled bisimilarity (≈l), which was defined in Section 3.2.
We introduce two notations to make clear the requirements. First, we de-
note with “EPI [ ]” the context of the process EP pruned of identities that
appear in the set I. For example, the process νn˜.( | | Cσid3σa3 | . . . |Cσidjσaj |
Eσid′1σm1 | . . . |Eσid′kσmk |Qσq|Kσdist |A1| . . . |Al) can be concisely written as
EP{id1,id2}[ ]. Such compact notation is useful to specify and focus exactly
on the processes concerned by the requirement. For example, we can write
EP{id1,id2}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 ] to reason about candidates id1 and id2 without
repeating the entire exam instance.
Second, we denote with “EP |e” the process EP pruned of the code that
follows the event e. For example, the process EP |marked considers an exam
instance that terminates at marking, namely after the event marked is emitted.
This notation is useful to capture fixed-term requirements such as anonymous
marking, which is intended to hold until after the marking, but is eventually
falsified at notification when the mark is assigned to the candidate.
The first privacy requirement we consider is Question Indistinguishability.
This requirement says that the questions are not revealed until the testing phase
begins. Thus, it is a fixed-term requirement that sees the exam process ending
with the preparation phase.
Definition 23 (Question Indistinguishability) An exam protocol ensures
Question Indistinguishability if for any exam process EP and any questions
q1 and q2
EP[Qσq1 ]|registered ≈l EP[Qσq2 ]|registered
Question Indistinguishability states that two processes with different ques-
tions have to be observationally equivalent until after the preparation phase.
Note that this requirement is more stringent than reachability-based secrecy
because the attacker should not be able to distinguish whether the exam will
use q1 or q2 despite he knows both the questions in advance. For instance, the
attacker cannot say whether the questions of the current exam are similar to the
questions of the previous exam, which are on attacker’s knowledge. The analysis
of Question Indistinguishability requires the question committee to be honest
otherwise they could reveal the questions to the attacker making the require-
ment useless. However, it is particularly interesting to consider a scenario with
other corrupted roles. For example, candidates might be interested to know
the questions in advance. Such scenario can be explicitly captured by replacing
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honest candidates with corrupted ones using the definition of corrupted process,
which is defined in Section 3.2. Assuming candidate id1 being corrupted, we
obtain
EP{id1}[(Cσid1σa1)
c1,c2 |Qσq1 ]|registered ≈l
EP{id1}[(Cσid1σa1)
c1,c2 |Qσq2 ]|registered
The next requirement is Anonymous Marking, which covers preparation,
testing, and marking. This requirement signifies that the examiner marks a test
while ignoring its author, namely an anonymous test. It is a clear contribution to
the fairness of the marking. As it stands, the requirement insists on anonymity
only until the point that the examiner affixes a mark. Anonymous Marking can
be specified as two exam instances in which the processes of two candidates who
swap their answers cannot be distinguished until after the end of the marking
phase.
Definition 24 (Anonymous Marking) An exam protocol ensures Anony-
mous Marking if any exam process EP , any two candidates id1 and id2, and
any two answers a1 and a2
EP{id1,id2}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 ]|marked ≈l EP{id1,id2}[Cσid1σa2 |Cσid2σa1 ]|marked
In other words, Anonymous Marking says that the process where candidate
id1 submits a1 and candidate id2 submits a2 is indistinguishable to the process
where candidate id1 submits a2 and candidate id2 submits a1. It prevents the
attacker to obtain the identity of the candidate who submits a certain answer
before the marking ends. Candidate
Similarly to Question Indistinguishability, it is interesting to consider cor-
rupted principals in the analysis of Anonymous Marking, which means that
nobody knows who submitted a test while this is being marked, except the of-
ficial author of the test. An implication is that test anonymity during marking
will even resist collusion of the examiner with other authorities and candidates.
Again, the definition of corrupted process can model corrupted examiners and
authorities. The definition can be also used to specify corrupted candidates,
however the candidates id1 and id2 who submit two different answers have to
be honest. This avoids the corner case in which all candidates but one reveal
their answers to the attacker, who can easily associate the remaining answer
with the honest candidate and thus trivially violate the requirement.
We now consider the requirement of Anonymous Examiner, which concerns
all the phases of an exam. In fact, an exam could require examiner anonymity
forever to prevent bribing or coercion. Thus, the requirement of Anonymous
Examiner says that no candidate knows which examiner marked their tests.
This can be formalised as:
Definition 25 (Anonymous Examiner) An exam protocol ensures Anony-
mous Examiner if for any exam process EP , any two candidates id1 and id2,
any two examiners id ′1 and id
′
2, any two marks m1 and m2, and two associations
test1 and test2
EP{id1,id2,id′1,id′2} [Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |Eσid′1σm1 |Eσid′2σm2 |Kσtest1 ] ≈l
EP{id1,id2,id′1,id′2} [C σid1 σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |Eσid′1σm2 |Eσid′2σm1 |Kσtest2 ]
where
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– σtest1 associates the test of candidate id1 to examiner id
′
1 and the test of
candidate id2 to examiner id
′
2;
– σtest2 associates the test of candidate id1 to examiner id
′
2 and the test of
candidate id2 to examiner id
′
1.
Thus, Anonymous Examiner states that a process in which the examiner id ′1
evaluates the test of candidate id1 while the examiner id
′
2 evaluates the test
of candidate id2 is indistinguishable to the process in which the examiner id
′
1
evaluates the test of candidate id2 while the examiner id
′
2 evaluates the test
of candidate id1. Note that the two marks σm1 and σm2 are swapped on ex-
aminer processes to ensure that each test is evaluated with the same mark in
both cases. In the field of peer review systems, this requirement is known as
blind review. The requirement of double-bind review instead refers to a peer re-
view system that ensure both Anonymous Examiner and Anonymous Marking,
namely anonymity is provided to both authors and examiners. However, peer re-
view systems usually assume that the collector knows which examiner evaluates
a test, while other systems may not. To ensure a stronger version of Anonymous
Marking it is possible to model corrupted collectors, candidates, and any other
principal, provided that examiners id′1 and id
′
2 are honest. This would avoid
the corner case in which an examiner reveals the mark to the attacker, a case
that would trivially violate the requirement.
The requirement of Mark Privacy concerns all phases of an exam. It states
that the mark ultimately attributed to a candidate is treated as valuable per-
sonal information of the candidates. More specifically, no one learns the marks,
besides the examiner, the concerned candidate, and the authority responsible
for the notification. This means that the marks cannot be public.
Definition 26 (Mark Privacy) An exam protocol ensures Mark Privacy if
for any exam process EP and any two marks m1 and m2
EP{id′}[Eσid′σm1 ] ≈l EP{id′}[E σid′σm2 ].
The definition of Mark Privacy means that a process in which the examiner
id′ assigns the mark m1 to an answer cannot be distinguished from a process
in which the same examiner assigns a different mark m2 to the same answer.
This is a strict requirement because an exam protocol that guarantees Mark
Privacy cannot publicly disclose the marks even if these cannot be associated
with the corresponding candidates. In fact, the publication of the marks allows
the attacker to distinguish the processes. Again, it can be assumed that some
candidates and examiners are corrupted, namely collaborate with the attacker
to find out the marks of other candidates. However, the examiner who assigns
the different marks, the two candidates who submit the tests, and the authority
in charge of the notification of the marks should be honest. Otherwise, any of
these could violate the requirement by revealing the mark to the attacker.
Since Mark Privacy can be a requirement too strong to satisfy, we introduce
a variant called Mark Anonymity. This requirement states that no one learns
the association between a mark and the corresponding candidate. Intuitively,
an exam protocol that publishes the list of all marks might still ensure Mark
Anonymity, but not Mark Privacy. This is a common privacy requirement in
scenarios like public competitions, in which marks are published and associated
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with a list of pseudonyms for transparency. Mark Anonymity can be defined as
follows:
Definition 27 (Mark Anonymity) An exam protocol ensures Mark Anony-
mity if for any exam process EP , any two candidates id1, id2, any examiners
id′, any two answers a1, a2, two substitutions σma and σmb and an association
test
EP{id1,id2,id′}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |Eσid′σma |Kσtest] ≈l
EP{id1,id2,id′}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |Eσid′σmb |Kσtest]
where
– σtest associates the tests of both candidates id1 and id2 to the examiner
id ′;
– σma attributes the mark m1 to the answer a1 and the mark m2 to the
answer a2;
– σmb attributes the mark m2 to the answer a1 and the mark m1 to the
answer a2.
In other words, a process in which an examiner evaluates two answers a1
and a2 respectively with m1 and m2 is indistinguishable for the attacker with
a process in which the examiner evaluates the same answers but with swapped
marks, namely the examiner marks a1 and a2 respectively with m2 and m1. In
doing so, the authority can make the list of marks public assuming the attacker
cannot associate the marks to the candidates. The analysis of Mark Anonymity
requires the two concerned candidates, the examiner, and the notifier authority
to be honest. Otherwise, they can simply reveal the answer and the associated
mark to allow the attacker to distinguish the two case processes. Other princi-
pals can be considered corrupted. It can be noted that an exam protocol that
guarantees Mark Privacy also guarantees Mark Anonymity. In fact, σma and
σmb defined in Mark Anonymity are special instances of σm1 and σm2 defined
in Mark Privacy.
3.5 The Huszti-Petho˝ Protocol
We validate our formal framework with the analysis of the Huszti-Petho˝ [HP10]
exam protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first exam protocol
proposed in the literature that aims to guarantee authentication and privacy
requirements in presence of corrupted candidates and exam authorities.
Huszti and Petho˝ informally analyse their protocol with respect to six secu-
rity requirements. They state the requirements informally, and each requirement
contains sub requirements. For example, the requirement of Secrecy implicitly
specifies two sub requirements as it states that “exam questions are kept secret”
and “only the corresponding student should know his mark”. Table 3.1 clarifies
the sub requirements and shows how to map them to the formal requirements
proposed in this dissertation. By looking at the table, it can be seen that com-
binations of our formal requirements capture any informal requirement defined
by Huszti and Petho˝. For example, Huszti and Petho˝’s definition of Robustness,
which says that questions can not be altered after submission, is captured by the
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Huszti and Petho˝
This dissertation
Requirement Description
Authenticity
Only eligible students tests should be
considered
Candidate Authorisation
Answer Authenticity
It should be verified whether the exam
grade is proposed by a teacher
Mark Authenticity
Anonymity
Teachers do not know which paper be-
longing to which student he is correcting
Anonymous Marking
Students do not know who corrects their
papers
Anonymous Examiner
Secrecy
Exam questions are kept secret
Question Indistinguishability
Only the corresponding student should
know his mark
Mark Anonymity
Robustness
Exam questions can not be altered after
submission
Answer Authenticity
Test Authenticity
Mark Authenticity
Correctness
Students are not allowed to take the
same exam more than once
Answer Authenticity
Receipt
Students are able to make sure of the
successful submission
Answer Authenticity
Test Authenticity
Mark Authenticity
Table 3.1: Comparison of Huszti and Petho˝’s requirements with ones proposed
in this dissertation.
combination of Answer Authenticity, Test Authenticity, and Mark Authentic-
ity. We anticipate that the results of our analysis show the protocol guarantees
only one of our formal requirements, but none of the six envisaged by Huszti
and Petho˝. The Huszti-Petho˝ exam protocol uses four cryptographic build-
ing blocks, namely ElGamal encryption [Elg85], zero-knowledge proof [GMR85],
reusable anonymous return channel [GJ03], and a timed-release service based
on Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79].
ElGamal encryption
This cryptographic primitive for public-key cryptography consists of three al-
gorithms of key generation, encryption, and decryption. The key generation
algorithm outputs the public key PK = (G, q, g, h) and the secret key SK = s;
G is a cyclic group of order q with generator g; s is a random value in Z∗q ; and
h = gs. The encryption algorithm takes in a message m and a random value
k ∈ Z∗q , and outputs the ciphertext (gk,m · hk), which is denoted with {m}PK .
The decryption algorithm takes as input the ciphertext {m}PK and the secret
key SK, and outputs the message m. In fact, h
k
gks
= g
sk
gks
= m. The ElGamal en-
cryption primitive is semantically secure assuming the decisional DiffieHellman
problem is intractable.
Zero-knowledge proof
This cryptographic scheme allows a prover to convince a verifier that a given
statement is true without revealing any extra information except the correct-
ness of the statement. A zero-knowledge scheme must guarantee completeness,
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soundness, and zero knowledge. Completeness means that if the statement is
true, then the verifier always accepts the statement. Soundness means that
if the statement is false, then the verifier always rejects the statement. Zero
knowledge means that the verifier cannot get any information apart from the
fact that the statement is indeed true.
Zero-knowledge schemes can be categorised in non-interactive and interac-
tive. Interactive zero-knowledge proofs require prover and verifier to exchange
at least two messages. The input of the prover is usually a challenge message
sent by the verifier. In so doing, the proof is only valid for that challenge, and
cannot replayed by the prover to someone else.
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof schemes contain only the message sent
by a prover to the verifier. They are simpler and more efficient than interactive
schemes, hence more suitable for the inclusion in the design of cryptographic
protocols. In the remainder, we only consider non-interactive schemes as zero-
knowledge proof.
Reusable anonymous return channel
This cryptographic scheme implements anonymous two-way conversations be-
tween a sender and a receiver by means of a mixer. The mixer is implemented by
a re-encryption mix network that consists of a chain of mix servers. The servers
take in messages from multiple senders, randomly shuffle them, and send them
to the receivers. One goal of reusable anonymous return channel is to ensure
the anonymity of the sender who send a message via the mixer. Another goal
is to allow the receiver to reply to the sender still guaranteeing the anonymity
of the sender. Note that reusable anonymous return channel scheme aims to
ensure anonymity, but not secrecy of the messages [GJ03]. As we shall see, the
Huszti-Petho˝ protocol resorts on this primitive for both message secrecy and
sender anonymity.
Reusable anonymous return channel consists of five algorithms, namely setup,
submission of messages, delivery of messages, submission of reply, and delivery
of reply. The scheme assumes a primitive for digital signature, but the authors
do not specify which one. However, digital signature primitives usually employ
public-key cryptography and consist of three algorithms of key generation, sign-
ing, and verification. Key generation outputs the secret signing key SSK and
verification public key SPK. The signing algorithm takes in a message m and
the signing key SSK, and outputs the signature SignSSK(m). The verification
algorithm takes as input the signature SignSSK(m) and the verification public
key SPK, and returns true if the signature is correct, namely the message m
was actually signed with the signing key SSK.
The setup algorithm consists of mix servers jointly generating an ElGamal
key pair (SKM , PKM ), and signature keys (SSKM , SPKM ). Sender and re-
ceiver also generate respectively the ElGamal pairs (PKA, SKA) and (PKB ,
SKB). The identities of sender and receiver are denoted respectively with the
tags IDA and IDB . For example, email addresses can serve as identity tag.
The algorithm of the submission of messages is run by the sender A. It
allows A to send an anonymous message m to the receiver with tag IDB . The
sender generates the triplet
({IDA,PKA}PKM , {m}PKM , {IDB , PKB}PKM )
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1. A→M : {IDA,PKA}PKM , {m}PKM , {IDB , PKB}PKM
2. M→B : SignSSKM ({IDA,PKA}PKM ), {m}PKB
3. B→M : {IDB ,PKB}PKM , {m ′}PKM ,SignSSKM ({IDA,PKA}PKM )
Figure 3.4: Reusable anonymous return channel in the Alice-Bob notation
and two proofs of knowledge of {IDA,PKA} and of {IDB ,PKB}. Proofs of
knowledge are similar to zero-knowledge schemes but guarantee only complete-
ness and soundness. In this case, they aim to avoid the attacker to decrypt the
triplets by using the mixer as an oracle. The sender outputs the triplet and the
proofs.
The algorithm of delivery of messages is run by the mixer. It takes as input
a batch of triplets and proofs sent from different senders. The mixer checks the
proofs and then randomly shuffles the batch of triplets. Each triplet is extended
with a checksum to ensure they are not separated during the shuffle. The
message m is then re-encrypted with PKB , resulting in the ciphertext {m}PKB .
The mixer signs the first element of the triplet in input {IDA,PKA}PKM , and
outputs the pair
(SignSSKM ({IDA,PKA}PKM ), {m}PKB ).
The receiver can reply an anonymous message with a new message m′
using the algorithm for submission of reply. The receiver takes in the pair
(SignSSKM ({IDA,PKA}PKM ), {m}PKB ), encrypts the message m′ with the pub-
lic key of the mixnet PKM resulting in m
′
PKM , and outputs the triplet
({IDB ,PKB}PKM , {m ′}PKM ,SignSSKM ({IDA,PKA}PKM ))
and the proof of knowledge of {IDB ,PKB}.
The algorithm of delivery of reply is similar to one of delivery of mes-
sages. The only difference is that the input consists of triplet ({IDB ,PKB}PKM ,
m ′PKM ,SignSSKM ({IDA,PKA}PKM )) and proof of knowledge of {IDB ,PKB},
thus the mixer verifies only one proof of knowledge.
A succinct description of reusable anonymous return channel in the Alice-
Bob notation is provided in Figure 3.4.
Timed-release service
This service is based on threshold Shamir’s secret sharing, a cryptographic
primitive that ensures fixed-term secrecy. A secret is shared among n servers
and cannot be reconstructed unless some servers collaborate to reveal the se-
cret. This service assumes the existence of a trusted third party, which in the
Huszti-Petho˝ protocol is known as registry. The registry knows the secret, boot-
straps the servers, and serves as authority to provide absolute time reference
to the servers. The Huszti-Petho˝ protocol uses the timed-release service to
deanonymise the candidate’s pseudonym for notification. We do not detail this
service further because in our analysis we assume the servers to be trusted.
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3.5.1 Description
The Huszti-Petho˝ protocol specifies six roles: exam authority (EA), registry,
timed-release service (NET), question committee (COM), candidate (C), exam-
iner (E). The exam authority manages the entire exam process. Specifically, it
generates the pseudonyms to anonymise candidates’ tests and examiner’s identi-
ties, collects the tests, distributes the tests to examiners, and notifies the marks
to the candidates. The registry generates the necessary cryptographic keys for
the other roles and bootstraps the timed-release service. The NET consists of
the servers that implement the timed-release service, and contributes to generate
and revoke the candidate pseudonyms using threshold Shamir’s secret sharing.
The question committee generates the questions for the exam, the candidate
takes the exam, and the examiner marks the tests.
The protocol assumes that no candidate reveals their private keys to other
candidates, and that invigilators supervise candidates during the testing phase.
All communications take place via reusable anonymous return channels.
The protocol originally sees three stages: registration, exam, and grading. It
can be observed that the exam stage begins with the exam authority checking
the candidate’s eligibility, and concludes with the examiner sending the mark
to the exam authority. Thus, to match this structure with our phases, we
map the registration stage to preparation, the grading stage to notification,
and we divide the exam stage in testing and marking. We provide a high-level
description of the protocol, which is supported by a more detailed specification
in the Alice-Bob notation in Figure 3.5.
Preparation
This phase concerns the registration of both candidate and examiner, and the
generation of the pseudonyms. The exam authority publishes the public pa-
rameters to identify a new exam (step 1). The question committee then signs
and sends the questions, which are encrypted with the public key of the mixer
implementing the reusable anonymous return channel (step 2). The mixer will
publish the questions only at time of testing (time1 ).
The registration of the examiner consists of creating a pseudonym, which is
jointly generated by the exam authority and the examiner. The examiner verifies
the correctness of the pseudonym by using a zero-knowledge proof (ZKPeq) on
the equality of the discrete logarithms with the exam authority (step 6). To enrol
for an exam, the examiner sends pseudonym and subject to the exam authority
(step 9), and proves the knowledge of his secret key (ZKPsec(SKE )). Note that
the exam authority knows that the examiner is eligible for the exam, but cannot
learn the examiner identity since the communication takes place via reusable
anonymous return channel. Thus, at the end of examiner registration, the exam
authority stores the encrypted identity of the examiner ({IDE ,PKE}PKM ) (step
10), which the exam authority will use to send the answer to the anonymous
examiner at marking.
The registration of a candidate slightly differs from the registration of an
examiner since the anonymity of the candidate eventually will be broken at
notification, while the anonymity of examiner may last forever. The pseudonym
of the candidate is jointly calculated by the exam authority, the candidate, and
also the NET. The NET stores the secret values used for the generation of the
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Preparation
1. EA publishes g and h = gs
2. COM → EA : {SignSSKCOM (question, time1)}PKM
3. EA checks E eligibility, and calculates q˜ = PKsE //Examiner Registration
4. EA→ E : q˜, gE
5. E calculates q′ = (q˜)α, t = (gE)α, and q = tSKE
6. EA↔ E : ZKPeq((q, q′), (g, h)) //E pseudonym is (t, q, q′)
7. E → EA : t, q, q′, subject
8. EA checks qs = q′
9. E ↔ EA : ZKP sec(SKE)
10. EA stores ZKP data plus {IDE ,PKE}PKM and subject
11. EA checks C eligibility, and calculates p˜ = (PKC)
s //Candidate Registration
12. EA→ NET : p˜, gC
13. NET calculates p′ = (p˜)Γ, and r = (gC)Γ, and stores time of notification, p˜,
and gC .
14. NET → C : r, p′
15. C calculates p = rSKC
16. EA↔ C : ZKPeq((p, p′), (g, h)) //C pseudonym is (r, p, p′)
Testing
17. C → EA : r, p, p′, subject
18. EA checks ps = p′
19. C ↔ EA : ZKP sec(SKC)
20. EA→ C : SignSSKCOM (question), time1
21. C → EA : r, p, {answer}PKM , time2
22. EA→ C : Hash(r, p, p′, subject, transC , question, time1, time2, {answer}PKM )
Marking
23. EA→ E : {answer}PKM
24. E → EA : mark ,Hash(mark , answer), [Hash(mark , answer)]SKE , verzkp
where verzkp = ZKPeq(Hash(mark , answer), [Hash(mark , answer)]
SKE ), t, q
Notification
26. EA→ NET : p′ // Note that r = (gC)Γ, p = (PKC)Γ, p′ = (gC)Γs
27. NET calculates p′ = (p˜)Γ
28. NET → EA : {p′, p˜}PKEA
29. EA stores mark ,Hash(mark , answer), [Hash(mark , answer)]SKE , verzkp
Figure 3.5: The Huszti-Petho˝ e-exam protocol in the Alice-Bob notation
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candidate pseudonym (step 13), and will use the secret values at notification to
allow the exam authority to associate the candidate with the mark. Similarly
to the registration of examiner, the candidate can verify the correctness of the
pseudonym using a zero-knowledge proof (ZKPeq) of the equality of the discrete
logarithms with the exam authority being the prover (step 16).
Testing
The candidate sends the pseudonym to the exam authority (step 17) and proves
the knowledge of the private key (ZKPsec(SKC )) (step 19). We stress that the
protocol assumes the candidate does not share with other principals the private
key. The exam authority checks whether the pseudonym is allowed for the exam
(step 18), and then sends the questions signed by the question committee (step
20). The candidate then sends the answer (step 21) encrypted with the public
key of the mixer ({answer}PKM ). At marking, the mixer will re-encrypt the
answer with the public key of the examiner. Thus, the exam authority cannot
learn the answer submitted by the candidate. Testing concludes with the exam
authority sending to the candidate a receipt (step 22), which consists of the hash
of all parameters seen by the exam authority during testing, the transcription of
the zero-knowledge proof (transC ), and the time when the answer was submitted
(time2 ).
Marking
We recall that at preparation the exam authority stored the encrypted identities
of the examiners, thus it can choose an examiner who is eligible for the exam
to forwards the candidate’s answer. The examiner assigns the answer with a
mark (step 23), and sends it to the exam authority with a zero-knowledge proof
(verzkp), which proves the examiner actually marked the answer (step 24).
Notification
When all the answers are marked, the NET de-anonymises the pseudonyms
associated to the answers, so the exam authority can link back the pseudonym
with the corresponding candidate (steps 27-28). Finally, the exam authority
stores the marks and the zero-knowledge proof provided at marking by the
examiner (step 29).
3.5.2 Formal Analysis of Reusable Anonymous Return
Channel
Prior to verify the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol, we provide a formal analysis of reusa-
ble anonymous return channel. In particular, we verify whether the scheme
ensures message secrecy and anonymity of sender and receiver as it is assumed
in the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol.
Model choices
The equational theory in Table 3.2 models the cryptographic primitives for
reusable anonymous return channel. It includes models for ElGamal public-key
encryption, digital signatures, and zero-knowledge proof. ElGamal encryption
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consists of two functions encryption and decryption. A message encrypted with
a public key can only be decrypted using the corresponding secret key. Digital
signature consists of two equations: the function getmess checks integrity as it
returns a message embedded into a signature; the function checksign checks also
for authenticity as it returns the message only if the function is provided with
the correct verification key. The theory for zero-knowledge proof that we use
is inspired by Backes et al. [BMU08], who model zero-knowledge proof as two
functions. The function zkp proof models the proof that the prover builds to
demonstrate the knowledge of the secret, which in the case of reusable anony-
mous return channel is the message encrypted with the public key of the mixer.
The function zkpsec models the verification of the proof by the verifier, which
in the case of reusable anonymous return channel is the mixer. The function
zkp proof (public, secret) takes as arguments public and secret parameters. In
this case, the public parameter is the encryption of the message, and the private
parameter is the message. Note that the correct function can be constructed
only by the prover who knows the private parameter. The verification function
zkpsec(zkp proof (public, secret), verinfo) takes as arguments the proof function
and the verification parameter verinfo. The verifier only accepts the proof if
the relation between verinfo and secret is satisfied.
The ProVerif description of sender, receivers, and mixer processes is outlined
in Figure 3.6. We specify one sender and two receivers, and model a simpler
version of reusable anonymous return channel without considering the submis-
sion of reply, namely we omit step 3 of Figure 3.4. As we shall see later, this
simpler version is sufficient to show successful attacks on message secrecy and
sender anonymity.
An instance of reusable anonymous return channel is in Figure 3.7. We
recall that submission of a message consists of the triplet ({IDA,PKA}PKM ,
{m}PKM , {IDB , PKB}PKM ). We use the choice command in ProVerif to check
both message secrecy and sender anonymity. This command allows us to verify
if the processes obtained by instantiating a variable with two different values
are bisimilar.
We analyse secrecy of the message by checking whether the attacker can
distinguish the two scenarios in which the sender outputs two different messages.
Thus, choice is applied in the second element of the triplet, and the process of
the sender becomes as in Figure 3.8.
We analyse anonymity of the sender by checking whether the attacker can
say if the message is sent either to Receiver 1 or Receiver 2. In this case, choice
is applied in the first element of the triplet. Figure 3.9 shows the process of the
sender to check anonymity.
Results
The results of the automatic analysis in ProVerif indicate that reusable anony-
mous return channel fails to guarantee both secrecy of messages and anonymity
of sender and receiver identities. According the attack traces generated by
ProVerif, both message secrecy and sender anonymity can be exploited using
the same attack strategy. The attacker can use the mixer as decryption oracle,
letting the mixer reveal any of the plaintexts contained in the triplet. The zero-
knowledge proofs required to avoid this very attack reveal to be insufficient. In
fact, the attack traces provided by ProVerif show the attacker can input the
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(*----Sender----*)
let A (SKa: skey, PKb: pkey, PKmix: pkey, SPKmix: spkey) =
out(c, (encrypt(pkey_to_bitstring(pk(SKa)), PKmix),
encrypt(secret_message, PKmix),
encrypt(pkey_to_bitstring(PKb), PKmix))).
(*----Receiver 1----*)
let B (SKb: skey, PKmix: pkey, SPKmix: spkey) =
in (c, (c1: bitstring , s1: bitstring, cm1: bitstring)).
(*----Receiver 2-----------------------*)
let C (SKc: skey, PKmix: pkey, SPKmix: spkey) =
in (c, (c1: bitstring , s1: bitstring, cm1: bitstring)).
(*----Mixer----*)
let MIX (SKmix: skey, SSKmix: sskey ) =
!MIX1(SKmix, SSKmix) | !MIX2(SKmix, SSKmix).
(*----Mixer 1----*)
let MIX1 (SKmix: skey, SSKmix: sskey ) =
in (c, (c1: bitstring, c2: bitstring, c3: bitstring,
p1:zkp, p2:zkp));
let (xmsg: bitstring) = decrypt(c2, SKmix) in
let (xdst: pkey) = bitstring_to_pkey(decrypt(c3, SKmix)) in
if(checkproof(p1,c1) && checkproof(p2,c3)) then
(out(c, (c1, sign(c1, SSKmix), encrypt( xmsg, xdst)))).
(*----Mixer 2----*)
let MIX2 (SKmix: skey, SSKmix: sskey ) =
in (c, (c1’: bitstring, c2’: bitstring, c3’: bitstring,
p1’:zkp, p2’:bitstring));
let (xmsg’: bitstring) = decrypt(c2’, SKmix) in
let (xdst’: pkey) = bitstring_to_pkey(decrypt(c3’, SKmix)) in
if(checkproof(p1’,c1’) && checksign(p2’,spk(SSKmix)) = c3’) then
(out(c, (c1’, sign(c1’, SSKmix), encrypt( xmsg’, xdst’)))).
Figure 3.6: The processes of sender, receivers, and mixer.
mixer with valid zero-knowledge proofs.
In the following we detail the attack traces. The attacker chooses one of the
three elements of the triplet. This choice depends on what the attacker wants
to learn: if the target is the content of the message, the attacker chooses the
second element; if the target is the identity of the sender, the attacker chooses
the first element; if the target is the identity of the receiver, the attacker chooses
the third element. Whatever the element of the triplet, the attacker submits
this as a new message.
Figure 3.10 shows how the attacker can defeat sender anonymity. The at-
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process
new skA: skey; let pkA = pk(skA) in out (c, pkA);
new skB: skey; let pkB = pk(skB) in out (c, pkB);
new skC: skey; let pkC = pk(skC) in out (c, pkC);
new skMIX: skey; let pkMIX = pk(skMIX) in out (c, pkMIX);
new sskMIX: sskey; let spkMIX = spk(sskMIX) in out (c, spkMIX);
(
(A(skA, pkB, pkMIX, spkMIX)) |
(B(skB, pkMIX, spkMIX)) |
(C(skC, pkMIX, spkMIX)) |
(MIX(skMIX, sskMIX))
)
Figure 3.7: The instance of sender, receiver, and mixer processes.
(*----Sender----*)
let A (SKa: skey, PKb: pkey, PKmix: pkey, SPKmix: spkey) =
out(c, (encrypt(pkey_to_bitstring(pk(SKa)), PKmix),
encrypt(choice[secret_message1, secret_message2], PKmix),
encrypt(pkey_to_bitstring(PKb), PKmix))).
Figure 3.8: The instance of sender to analyse message secrecy.
(*----Sender----*)
let A (SKa: skey, SKb:skey, PKb: pkey, PKc: pkey,
PKmix: pkey, SPKmix: spkey) =
out(c, (encrypt(pkey_to_bitstring(pk(choice[SKa, SKb]), PKmix),
encrypt(secret_message, PKmix),
encrypt(pkey_to_bitstring(PKb), PKmix))).
Figure 3.9: The instance of sender to analyse anonymity.
1. A→M : {IDA,PKA}PKM , {m}PKM , {IDB , PKB}PKM
2. I→M : {IDA,PKA}PKM , {IDA,PKA}PKM , {IDI , PKI}PKM
3. M→I : SignSSKM ({IDA,PKA}PKM ), {IDA,PKA}PK I
Figure 3.10: Attack trace on sender anonymity
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Primitive Equation
ElGamal encryption decrypt(encrypt(m, pk(sk), r), sk) = m
Digital signature
getmess(sign(m, ssk)) = m
checksign(sign(m, ssk), spk(ssk)) = m
Zero-knowledge proof
zkpsec(zkp proof(encrypt(m, pk(sk), r), (r,m)),
encrypt(m, pk(sk), r)) = true
Table 3.2: Equational theory to model reusable anonymous return channel
tacker targets {IDA, PKA}PKM , which becomes the second element of the new
triplet submitted by the attacker. Note that the attacker can leave the first
element of the triplet and the zero-knowledge proof unchanged. The attacker
replaces the third element of the triplet with a public key PKI for which the
attacker knows the corresponding secret key SKI . Thus, the attacker can also
provide the necessary proof of knowledge of the plaintext contained in the third
element. The mixer then shuffles the input messages, and encrypts the message
with the attacker public key. Since the attacker knows the secret key SKI , he
can decrypt the message, which in this case is IDA, PKA, namely the identity
of the sender.
Since the attacker can substitute any of the elements of the triplet as a
new message, reusable anonymous return channel can neither ensure secrecy of
the messages nor anonymity of sender and receiver. It can be observed that
the checksum meant to guarantee the integrity of the triplet is added after
the submission of the triplet, and is only used inside the mixer. Hence, the
checksum does not prevent the attacker from submitting a modified triplet.
Unfortunately even adding the checksum before the submission of the triplet
does not prevent the attack as the knowledge of the ciphertexts is sufficient to
compute the checksum.
Remark. Reusable anonymous return channel was originally designed to with-
stand a passive attacker that however can statically corrupt parties [GJ03]. Our
analysis in ProVerif considers an active attacker. We observe that a passive at-
tacker is not realistic in exam, where corrupted principals could actively try to
cheat. However, an attacker who statically corrupts principals can still defeat
reusable anonymous return channel. A corrupted principal can be instructed to
send and receive messages via the reusable anonymous return channel on behalf
of the attacker. The attacker still need to intercept those messages before they
enter the mixer, but this is possible with insecure networks such as the Internet.
3.5.3 Formal Analysis of the Huszti-Petho˝ Protocol
We now introduce the formal model of the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol and then the
results of the analysis of authentication and privacy.
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Primitive Equation
ElGamal encryption decrypt(encrypt(m, pk(sk), r), sk) = m
Digital signature
getmess(sign(m, ssk)) = m
checksign(sign(m, ssk), spk(ssk)) = m
Zero-knowledge proof
zkpsec(zkp proof(exp(exp(g, e1), e2), e2),
exp(exp(g, e1), e2)) = true
Diffie-Hellman exp. exp(exp(exp(g, x), y), z) = exp(exp(exp(g, y), z), x)
ZKP of discrete log.
checkproof (xproof (p, p′, t, exp(t, e), e),
p, p′, t, exp(t, e)) = true
Table 3.3: Equational theory to model the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol
Model choices
The first model choice is about the channels. The Huszti-Petho˝ protocol as-
sumes that all messages are exchanged using reusable anonymous return chan-
nel. In the previous section, we demonstrated that reusable anonymous return
channel fails to guarantee both message secrecy and sender anonymity. We
choose to model the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol with the ideal implementation of
reusable anonymous return channel, which guarantees anonymity of senders
and receivers. This can be implemented with ProVerif’s anonymous channels.
The equational theory depicted in Table 3.3 models the cryptographic prim-
itives used within the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol. It includes the same models of
ElGamal encryption, digital signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs defined for
reusable anonymous return channels. In addition, we provide an equation to
model the Diffie-Hellmann exponentiation. This model is limited because it
just takes into account the equation needed for the protocol to work, and does
not capture the full set of algebraic properties of Diffie-Hellmann exponentiation
that an attacker may exploit to break the protocol. However, this has a limited
influence on our analysis because, as we shall see later, the protocol ensures only
one out ten security requirements, namely in most cases the attacker breaks the
protocol though the simple model of Diffie-Hellmann exponentiation.
The equations for zero-knowledge proofs are customised according to the
exponentiation operator. In particular, we support the model of zero-knowledge
proof of the equality of discrete logarithms check proof with tables in ProVerif.
This approach is needed because ProVerif cannot deal with the associativity
of multiple exponents. This approach is sound because it limits the attacker
capability to generate fake zero-knowledge proofs, since the attacker cannot
write and read ProVerif tables.
We assume that the same generator g is used to generate the pseudonyms
of candidates and examiners. This choice is sound because we distinguish the
roles, and each principal is identified by its public key. We replace the can-
didate identity with the corresponding pseudonym inside the events to check
authentication requirements. Note that the replacement is also sound because
the equational theory preserves the bijective mapping between the keys that
identify the candidates and the pseudonyms.
The process of the exam authority is modelled as in Figure 3.11 and 3.12. It
is conveniently split into four sub processes. Three sub processes concern prepa-
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let EAi (SSKea: sskey, SPKcom: spkey) =
(*Preparation*)
new s: exponent;
let h=exp(g, s) in
let sh=sign(h,SSKea) in
out(c, (h,sh));
in(c, (quest: bitstring, squest: bitstring));
(!Ereg(h,s) | !Creg(h,s,quest,squest, SPKcom, SSKea)).
let Ereg (h: bitstring, s: exponent)=
(* Examiner Registration *)
get keys (=g_e, xpk_e) in
let q_tilde=exp(xpk_e, s) in
out(c, (q_tilde, xpk_e));
insert zkpeq(q_tilde, xpk_e);
(* EA inserts q_tilde into a table to support the zkp with E *)
in(c, (q: bitstring, q’: bitstring));
out(c, xproof(q,q’,g, h, s));
in (c, (t: bitstring, =q, =q’));
if exp(q,s)=q’ then
in(c, zkp_sec_proof: bitstring);
if zkpsec2(zkp_sec_proof,t, q)=true then 0.
let Creg (h: bitstring, s: exponent, quest: bitstring,
squest: bitstring, SPKcom: spkey, sskea:sskey)=
(* Candidate Registration *)
get keys (=g_c, xpk_c) in
let p_tilde=exp(xpk_c, s) in
insert reg_cand(xpk_c, p_tilde, h);
out(c, (p_tilde, g_c));
(* EA inserts p_tilde into a table to support the zkp with C *)
insert zkpeq(p_tilde, xpk_c);
in(c, (p: bitstring, p’: bitstring));
(* EA registered C with pseudonym ’p’ to the exam ’h’ *)
out(c, xproof(p,p’,g, h, s));
Exam(h,s,quest,squest, SPKcom,sskea).
Figure 3.11: The process of the exam authority that concerns preparation.
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let Exam (h: bitstring, s: exponent, quest: bitstring,
squest: bitstring, SPKcom: spkey, SSKea: sskey)=
(*Testing*)
in (c, (r: bitstring,p: bitstring,p’:bitstring));
if exp(p,s)=p’ then
in (c, zkp_sec_proof: bitstring);
if zkpsec2(zkp_sec_proof, r, p)=true then
if quest=checksign(squest, SPKcom) then
out(c, (quest, squest));
in (c, (=r, =p, answer: bitstring));
(* EA succesfully collects the pair (’quest’,’answer’) *)
(* from C with pseudonym ’p’ for the exam ’h’ *)
event collected(p’, h, quest, answer);
out(c, hash( (r, p, p’, zkp_sec_proof, quest, answer)));
(*Marking*)
(* EA chooses an E who registered for the exam ’h’ *)
get examinertable(t, q, =h, xzkp_sec_proof) in
new eap: bitstring;
(* EA assigns ’eap’ to the pair (’quest’,’answer’) *)
(* submitted by C with pseudonym ’p’ for the exam ’h’,*)
(* and distributes them to E with pseudonym ’q’ *)
event distributed(p’,h, quest, answer, eap, q);
out(c, (eap, answer));
get zkpeq(hma,=spkeytobitstring(spk(SSKea))) in
in (c, (mark: bitstring, =hma, hma_e_enc: bitstring,
zkp_sec_hma: bitstring, =t, =q));
if (checkproof(zkp_sec_hma, hma, hma_e_enc,t,q)=true) then
out(c, p’);
(*Notification*)
in (c, (=p’, p_tilde: bitstring));
get reg_cand(xpk_c, =p_tilde, =h) in
insert marks(xpk_c,mark, hma, hma_e_enc, zkp_sec_hma, t,q).
Figure 3.12: The process of the exam authority that concerns testing, marking,
and notification.
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Requirement Result Time
Candidate Authorisation X 26 s
Answer Authenticity × 3 s
Test Origin Authentication × 3 s
Test Authenticity × 33 s
Mark Authenticity × 52 s
Question Indistinguishability × < 1 s
Anonymous Marking × 1h 58 m 33 s
Anonymous Examiner × 6h 37 m 33 s
Mark Privacy × 23 m 59 s
Mark Anonymity × 49 m 5 s
Table 3.4: Summary of the analysis of the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol.
ration and consist of the initialisation of the exam authority, the registration of
the candidate, the registration of the examiner. The last sub process concerns
the remaining phases, namely testing, marking, and notification.
The ProVerif model of the candidate is depicted in Figure 3.13, the examiner
process is in Figure 3.14, the NET process is in Figure 3.15, and the exam
process is modelled as in Figure 3.16. All the processes are augmented with the
events that allow verifying the authentication requirements. To verify Question
Indistinguishability we use the noninterf command of ProVerif, which checks
that any two instances of the exam protocol that only differ in the value of
the variable of questions are bisimilar. To verify Mark Privacy, Anonymous
Examiner and Anonymous Marking we use the ProVerif command choice[].
The full ProVerif code used to analyse the requirements of the Huszti-Petho˝
protocol is available on the Internet [Giu15].
Results
The analysis in ProVerif shows that the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol only ensures Can-
didate Authorisation as reported in Table 3.4. Regarding Answer Authenticity,
ProVerif shows an attack trace that allows the exam authority to accept a test
that has not been submitted by a registered candidate. In fact, the attacker
can generate a fake pseudonym that allows him to take part in an exam for
which the attacker did not register. This is possible because the exam authority
does not check whether the pseudonym has been actually created using the par-
tial information provided by the NET. The attacker generates a secret key SKI ,
and calculates an associate pseudonym, which sends to the exam authority. The
exam authority successfully verifies the received data since the attacker knows
SKI , hence the exam authority accepts the test. In other words, the exam au-
thority may collect a test whose pseudonym is replaced with one chosen by the
attacker. The same attack trace violates Test Origin Authentication because the
attacker can generate a valid pseudonym for a candidate who did not register
for the exam.
ProVerif finds a counterexample that invalidates Test Authenticity. The
requirement cannot be achieved because there is no mechanism that allows
the examiner to check whether the answers have been forwarded by the exam
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let C (SKc: skey, SPKea: spkey, SPKcom: spkey) =
(*Preparation*)
in (c, (h: bitstring, sh: bitstring));
if h=checksign(sh, SPKea) then
(* The zkp of equivalence of discrete log is supported by *)
(* the tables ’zkpeq’ and ’zkpeqnet’. *)
(* In doing so, C can verify that ’ea_tilde’ and ’p_tilde’ *)
(* have been correctly generated resp. by EA and NET *)
get zkpeq(ea_tilde, =exp(g,skey_to_exponent(SKc))) in
get zkpeqnet(=ea_tilde,r,p’) in
let p=exp(r,skey_to_exponent(SKc)) in
out(c, (p, p’));
in (c, zproof: bitstring);
if (checkproof(zproof, p, p’,g,h)=true) then
let zkp_sec_c = zkp_proof2(r,p,skey_to_exponent(SKc)) in
out(c, (r,p,p’));
out(c, zkp_sec_c);
(*Testing*)
in (c, (quest: bitstring, squest: bitstring));
if quest=checksign(squest, SPKcom) then
new answ: bitstring;
(* C submits ’answ’ and ’quest’ for the exam ’h’ *)
event submitted(p’, h, quest, answ);
out(c, (r, p, answ));
in (c, receipt: bitstring);
if (hash( (r,p,p’, zkp_sec_c, quest, answ))=receipt) then
(*Notification*)
get marks(=exp(g,skey_to_exponent(SKc)),mark, hma, hma_e_enc,
zkp_sec_hma, t,q) in
get zkpeq(=hma,=spkeytobitstring(SPKea)) in
if (hash((mark, answ)) = hma && checkproof(zkp_sec_hma, hma,
hma_e_enc,t,q)=true ) then
(* C is notified with ’mark’ for the exam ’h’ *)
event notified(p’,h,mark).
Figure 3.13: The process of the candidate.
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let E (SKe: skey, SPKea: spkey, SPKcom: spkey) =
(*Preparation*)
in (c, (h: bitstring, sh: bitstring));
if h=checksign(sh, SPKea) then
new alpha: exponent;
get zkpeq(q_tilde, =exp(g,skey_to_exponent(SKe))) in
let q’=exp(q_tilde, alpha) in
let t=exp(g, alpha) in
let q=exp(t, skey_to_exponent(SKe)) in
out (c, (q, q’));
in (c, zproof: bitstring);
if (checkproof(zproof, q, q’,g,h)=true) then
let zkp_sec_e = zkp_proof2(t,q,skey_to_exponent(SKe)) in
out(c, (t,q,q’));
out(c, zkp_sec_e);
insert examinertable (t, q, h, zkp_sec_e);
(*Marking*)
in (c, (quest: bitstring, squest: bitstring));
if quest=checksign(squest, SPKcom) then
in (c, (eap: bitstring, answer: bitstring));
new mark: bitstring;
event marked(quest, answer, mark, eap, q, h);
let hma=hash( (mark, answer) ) in
let hma_e= exp(hma, skey_to_exponent(SKe)) in
insert zkpeq(hma, spkeytobitstring(SPKea));
let zkp_sec_hma=xproof(hma,hma_e,t,q,skey_to_exponent(SKe)) in
out(c, (mark, hma, hma_e, zkp_sec_hma, t, q)).
Figure 3.14: The process of the examiner.
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let NET () =
(*Preparation*)
in (c, (p_tilde: bitstring, =g_c));
new ro: exponent;
let p’=exp(p_tilde, ro) in
let r=exp(g, ro) in
(* The NET registered the candidate with pseudonym p’ *)
event registered(p’);
out(c,(p’, r));
(* The NET inserts ’p_tilde’ into a table to support *)
(* the zkp between EA (the prover) and C (the verifier) *)
insert zkpeqnet(p_tilde,r,p’);
(*Notification*)
in (c, =p’);
out(c, (p’, p_tilde)).
Figure 3.15: The process of the NET.
process
!(
new sskEA: sskey; let spkEA = spk(sskEA) in out (c, spkEA);
new sskCom: sskey; let spkCom = spk(sskCom) in out (c, spkCom);
new question: bitstring;
let squestion=sign(question, sskCom) in
out(c, (question, squestion));
!(new skC: skey; let pkC = exp(g,skey_to_exponent(skC)) in
out (c, pkC); insert keys(g_c, pkC); C(skC, spkEA, spkCom)
)|
!(EAi(sskEA , spkCom))|
!(new skE: skey; let pkE = exp(g,skey_to_exponent(skE))
in out (c, pkE); insert keys(g_e, pkE); E(skE, spkEA, spkCom)
)|
!(NET())
)
Figure 3.16: The exam process.
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Requirement Result Time
Candidate Authorisation X 3 s
Answer Authenticity × 2 s
Test Origin Authentication X 2 s
Test Authenticity X 3 s
Mark Authenticity X 4 s
Table 3.5: Summary of the analysis of authentication of the modified Huszti-
Petho˝ protocol.
authority. Although the answer is encrypted with the public key of the mixer,
this does not guarantee that the exam authority actually sent the message,
because anyone can submit any message to the mixer.
Regarding Mark Authenticity, ProVerif provides an attack trace in which
the attacker can forward any answer to any examiner, even if the answer was
not collected by the exam authority. Moreover, no mechanism ensure that the
notified mark originates from the exam authority. In fact, the attacker can
notify the candidate by himself with a mark of his choice.
The Huszti-Petho˝ exam protocol does not guarantee any privacy require-
ment. Intuitively, all privacy requirements can be violated because reusable
anonymous return channel does not guarantee anonymity.
However, even assuming anonymous channels, ProVerif shows an attack trace
for each requirement. Question Indistinguishability does not hold because mes-
sages sent via reusable anonymous return channel are not secret, as our analysis
demonstrates. Since the questions are sent through the anonymous channel, the
attacker can still obtain them.
Anonymous Marking is violated since the attacker can check whether a can-
didate accepts the zero-knowledge proof, hence associates the candidate identity
with the pseudonym, and then identifies the candidate’s test.
Anonymous Examiner can be also violated because the attacker can track
which examiner accepts the zero-knowledge proof when receiving the partial
pseudonym, hence associates the answer to the examiner.
Mark Privacy fails because the examiner sends the mark to the exam au-
thority via reusable anonymous return channel, which does not ensure secrecy.
Finally, ProVerif shows that the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol does not also ensure
Mark Anonymity. Since one can track which pseudonym is assigned to the
candidate, and the mark is not secret, the attacker can link the candidate to
the assigned mark.
3.5.4 Fixing Authentication
We propose four modifications to the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol in order to achieve
most of authentication requirement. In particular, we prove in ProVerif that
the modified Huszti-Petho˝ protocol achieves Candidate Authorisation, Test Ori-
gin Authentication, Test Authenticity, and Mark Authenticity as in Table 3.5.
We found no easy solution for Answer Authenticity because the protocol sees
no signatures for candidates, and reusable anonymous return channel does not
guarantee authentication. The first modification consists in the NET receiving
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the partial pseudonyms generated by the exam authority via a secure channel in-
stead via reusable anonymous return channel. It can be observed that the exam
authority and the NET do not need to communicate anonymously via RARC,
as the original protocol prescribes. Conversely, they need a secure channel to
avoid that the attacker injects messages. In doing so, the attacker cannot use
the NET to generate fake pseudonyms.
Similarly, the second modification consists in the exam authority receiving
the eligible pseudonyms from NET via a secure channel. Thus, the exam au-
thority generates zero-knowledge proofs of the equality of discrete logarithm
to eligible pseudonyms only. The exam authority can also store the eligible
pseudonyms, which can be checked at testing before the exam authority accepts
a test from a candidate.
The third modification concerns marking and consists in the exam authority
signing the collected test prior to distribute it to the chosen examiner. In fact, it
is required the examiner identity to be anonymous but not the exam authority’s.
Thus, the examiner marks the test only if the signature can be correctly verified.
In the original protocol, the examiner could not verify whether a test was sent
by the exam authority.
The last modification concerns the test identifier the exam authority affixes
to the test before distributing it to the examiner, and consists in a modified
receipt of candidate’s submission. The exam authority adds the test identifier
to the receipt and signs it. The examiner also adds the test identifier into the
receipt of marking, hence the candidates can verify whether they are notified
with the correct marks. In the original protocol, the attacker could notify the
candidate with any other examiner’s mark because the candidate was unaware
of the test identifier.
Table 3.4 summarises the results of the formal analysis of the Huszti-Petho˝
protocol assuming all principal being honest. The reported times refer to
ProVerif analyses over an Intel Core i7 3.0 GHz machine with 8 GB RAM.
It can be seen that the modified Huszti-Petho˝ protocol guarantees four out
five authentication requirements. Unfortunately, no easy solution can be en-
visaged for privacy. The design of the original protocol is heavily based on the
assumption that reusable anonymous return channel guarantees secrecy, authen-
tication, and anonymity. Since reusable anonymous return channel guarantees
none of these properties, the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol would need a complete re-
design to achieve privacy.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter discusses a formal framework for the security analysis of exam
protocols. Although many symbolic analysis methods have been proposed, our
choice to model exams in the applied pi-calculus reveals to be interesting. We
advance five authentication and five privacy requirements for exam, counting
a total of ten novel requirements. The proposed framework is validated with
the formal analysis of the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol, the first secure exam scheme
proposed in the literature. The protocol succumbed to our analysis, though
being quite complex.
It is found that the protocol guarantees only one of the ten requirements. Au-
thentication is compromised because of inaccuracies in the protocol design. Pri-
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vacy requirements are mostly violated because assumptions on reusable anony-
mous return channel. It is demonstrated that an attacker can compromise
message secrecy and anonymity on reusable anonymous return channel.
This chapter also introduces a few modifications on the Huszti-Petho˝ pro-
tocol in order to guarantee most of the authentication requirements. A formal
analysis in ProVerif confirms that the modified protocol ensures these require-
ments. However, even with an ideal reusable anonymous return channel imple-
mentation that ensures anonymity, the Huszti-Petho˝ protocol does not ensure
any privacy requirements. Thus, we think that the protocol requires fundamen-
tal changes.
Generally speaking, the proposed formal framework brings exams into the
attention of the security community. Computer-based exams are becoming
widespread, and it can be difficult to discover exam protocol vulnerabilities
as they may be exposed to unprecedented cheating attacks.
This work poses the first research step in the formal understanding of exam
protocols. This is corroborated by the analysis of more protocols as discussed
in chapters 5 and 6.
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Chapter 4
Formalising Verifiability
A fundamental requirement of exams is transparency. While traditional exams
can be normally observed through all the phases of the exam, computer-assisted
exams may introduce opaqueness. In general, any operation performed by com-
puters may not be observable, depending on the level of computer assistance.
For example, computer markers may alter the evaluations of the tests, or a
malware in the collector may modify or drop the submitted tests. Thus, trans-
parency demands for verifiable exams. A verifiable exam can be checked for the
presence or the absence of irregularities and provides evidences about fairness
and correctness of marking. Moreover, verifiable exams foster public trust, as
transparency can persuade the involved parties to comply with regulations.
To analyse whether an exam protocol is verifiable, it is necessary to clarify
the relevant verifiability requirements, and then build a framework to check the
protocol against these requirements. In this chapter, we present a clear un-
derstanding of verifiability for exam protocols and propose a methodology to
analyse their verifiability. Differently from the framework advanced in chapter
3, we propose a formal framework based on multisets that abstract away from
the applied pi-calculus constraints and is suitable for both symbolic and compu-
tational analysis. We also formalise eleven verifiability requirements for exams.
Each requirement is pivoted on a verifiability-test, and we state the conditions
that a sound and complete verifiability-test has to satisfy. Following a practice
already explored in other domains [CF85, BT94, Ben96, HS00], we classify our
verifiability requirements into individual and universal.
Outline of the chapter. Section 4.1 discusses the related work about the
formalisation of verifiability in other contexts. Section 4.2 introduces the con-
stituents of the formal framework. Section 4.3 contains the specification of
eleven verifiability requirements for exams. Section 4.4 draws the conclusions
and outlines the future work.
4.1 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, verifiability for exams has not been studied at
the time of writing this manuscript. Few papers list informally a few security
requirements. Castella-Roca et al. [CRHJDJ06] discuss a secure exam man-
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agement system, and informally define authentication, privacy, correction and
receipt fullness. Huszti and Petho˝ [HP10], whose protocol is analysed in chap-
ter 3, extend the requirements with secrecy and robustness. None of the works
outlined above addresses verifiability.
However, verifiability has been studied in domains close to exams, such as
voting and auctions, and different models and requirements have been proposed
from the beginning of 2010s [DHL13, KuTV10, KRS10]. In voting, individ-
ual verifiability signifies that voters can verify that their votes have been han-
dled correctly, namely “cast as intended”, “recorded as cast”, and “counted as
recorded” [BT94, HS00]. The concept of universal verifiability has been intro-
duced to express that auditors can verify the correctness of the tally using only
public information [CF85, BT94, Ben96]. Kremer et al. [KRS10] formalised both
individual and universal verifiability in the applied pi-Calculus. They also intro-
duced the requirement of eligibility verifiability, which expresses that auditors
can verify that each vote in the election result was cast by a registered voter,
and there is at most one vote per voter. Smyth et al. [SRKM10] used ProVerif
to check verifiability in three voting protocols. They express the requirements as
reachability properties. In the next chapter, we also analyse an exam protocol
in ProVerif to validate our framework. However, our model and definitions are
constrained neither to the applied pi-Calculus nor to ProVerif. The sound and
complete verifiability-tests that we use to specify our requirements are inspired
by the work of Dreier et al. [DHL13], who formalised verifiability for e-auction.
Ku¨sters et al. [KuTV10] studied accountability. This requirement says that,
in presence of a protocol failure, one can identify the principal responsible for
the failure. The notion of accountability is strongly related to verifiability as the
latter’s goal is to check the presence of protocol failures. In their work, Ku¨sters et
al. give symbolic and computational definitions of verifiability, which they argue
to be a weak variant of accountability. Differently from our approach, their
framework has to be instantiated for each application by identifying relevant
verifiability goals.
Guts et al. [GFZN09] defined auditability as the quality of a protocol, which
stores a sufficient number of evidences, to convince an honest judge that specific
properties are satisfied. As we shall see later, auditability expresses the same
concept of universal verifiability as defined in this dissertation: anyone, even an
outsider without a private knowledge about the protocol execution, can verify
that the system relies only on the available pieces of evidence.
4.2 A More Abstract Model
In chapter 2, we observed that any exam involves at least the candidate role plus
other possible authority roles, and that the run of an exam can be represented
as the sequential execution of preparation, testing, marking, and notification
phases. From these observations, we build a formal framework for the analysis
of verifiability requirements. While in chapter 3 we advanced a framework based
on the applied pi-calculus, hence supported by an operational semantics, here
we propose an abstract framework for the analysis of verifiability that comes
without such semantics. On the one hand, a more abstract framework requires
to map the model onto one that allows the analysis of the protocol. On the other
hand, it allows for a wider choice of analysis methods, regardless whether they
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are based on the symbolic or computational model. In chapter 5 we validate this
framework by analysing verifiability in a novel exam protocol, using ProVerif as
analysis method.
We view the abstract model of an exam consisting of four sets, three rela-
tions, and one function. The four sets are of candidate’s identities I, questionsQ,
answers A, and marks M . The three relations Accepted, Marked, and Assigned,
link candidates, questions, answers, and marks along the four phases. A test
consists of the pair (Q × A) of questions and answers. The function Correct
maps a mark to a test. It is assumed that sets and relations are built from data
logs such as registers or repositories.
Definition 28 (Exam (abstract model)) An exam E is a tuple (I,Q,A,M,
α) where I of type I is a set of candidate identities, Q of type Q is a set of
questions, A of type A is a set of answers, M of type M is a set of marks, and
α is the set of the following relations:
• Accepted ⊆ I × (Q × A): the candidates’ tests accepted by the collector
authority;
• Marked ⊆ I × (Q×A)×M : the marks given to the candidates’ tests;
• Assigned ⊆ I ×M : the marks assigned to the candidates;
• Correct : (Q×A)→M: the function used to mark a test.
Definition 28 can be extended with two specific subsets:
• Ir ⊆ I as the set of identities of candidates who registered for the exam;
• Qg ⊆ Q as the set of questions generated by the question committee.
It can be noted that this approach can model exam executed either hon-
estly or with frauds. For example, the set I \ Ir contains the identities of the
unregistered candidates who took the exam. Similarly, the set Q \Qg contains
the illegitimate questions administered at the exam. An honest execution of an
exam requires (I \ Ir) = (Q \Qg) = ∅
The function Correct models any objective mapping that assigns a mark to
an answer. This works well for multiple-choice tests, but it is inappropriate for
free-response tests. The evaluation of a free-response question is hardly objec-
tive: the ambiguities of natural language can lead to subjective interpretations
by the examiner. In this case, it is not possible to verify the correctness of the
marking, whatever model is considered. In other words, an exam protocol that
does not allow a definition of the function Correct cannot be checked for the
correctness of the marking.
4.3 Verifiability Requirements
In this section we present eleven verifiability requirements for exams. Verifia-
bility is a sort of meta-requirement as a protocol is verifiable with respect to
specific properties.
To be verifiable an exam should be testable, namely it should provide an exe-
cutable procedure (verifiability-test) that checks a specific property on the exam
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execution. For executable procedure we refer to the existence of a procedure
that takes in some data and outputs true or false. Such procedure may be either
explicitly provided by the protocol designer or found by the protocol analyst. A
verifiability requirement has the form t(e)⇔ c, where the verifiability-test t(e)
is a function from E → bool, where E is the set of data e, and c is a predicate
that models the specific property. The data needed to run the verifiability-test
are obtained from the available information about the execution of the exam
and from the private knowledge of the involved roles. It is assumed that the
pieces of data become available after the exam concludes and are not subject to
further changes. The following definition resumes the notion of testable exam.
Definition 29 (Testable exam) An exam protocol is testable if it provides a
verifiable-test that checks a desired property.
Being testable is not a sufficient condition for an exam to be verifiable be-
cause the verifiability-test should be sound and complete (⇔) for the specific
property: the success of the verifiability-test is a sufficient condition for c to
hold (soundness ⇒), and the success of the verifiability-test is a necessary con-
dition for c to hold (completeness ⇐). This is captured by the definition of
verifiable exam.
Definition 30 (Verifiable exam) An exam protocol is verifiable for a desired
property if the exam is testable and the corresponding verifiable-test is sound
and complete.
With a security take, a verifiability-test should be sound in presence of an
attacker and corrupted principals. It means that when the test succeeds the
property holds despite the presence of attacker and corrupted principals. The
verifiability-test should be complete to avoid trivialities: a verifiability-test that
always returns false is sound but useless.
Sound verifiability-tests cannot be complete if a corrupted principal is al-
lowed to submit incorrect data, since the verifiability-test would fail although
the property holds. Thus, a verifiability-test should be complete in the sense
that if all principals follow the protocol, then the verifiability-test must succeed.
A verifiability-test can be run by exam principals or outsiders, a distinction
that leads to two notions of verifiability requirements: individual and universal.
In the scenario of exam, we view individual verifiability as verifiability from the
perspective of the candidate role. The candidate can feed the verifiability-test
with the private knowledge acquired during the exam, namely the candidate’s
identity, the test, the mark, and the messages the candidate exchanged with the
other principals through the exam.
We view universal verifiability as verifiability from the perspective of an
external auditor or outsider. This role can be played by auditors who acquire
no private knowledge during the exam. The auditor typically has no tasks
associated to an exam, thus he has no candidate’s identity, he has not seen
the exam’s questions, answered any of them, and he did not receive any mark.
Besides, he has not interacted with any of the exam principals. In short, the
auditor runs the verifiability-tests only using the exam’s available pieces of data.
The list of proposed verifiability requirements is not meant to be exhaustive
but aims to cover all the phases of an exam. The requirements concern the
verifiability of candidate registration, the validity of questions, and the integrity
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Requirement Individual Verifiability Universal Verifiability
Registration
RUV(e)⇔
Ir ⊇ {i : (i, x) ∈ Accepted}
Question Validity QVIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (q ∈ Qg)
Marking Correctness
MCIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔
(Correct(q, a) = m)
MCUV(e)⇔
(∀(i, x,m) ∈ Marked,
Correct(x) = m
Test Integrity
ETIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔(
(i, (q, a)) ∈ Accepted
∧∃m′ : (i, (q, a),m′) ∈ Marked) ETIUV(e)⇔ Accepted ={(i, x) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked}
Test Markedness
ETMIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔
(∃m′ : (i, (q, a),m′) ∈ Marked))
ETMUV(e)⇔ Accepted ⊇
{(i, x) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked}
Marking Integrity
MIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔
∃m′ : ((i, (q, a),m′) ∈ Marked
∧(i,m′) ∈ Assigned) MIUV(e)⇔ Assigned ={(i,m) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked}
Marking Notification
Integrity
MNIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔
(i,m) ∈ Assigned
Table 4.1: Individual and Universal Verifiability
of tests, marks, and notification. In the remainder of the section we detail the
requirements, which are concisely listed in Table 4.1. Generally speaking, an
exam is fully verifiable, if it ensures all the verifiability requirements.
4.3.1 Individual Verifiability
Individual verifiability allows the candidate to verify some aspects of the exam
using the public data that is available from the execution of the exam plus
the candidate’s private knowledge. The candidate knows her identity i, the
test she submitted, which consists of question q and answer a, and the notified
mark m. The candidate also knows the perspective p of the run of the exam.
The perspective consists of the messages the candidate sent and received during
the run of the exam. Thus, the data is a tuple (i, q, a,m, p). Note that the
candidate’s perspective p is not necessary to specify the predicate that models
the properties to verify. In fact, the perspective never appears in the predicate
c. However, the perspective may be necessary to implement the verifiability-test
t(e).
The six individual verifiability requirements concern the validity of the ques-
tions, the integrity of the submitted test, and the correctness and integrity of
the mark notified to the candidate.
The first requirement is Question Validity, which signifies that the candidate
can check that she received the questions actually generated by the question
committee. The requirement is modelled by a verifiability-test that returns
true if the questions q received by the candidate belong to the set of the valid
questions Qg generated by the question committee. This is formalised as follows:
Definition 31 (Question Validity I.V.) Given an exam E and a set of
verifiability-tests β, then (E, β) is question validity verifiable if there is a
verifiability-test QVIV : E → bool in β such that
QVIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (q ∈ Qg)
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The next requirement is Marking Correctness, which says that the candidate
can verify that the mark she received is correctly computed on her test. It can
be formalised as:
Definition 32 (Marking Correctness I.V.) Given an exam E and a set of
verifiability-tests β, then (E, β) is marking correctness verifiable if there is a
verifiability-test MCIV : E → bool in β such that
MCIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (Correct(q, a) = m)
A way to ensure Marking Correctness is to give the candidate access to
the marking algorithm, so she can compute again the mark and compare it
with the one she received. As we discussed in Section 4.2, this makes perfect
sense with multiple-choice tests, but it makes not in the case of free-response
tests. However, one can envisage other ways to convince the candidate she
received the correct mark, provided the examiner follows the marking algorithm
correctly. For example, the candidate could check that the integrity of her test
is preserved from submission until marking, and that the integrity of the mark is
preserved from marking until notification. The remaining individual verifiability
requirements cover these very checks.
The third requirement is Test Integrity, which states that the candidate can
check that her test is accepted and marked as she submitted it. It is formalised
as follows:
Definition 33 (Test Integrity I.V.) Given an exam E and a set of verifi-
ability-tests β, then (E, β) is test integrity verifiable if there is a verifiability-test
ETIIV : E → bool in β such that
ETIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔
(
(i, (q, a)) ∈ Accepted ∧ ∃m′ : (i, (q, a),m′) ∈ Marked)
Since the verifiability-tests are run after the conclusion of the exam, Test
Integrity cannot capture the scenario in which a test is modified before the
marking and put back to its original version after marking. Such scenario can
be detected by verifying Marking Correctness.
Another requirement that concerns the integrity of the test is Test Marked-
ness, which says that the candidate can check that the test she submitted is
marked without modification. It can be specified as follows:
Definition 34 (Test Markedness I.V.) Given an exam E and a set of
verifiability-tests β, then (E, β) is test markedness verifiable if there is a
verifiability-test ETMIV : E → bool in β such that
ETMIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (∃m′ : (i, (q, a),m′) ∈ Marked)
Note that the predicate of Test Markedness coincides with the one of Test
Integrity pruned of “(i, (q, a)) ∈ Accepted”. Thus, if ETIIV succeeds, then
ETMIV also succeeds, namely ETIIV(i, q, a,m, p) ⇒ ETMIV(i, q, a,m, p). However,
if the ETIIV fails, but ETMIV succeeds, it follows that the test of the candidate is
modified upon acceptance but put back to its original version before marking.
This may be not a security issue for the candidate since her test is marked
as submitted. However, the candidate can report this issue to the responsible
authority for further investigation. Another scenario where an exam protocol
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may provide ETMIV but not ETIIV is when there is a lack of available data at the
conclusion of the exam.
The next requirement is Mark Integrity, which signifies that the candidate
can verify that the mark attributed to her test is assigned to her without any
modification. This requirement is formalised as follows:
Definition 35 (Mark Integrity I.V.) Given an exam E and a set of verifi-
ability-tests β, then (E, β) is mark integrity verifiable if there is a verifiability-
test MIIV : E → bool in β such that
MIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ ∃m′ :
(
(i, (q, a),m′) ∈ Marked ∧ (i,m′) ∈ Assigned)
The last requirement is Mark Notification Integrity, which says that the
candidate can check she received the mark assigned to her. This requirement is
formalised as:
Definition 36 (Mark Notification Integrity I.V.) Given an exam E and
a set of verifiability-tests β, then (E, β) is mark notification integrity verifiable
if there is a verifiability-test MNIIV : E → bool in β such that
MNIIV(i, q, a,m, p)⇔ (i,m) ∈ Assigned
There is a subtle difference between the two last definitions. MIIV can succeed
despite the candidate is notified with a mark that is different from the one
assigned to her, while MNIIV cannot. Conversely, if MNIIV succeeds, then MIIV
could fail if the examiner evaluated the test with a different mark.
4.3.2 Universal Verifiability
The definitions of universal verifiability are not pivoted around any exam role,
but consider the viewpoint of an external auditor. The auditor runs the
verifiability-tests on the public data available after an exam protocol run. Hence,
the knowledge of the auditor consists of a general variable e that contains the
data.
The five universal verifiability requirements concern the registration of the
candidates and the integrity of the batch of tests from the submission until after
the marking. The requirements of Question Validity and of Mark Notification
Integrity, which are definitions relevant for individual verifiability, are hard to
capture in the context of universal verifiability. This is because the external
auditor has no knowledge of the questions nor of the marks received by the
candidates, but only of public data.
The first universal verifiability requirement we consider is Registration, which
says that an auditor can check that all accepted tests are submitted by registered
candidates. Thus, the collector should have considered only tests that originated
from eligible candidates. This requirement can be specified as:
Definition 37 (Registration U.V.) Given an exam E and a set of verifi-
ability-tests β, then (E, β) is registration verifiable if there is a verifiability-test
RUV : E → bool in β such that
RUV(e)⇔ Ir ⊇ {i : (i, x) ∈ Accepted}
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Note that the superset symbol is preferred over strict equality since a candi-
date may register for an exam but may not show at testing. Thus, the collector
may accept fewer tests than registered candidates.
The next requirement is Marking Correctness, which signifies that an audi-
tor can check that all the marks attributed by the examiners to the tests are
computed correctly. It is formalised as follows:
Definition 38 (Marking Correctness U.V.) Given an exam E and a set of
verifiability-tests β, then (E, β) is marking correctness universally verifiable if
there is a verifiability-test MCUV : E → bool in β such that
(MCUV(e))⇔ (∀(i, x,m) ∈ Marked, Correct(x) = m))
Marking Correctness makes the same arguments about free-response of tests
we observed for Marking Correctness. However, for the sake of transparency, it
can be assumed that exam authorities allow auditors to access the logs of the
exam such that the auditors can inspect the marking process.
The third requirement is Test Integrity, which says that an auditor can verify
that all and only accepted tests are marked without any modification. It means
that the auditor can be convinced that no test is modified, added, or deleted
until the end of marking. This requirement is formalised as:
Definition 39 (Test Integrity U.V.) Given an exam E and a set of verifi-
ability-tests β, then (E, β) is test integrity universally verifiable if there is a
verifiability-test ETIUV : E → bool in β such that
(ETIUV(e))⇔ (Accepted = {(i, x) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked})
The equality symbol in the predicate specification enforces that at marking
no test has been added or removed from the batch of accepted tests.
The next requirement is Test Markedness, which says that an auditor can
check that only the accepted tests are marked without modification. It is for-
malised as follows:
Definition 40 (Test Markedness U.V.) Given an exam E and a set of
verifiability-tests β, then (E, β) is test markedness universally verifiable if there
exists a verifiability-test ETMUV : E → bool in β such that
(ETMUV(e))⇔ (Accepted ⊇ {(i, x) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked})
It can be noted that Test Markedness is a relaxed version of Test Integrity
because the predicate of the former definition does not require strict equality
of the two multisets. Thus, if ETIUV fails but ETMUV succeeds, it follows that at
least one accepted test has not been marked. This scenario however may not be
a security problem. For example, the rules of the exam may allow the candidate
to drop the examination after testing. Conversely, the scenario in which an
examiner marks a test that was not accepted is normally considered a violation
of the exam.
The last requirement we consider is Mark Integrity, which signifies that an
auditor can check that all and only the marks associated to the tests are assigned
to the corresponding candidates with no modifications. This is formalised as:
CHAPTER 4. FORMALISING VERIFIABILITY 63
Definition 41 (Mark Integrity U.V.) Given an exam E and a set of verifi-
ability-tests β, then (E, β) is mark integrity universally verifiable if there exists
a verifiability-test MIUV : E → bool in β such that
(MIUV(e))⇔ (Assigned = {(i,m) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked})
The equality symbol in the specification of the predicate enforces that no
pair of candidates and marks have been added or removed from the batch of
marked tests.
To conclude, it can be observed that the combination of registration, test
integrity, and mark integrity universal verifiability enforces the verifiability from
preparation to notification of an exam protocol.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter advances verifiability requirements for exam protocols. The do-
main of exam has unique features that call for verifiability definitions that are
different from ones proposed for voting and auctions. The eleven requirements,
which are classified in individual and universal verifiability categories, are spec-
ified in a formal and abstract model that opens up opportunities for both sym-
bolic and computational analysis. This model contrasts the frameworks pro-
posed for the verifiability of voting and auction protocols, as the latter usually
focus on cryptographic protocols. Intuitively, the proposed model is sufficiently
abstract to specify any type of exam, from traditional to Internet-based ex-
ams. Traditional exams usually provide evidence data via log-books and regis-
ters, while Internet-based exams implement the electronic versions, such as web
bulletin-boards.
Individual verifiability definitions consider a candidate who can check if she
got a valid set of questions, if her test was properly processed through the phases
of the exam, and if her mark was correctly computed. Universal verifiability
definitions consider an external auditor who can check the correct execution of
the exam with no private knowledge about the run of the exam. The auditor
can verify if only registered candidates took the exam, if all tests were properly
processed and marked, and if the marks were assigned correctly.
We validate the proposed model in the next chapter, in which we introduce
an Internet-based exam protocol. We analyse it for the eleven verifiability re-
quirements, and show how to map the relations defined in the proposed abstract
model in ProVerif.
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Chapter 5
The Remark!
Internet-based Exam
Protocol
In the last decade, computers have been extensively introduced in the design of
critical systems such as voting, auctions, and exams. Computers are progres-
sively becoming the main components of such systems providing the core tasks.
In the context of exam, computers can be used for local tasks, such as genera-
tion of questions and automatic marking, but also to support remote tasks. For
example, remote registration and remote notification of candidates are must-
have functionalities of exams that expect many candidates; remote testing, in
which distant located candidates take the exam at their place, is the distinctive
functionality of Internet-based exams. At an extreme, all the phases of an exam
may take place remotely.
The use of computers exposes exams to new threats and requires changing
the well-established procedures used in traditional exam. The design of secure
exam protocols is further complicated by the conflicting interests that roles typ-
ically have in an exam. In fact, it may be hard to find a role who can play as
TTP, as recent exam scandals confirm [Cop13, Wat14, Lip14]. In this chap-
ter, we advance Remark!, a new Internet-based exam protocol that guarantees
several authentication, privacy, and verifiability requirements without the need
of a TTP. The idea behind Remark! is to distribute the trust across the several
servers that compose an exponentiation mixnet. As we shall see later, the mixnet
generates the pseudonyms that allow the exam principals to encrypt and sign
messages anonymously. Using ProVerif, we prove that Remark! ensures all the
authentication and privacy requirements proposed in chapter 3 with minimal
reliance on trusted parties. Moreover, we demonstrate that Remark! provides
the verifiability-tests listed in chapter 4, and discuss the necessary assumptions
to make Remark! fully verifiable.
Assumptions
Like any other security protocol, Remark! is not designed to withstand every
possible threat. For instance, it cannot cope with plagiarism, but assumes ap-
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propriate invigilation during testing. Principals may still collude and communi-
cate via subliminal channels, for instance by using steganography. Although it
is hard to rule out completely such a threat, steganalysis techniques can be of
some help here. Other countermeasures may be needed against collusion attacks
that exploit covert channels. We thus specify seven assumptions conveniently
for the goals of Remark!. In particular, we assume that:
1. Each principal holds a long-term public/private pair of keys.
2. The candidate holds a smart card in which the personal details of the
candidate are visibly engraved. The smart card securely stores the candi-
date’s private key, namely the private key cannot be extracted from the
smart card.
3. The candidate is invigilated during testing to mitigate cheating. Invigila-
tion for remote testing can be guaranteed with online invigilation software,
such as ProctorU [Inc15].
4. The model answers are kept secret from the candidates until after testing.
The examiners may be provided with the model answers at marking.
5. It is available an authenticated append-only bulletin board that guarantees
everyone to see the same data, though write access might be restricted to
appropriate entities [BRT13]. An implementation of a bulletin board and
its formal analysis has been proposed by Culnane and Schneider [CS14].
6. It is available an implementation of TLS channel that ensures integrity
and confidentiality of messages.
7. At least one of the servers that compose the exponentiation mixnet is
honest.
Outline of the chapter. Section 5.1 reviews a few proposals of secure pro-
tocols for Internet-based exams. Section 5.2 details exponentiation mixnet, a
cryptographic scheme on which Remark! is based. Section 5.3 describes Re-
mark! according the four phases of an exam. Section 5.4 contains the formal
analysis in ProVerif of ten authentication and privacy requirements Section 5.5
contains the formal analysis in ProVerif of eleven verifiability requirements. Fi-
nally, Section 5.6 discusses future work and concludes the chapter.
5.1 Related work
To the best of our knowledge only few works propose protocols for Internet-
based exams. TOEFL [TOE], which is one of the major English-language test
in the world, has replaced its traditional exams with Internet-based exams.
Neither the specification nor the security requirements of the TOEFL protocol
are publicly available. Moreover, its design probably includes a trusted exam
authority that is in charge of the critical tasks of the exam. The same concerns
apply for MOOCs, which offer Internet-based exams that grant credits for many
universities [Lew13]. Conversely, Remark! is designed to minimise the reliance
on trusted parties. Huszti-Petho˝ [HP10] advanced an Internet-based exam with
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few trust requirements on principals, but in chapter 3 we have shown that the
protocol has several security issues. In contrast, we prove that Remark! ensure
all the security requirements.
In the domain of Computer Supported Collaborative Working, Foley and
Jacob [FJ95] formalised confidentiality requirements and proposed an exam as
case study. Maffei et al. [MPR13] implemented a course evaluation system that
guarantees privacy using anonymous credential schemes without a trusted third
party. Similarly, Hohenberger et al. [HMPs14] advanced ANONIZE, a protocol
for surveys that ensures authentication and privacy in presence of corrupted
authorities. However, surveys have different security requirements than exams,
for instance, surveys do not consider test authorship and fixed-term anonymity
definitions.
Some related protocols have been proposed in the area of conference man-
agement systems. Kanav et al. [KLP14] introduced CoCon, a formally verified
implementation of conference management system that guarantees confidential-
ity. Arapinis et al. [ABR12] introduced and formally analysed ConfiChair, a
cryptographic protocol that addresses secrecy and privacy risks coming from a
malicious-but-cautious cloud. Their work has been recently extended to support
any cloud-based system that assumes honest managers, such as public tender
management and recruitment process [ABR13]. In Remark!, a different attacker
is considered since exam authorities, which are analogous to managers in cloud-
based systems, can be corrupted.
5.2 Exponentiation mixnet
Remark! relies on ElGamal encryption, digital signature, and exponentiation
mixnet. In this section, we detail the rudiments of exponentiation mixnet, while
the reader can refer to chapter 3 for a brief description of ElGamal encryption
and digital signature.
The main functionality provided by exponentiation mixnet is to generate
a pseudo public key that allows the owner of the corresponding private key
to encrypt and sign messages anonymously. An exponentiation mixnet takes
in a batch of public keys and outputs a set of new pseudo public keys. The
scheme ensures that no one but the owner of the public/private key pair can
link a public key of the original batch with any of the pseudo public keys. In
contrast to conventional re-encryption mixnet [Cha81] in which each term is
independently re-encrypted, the peculiarity of exponentiation mixnet is that
each mix server re-encrypts the terms by a common exponent value. This idea
appeared first in the work of Haenni and Spycher [HS11].
In the following, we detail the construction of an exponentiation mixnet,
which is depicted in Figure 5.1. Let g be a generator of a multiplicative subgroup
G of order q. Let us assume n principals 〈C1, . . . Cn〉, each have a pair of
public/private keys (PK ,SK ) such that PK = gSK . Let us assume m servers
composing the exponentiation mixnet. The mix server mix 1 takes the batch of
the public keys 〈PK 1, . . .PKn〉, generates a fresh random r1 ∈ {1, q − 1}, and
computes the batch of temporal pseudo public keys 〈PK r11 , . . .PK r1n 〉. Then,
mix 1 signs and sends to the bulletin board the computed batch in a secret
shuffled order, namely the server posts 〈PK r1pi1(1), . . . PK
r1
pi1(n)
〉. Additionally,
mix 1 posts a zero-knowledge proof of correctness and sends the new generator
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C1
C2
...
Cn
BB
PK 1
PK 2
...
PKn
g
mix1
BB
PK r1
pi1(1)
PK r1
pi1(2)
...
PK r1
pi1(n)
gr1
mix2
BB
PK r1r2
pi2◦pi1(1)
PK r1r2
pi2◦pi1(2)
...
PK r1r2
pi2◦pi1(n)
gr1r2
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
mixm
BB
PK rm
pim(1)
PK rm
pim(2)
...
PK rm
pim(n)
grm
=
=
=
=
PK 1
PK 2
PKn
hC
Figure 5.1: The exponentiation mixnet scheme
gr1 to the next server over a secure channel. Further servers repeat the steps
above as required. The last server, mixm, publishes the final batch of pseudo
public key 〈PK rmpim(1), . . .PK
rm
pim(n)
〉 and the final generator grm , where rm =∏m
i=1 ri and pim = pik ◦ · · · ◦pi1. Note that the intermediate gr1 , . . . , grm−1 terms
are not posted on the bulletin board. This prevents each principal to trace their
intermediate pseudo public keys through the mixnet. Although it is not clear
whether such eventuality is an attack, it is normally considered an undesired
feature. Each principal Ci can find the corresponding pseudo public key using
their private keys, since grmSK i = PK rmpim(i).
Remark! makes use of exponentiation mixnet at preparation to create the
pseudonyms for candidates and examiners. The mixnet is also required at noti-
fication to revoke the pseudonyms of candidates. In so doing, each server mix i
reveals its random value ri, hence by revealing all the values rm it is possible
to link the pseudonyms to the identities of the candidates.
5.3 Description
Remark! has four roles: exam authority (EA), candidate (C), examiner (E), and
mixnet (NET). The exam authority manages the exam and also plays the roles
of collector and notifier.
Remark! relies on a bulletin board to publish pseudonyms, questions, tests,
and marks. As we discussed in the previous section, the bulletin board is also
used in the exponentiation mixnet scheme. In the remainder, we assume that
anyone can post messages on the bulletin board, even the attacker. Thus, we
require each principal to sign their messages. However, if one assumes that the
bulletin board has appropriate write access control mechanisms, namely it only
publishes messages that originate from eligible principals, signatures may not
be necessary.
In the following, we detail Remark! according the phases of an exam. Figure
5.2 illustrates the protocol’s steps in form of a message sequence chart.
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Figure 5.2: The Remark! Internet-based exam protocol
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Preparation
The exponentiation mixnet generates the pseudonyms of candidate and exam-
iner. The generation takes place in two independent runs: first the mixnet
generates the pseudonym of candidates and then the pseudonym of examiners.
Such separation is necessary because only the identities of candidates should be
revealed at notification.
The public key PKC of an eligible candidate C is processed by the exponen-
tiation mixnet among the public keys of other candidates. After the last mix
server publishes the list of pseudonyms and the new generator hC := g
rm , the
candidate identifies her pseudo public key PKC computing h
SKC
C . The pseudo
public key from now on serves as the pseudonym for C.
After the pseudonyms of candidates have been published (step 1), the mixnet
generates the pseudonyms for examiners in a similar way. Since the mixnet
generates the pseudonyms of examiners using different random values, a new
generator hE is published at the end of the mix (step 2).
Testing
The exam authority generates the questions, signs them with its private key
SKA, and encrypts each question under a candidate pseudonym. We do not
specify how the exam authority generates the questions in order to include differ-
ent forms of questions (e.g., multiple choice, free-response, etc.) and assignments
(e.g., single question, different questions for candidate, random permutations of
a set of questions, etc.). In the remainder, with question we actually refer to a
list of questions possibly of size one.
Remark! assumes that an invigilator authenticates the candidate by checking
whether the personal details printed on the top of the smart card matches the
candidate identity. For remote authentication, this procedure can be supported
with tools such as ProctorU. Then, the exam authority publishes the encrypted
questions on the bulletin board (step 3). After the candidate answers the test,
she appends the answer to her pseudonym and question, so the filled test consists
of TC = 〈ques, ans,PKC〉. Then, she signs the test TC with her private key
SKC using the generator hC . Thus, the signature can be verified using the
pseudonym of the candidate PKC with respect to hC . The candidate then
encrypts the signed test with the public key of the exam authority PKA, and
submits it (step 4). The exam authority decrypts the test, and then signs the
hash of TC using its private key SKA. It then encrypts the signed hash under
the corresponding candidate’s pseudonym, that is, {SignSKA(H (TC ))}PKC , and
publishes such encryption as receipt (step 5).
Marking
The exam authority randomly chooses an eligible examiner pseudonym PKE ,
and encrypts the signed test TC under the chosen examiner pseudonym (step 6).
Note that the exam authority does not know the real identity of the examiner.
Moreover, it is possible to introduce a universally verifiable deterministic as-
signment of test to examiners. For example, encrypted tests and the examiner
pseudonyms could be posted in two lexically ordered lists, and the exam au-
thority cyclically assigns a test to an examiner according the order.
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After the designated examiner marks the test, he appends the mark to the
signed test, thus generating the evaluation MC = 〈SignSKA(PKE ,TC ),mark〉.
The examiner then signs MC with his private key SKE and the generator hE ,
and encrypts the signed evaluation under the public key of the exam authority
PKA (step 7).
Notification
The exam authority receives from the examiner the encrypted evaluation, which
it decrypts and re-encrypts under the corresponding candidate pseudonym PKC .
After the exam authority publishes all the test evaluations (step 8), it asks
the mixnet to reveal the random values r used to generate the pseudonyms
of the candidates (step 9). In so doing, the candidate anonymity is revoked,
and the mark can finally be registered. Note that each candidate learns the
corresponding mark before rm is revealed.
5.4 Formal Analysis of Authentication and Pri-
vacy
We analyse Remark! in ProVerif. We consider the authentication and privacy
requirements formally specified in chapter 3. The requirements with short de-
scriptions are recalled below:
• Authentication
– Candidate Authorisation, which says that only registered candidates
can take the exam.
– Answer Authenticity, which says that the collector considers only the
answers that candidates actually submitted.
– Test Origin Authentication, which says that the collector accepts only
tests that originate from registered candidates.
– Test Authenticity, which says that the examiner only marks the tests
intended for him.
– Mark Authenticity, which says that the candidate receives the mark
assigned to her test by the examiner chosen by the collector.
• Privacy
– Question Indistinguishability, which says that the questions are not
revealed until testing begins.
– Anonymous Marking, which says that the examiner marks a test
while ignoring its author.
– Anonymous Examiner, which says that the candidate cannot learn
which examiner marked her test.
– Mark Privacy, which says that no one learns the marks, besides the
examiner, the concerned candidate, and the notifier.
– Mark Anonymity, which says that no one learns the association be-
tween a mark and the corresponding candidate.
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Primitive Equation
ElGamal encryption
decrypt(encrypt(m, pk(k), r), k) = m
decrypt(encrypt(m, pseudo pub(pk(k),
rce), r), pseudo priv(k, exp(rce))) = m
checkpseudo(pseudo pub(pk(k), rce),
pseudo priv(k, exp(rce))) = true
Digital signature
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, k), spk(k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, pseudo priv(k,
exp(rce))), pseudo pub(pk(k), rce)) = m
Table 5.1: Equational theory to model Remark!
Model choices
We model the bulletin board as a public channel, and use the equational theory
depicted in Table 5.1. The theory consists of the standard equations for ElGamal
encryption and digital signatures extended with novel equations that model
pseudonyms as public keys. The pseudonym, which also serves as test identifier,
can be generated using the function pseudo pub, which takes in a public key
and a random exponent. In fact, this function models the main feature of
exponentiation mixnet. The function pseudo priv can be used by a principal
to decrypt or sign anonymous messages. The function takes in the private key
of the principal and the new generator published by the mixnet. The function
checkpseudo allows a principal to check whether a pseudonym is associated with
the principal’s private key. In practice, principals use this function to identify
their pseudonyms published on the bulletin board.
The process of the exam authority is in Figure 5.3, the process of the mixnet
is in Figure 5.5, the process of the candidate is in Figure 5.4, and the process of
examiner is in Figure 5.6. The exam process is depicted in Figure 5.7. In each
process we replace the identity of candidate with the corresponding candidate’s
pseudonym inside the events. This choice is sound because the equational theory
preserves the bijective mapping between keys and pseudonyms.
We analyse Remark! in ProVerif with the same approach used to verify the
Huszti-Petho˝ protocol in chapter 3. In particular, we use ProVerif’s noninterf
and choice[] commands to verify the privacy requirements. The full ProVerif
code is available on the Internet [Giu15].
Results
Assuming an attacker in control of the network and honest principals, ProVerif
successfully proves all authentication and privacy requirements. Table 5.2 re-
ports the execution times over an Intel Core i7 3.0 GHz machine with 8 GB
RAM. Also assuming corrupted principals, ProVerif proves that Remark! en-
sures all the requirements. Table 5.2 also reports the honest roles that are
required for each requirement to hold. Note that we only model the processes
needed to specify the requirement. For example, the specification of Anonymous
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let EA (skA:skey, pkN:pkey, ques:bitstring) =
(*Preparation*)
in(bbn, (pseudo_C:pkey, hc:bitstring, r: role, spseC:bitstring));
if (pseudo_C, hc, r) = checksign(spseC, pkN) && r = C then
let sques = sign(ques, skA) in
let eques = encrypt( (ques,sques), pseudo_C) in
out(bba, eques);
in(ch, eca:bitstring);
let ((=ques, ans:bitstring, =pseudo_C), sca:bitstring) =
decrypt(eca, skA) in
if (ques, ans, pseudo_C) = checksign(sca, pseudo_C) then
(* EA collects the test from C with pseudonym pseudo_C *)
event collected(pseudo_C, ques, ans);
let ca = (ques, ans, pseudo_C) in
let sca’ = sign(ca, skA) in
let eca’ = encrypt((ca, sca’), pseudo_C) in
out(bba, eca’);
(* Marking *)
in(bbn, (pseudo_E:pkey, he:bitstring, rolet:role,
spseE:bitstring));
if (pseudo_E, he, rolet) = checksign(spseE, pkN) &&
rolet = E then
let ca’’ = (ques, ans, pseudo_C, pseudo_E) in
let sca’’ = sign(ca’’, skA) in
let eca’’ = encrypt((ca’’, sca’’), pseudo_E) in
(* EA distributed the test (pseudo_C,ques,ans) *)
(* identified by pseudo_C (id_form = pseudo_C) to E pseudo_E*)
event distributed(pseudo_C,ques,ans,pseudo_C,pseudo_E);
out(bba, eca’’);
in(ch, ema:bitstring);
let ((=ca’’, =sca’’, mark:bitstring), sma:bitstring) =
decrypt(ema, skA) in
if (ca’’, sca’’, mark) = checksign(sma, pseudo_E) then
(* Notification *)
let ma = (ca’’, sca’’, mark) in
let ema’ = encrypt((ma, sma), pseudo_C) in
out(bba, ema’);
(*Reveal ID*)
in(ch, encsignetX: bitstring).
Figure 5.3: The process of the exam authority
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let Cand (skC:skey, pkA:pkey, pkN:pkey, ans:bitstring) =
(*Preparation *)
in(bbn, (pseudo_C:pkey, hc:bitstring, r: role, spseC:bitstring));
if (pseudo_C, hc, r) = checksign(spseC, pkN) && r = C then
let priv_C = pseudo_priv(skC, hc) in
if checkpseudo(pseudo_C, priv_C) =true then
(*Testing*)
in(bba, eques:bitstring);
let (ques: bitstring, sques:bitstring)=decrypt(eques, priv_C) in
if ques=checksign(sques, pkA) then
let ca = (ques, ans, pseudo_C) in
let sca = sign(ca,priv_C) in
let eca = encrypt((ca, sca), pkA) in
(* C with pseudo_C submits his test (ques, ans) *)
event submitted(pseudo_C, ques, ans);
out(ch, eca);
in(bba, eca’:bitstring);
let (=ca, sca’:bitstring) = decrypt(eca’, priv_C) in
if (ques, ans, pseudo_C) = checksign(sca’, pkA) then
(*Notification*)
in(bba, ema’:bitstring);
in(bbn, (pseudo_E:pkey, he:bitstring, role_E: role,
spseE:bitstring));
if (pseudo_E, he, E) = checksign(spseE, pkN) then
let ((ca’’: bitstring, sca’’: bitstring, mark:bitstring),
sma:bitstring) = decrypt(ema’, priv_C) in
if ca’’=(ques, ans, pseudo_C, pseudo_E) &&
ca’’=checksign(sca’’, pkA) then
if ((ques, ans, pseudo_C, pseudo_E), sca’’, mark) =
checksign(sma, pseudo_E) then
(* C with pseudo_C is notified with "mark" *)
event notified(pseudo_C, mark).
Figure 5.4: The process of the candidate
let NET (skN:skey, pkA:pkey, rc:bitstring) =
in(ch, (R: role));
get publickey(=R, rx, pkX) in
let hx = exp(rx) in
let pseudo_X = pseudo_pub(pkX,rx) in
let spseX = sign ((pseudo_X, hx, R), skN) in
out(bbn, ( pseudo_X, hx, R, spseX));
(*Reveal rc*)
let signetX = sign( (rc), skN) in
let encsignetX = encrypt ( (rc, signetX), pkA) in
out(ch, encsignetX).
Figure 5.5: The process of the mixnet
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let Ex (skE:skey, pkA:pkey, pkN:pkey, mark:bitstring) =
(*Preparation *)
in(bbn, (pseudo_E:pkey, he:bitstring, r: role, spseE:bitstring));
if (pseudo_E, he, E) = checksign(spseE, pkN) then
let priv_E = pseudo_priv(skE, he) in
if checkpseudo(pseudo_E, priv_E) =true then
(* Marking *)
in(bba, eca’’:bitstring);
let ((ques:bitstring, ans:bitstring, pseudo_C:pkey, =pseudo_E),
sca’:bitstring) = decrypt(eca’’, priv_E) in
if (ques, ans, pseudo_C,pseudo_E) = checksign(sca’, pkA) then
let ca = (ques, ans, pseudo_C, pseudo_E) in
let ma:bitstring = (ca, sca’, mark) in
let sma:bitstring = sign(ma,priv_E) in
let ema = encrypt((ma, sma), pkA) in
event marked(ques,ans,mark,pseudo_C,pseudo_E);
(* E with pseudo_E marked the test (ques, ans) *)
(* identified by pseudo_C with mark *)
out(ch, ema).
Figure 5.6: The process of the examiner
process
!(
(*Products of the secret exponent values of the servers *)
(* (represented by the NET): rc for C and re for E *)
new rc: bitstring;
new re: bitstring;
(*Assume one NET and one EA*)
new skA: skey; let pkA = pk(skA) in out (ch, pkA);
new skN: skey; let pkN = pk(skN) in out (ch, pkN);
(!( NET(skN, pkA, rc))) |
(!( new ques:bitstring; EA(skA, pkN, ques))) |
(!( new skC: skey; let pkC = pk(skC) in out (ch, pkC);
new ans:bitstring; insert publickey(C, rc, pkC);
Cand(skC, pkA, pkN, ans))
) |
(!( new skE: skey; let pkE = pk(skE) in out (ch, pkE);
new mark:bitstring; insert publickey(E, re, pkE);
Ex(skE, pkA, pkN, mark))
)
)
Figure 5.7: The exam process
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Requirement Result Time Honest roles
Candidate Authorisation X 1 s (C, EA, NET)
Answer Authenticity X 1 s (E, EA, NET)
Test Origin Authentication X 1 s (NET)
Test Authenticity X 1 s (E, EA, NET)
Mark Authenticity X 1 s (E, EA, NET)
Question Indistinguishability X 1 s (E, EA, NET)
Anonymous Marking X 1 s (C, NET)
Anonymous Examiner X 1 s (E, NET)
Mark Privacy X 3 m 39 s (EA, NET)
Table 5.2: Summary of authentication and privacy analysis of Remark!
Marking requires two candidates to be honest, otherwise they could just reveal
their tests to the attacker, who would trivially violate the protocol. However,
all other candidates can be corrupted and collude with the attacker to violate
the protocol.
Notably, Remark! ensures a stronger version of Anonymous Examiner since
no one, even the exam authority, knows which examiner marks which test. It can
be observed that Mark Anonymity is not in Figure 5.2: since Remark! ensures
Mark Privacy, it also guarantees Mark Anonymity.
Remark. We report an issue on an early version of Remark! that witnesses
how formal approaches contribute to achieve a deep understanding of the de-
sign models. In the first draft of Remark!, the receipt of submission of a test TC
consisted of the message {SignSKA(TC )}PKC , that is, the exam authority signs
the test and posts the signed test encrypted with the candidate’s pseudonym.
Moreover, the assignment of the test to the examiner consisted of the message
{SignSKA(TC )}PKE , namely the signed test encrypted with an eligible exam-
iner’s pseudonym. The rest of the protocol was unchanged respect to the current
version. With these two modifications ProVerif cannot prove Test Authenticity.
In fact, the attack trace shows that a corrupted candidate can pick an exam-
iner of her choice by re-encrypting the signed receipt received from the exam
authority. It means that the candidate can influence the choice of the examiner
who marks her test. Such attack could be avoided assuming an access control
mechanism that would not allow the candidate to post on the bulletin board.
However, the fixes implemented in the final version of Remark! shows that
there is no need of access control mechanisms to secure the protocol. The first
fix consists in signing the hash of the test as receipt. The second fix consists
in making the pseudonym of the chosen examiner explicit. In doing so, the
signature of the exam authority within the receipt cannot be used by a candidate
to designate any examiner.
5.5 Formal Analysis of Verifiability
The ProVerif model proposed to check authentication and privacy in the previ-
ous section can be also used to analyse Remark! for verifiability. The definitions
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of authentication and privacy introduced in chapter 3 are formulated in the
applied pi-calculus and can be coded straight to ProVerif. Conversely, verifia-
bility definitions are expressed in a more abstract model. Thus, it is necessary
to map sets and relations specified in the verifiability model to Remark!. We
briefly recall the informal descriptions of the verifiability requirements specified
in chapter 4.
• Individual Verifiability: a candidate can check that
– Question Validity : she received the questions actually generated by
the question committee.
– Marking Correctness: the mark she received is correctly computed
on her test.
– Test Integrity : her test is accepted and marked as she submitted it.
– Test Markedness: the test she submitted is marked without modifi-
cation.
– Marking Integrity : the mark attributed to her test is assigned to her
without any modification.
– Marking Notification: she received the mark assigned to her.
• Universal Verifiability: an auditor can check that
– Registration: all accepted tests are submitted by registered candi-
dates.
– Marking Correctness: all the marks attributed by the examiners to
the tests are computed correctly.
– Test Integrity : all and only accepted tests are marked without any
modification.
– Test Markedness: only the accepted tests are marked without modi-
fication.
– Marking Integrity : all and only the marks associated to the tests are
assigned to the corresponding candidates with no modifications.
We recall that Definition 28, which we introduced in chapter 4, considers
the data sets I, Q, A, M , and their elements i, q, a, m, which specify the
candidate identities, the questions, the answers, and the marks respectively. In
Remark!, the set I contains the candidate pseudonyms rather than the identities.
In the previous section we argued this choice to be sound. The sets Q, A,
and M contains the messages that correspond to questions, answers and marks
generated by the protocol’s principals, possibly manipulated by the attacker.
The relations Accepted, Marked, and Assigned are built from the posts that
appear on the bulletin board. The tuples (i, (q, a)) of the relation Accepted con-
sist of the receipts of submission that the exam authority publishes on the bul-
letin board at the end of testing. The tuples (i, (q, a),m) of the relation Marked
coincide with the tuples (i,m) of Assigned, and consist of the messages that the
exam authority publishes on the bulletin board at marking. Precisely, the tuples
(i, (q, a),m) are generated from the marked test signed by the examiner, that is,
SignSKE ,hE (MC). The tuples (i,m) instead are built from the encryption of the
marked test generated by the exam authority, that is, {SignSKE ,hE (MC)}PKC .
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It can be observed that encryption under the candidate’s pseudonym officially
assigns the mark to the candidate.
Finally, the function Correct, which is the algorithm used to mark the tests,
can be modelled as a ProVerif table.
5.5.1 Individual Verifiability
Individual verifiability definitions require the existence of verifiability-tests that
candidates run to check the properties of the protocol. We show that Remark!
has the necessary verifiability-tests. In ProVerif, we model the verifiability-tests
as processes that emit the event OK when the verifiability-test succeeds, and
emit the event KO when the verifiability-test fails.
We use correspondence assertions to prove soundness. ProVerif checks ver-
ifiability as a reachbility property. The verification strategy normally consists
of checking that the event OK is always preceded by the event emitted in the
part of the code where the predicate becomes satisfied. In the ProVerif model
of Remark! we assume an honest candidate principal who plays the role of the
verifier. The other principals are usually corrupted, if not stated otherwise.
The verifiability-test receives the data from the candidate via a private channel,
and the remaining data posted on the bulletin board via public channels. This
allows an attacker to manipulate the input data. Corrupted principals may
collude with the attacker.
We resort to unreachability of the event KO to prove completeness. In this
case, the ProVerif model enforces only honest principals and prevents the at-
tacker to manipulate the input data of the verifiability-tests. In fact, a complete
verifiability-test must succeed if its input data is correct.
In the following paragraphs, we specify the verifiability-tests for Remark!.
We also discuss the conditions to achieve sound and complete verifiability-tests
according to each individual verifiability requirement.
Question Validity
Remark! assumes that the exam authority generates the questions at prepara-
tion and publishes them at testing. Thus, we model the exam authority as an
honest process in ProVerif, otherwise a corrupted exam authority would publish
questions that are different from the ones actually generated.
The verifiability-test testQV , which is depicted in Figure 5.8, receives the
question eques that is published on the bulletin board from a public channel. It
also receives the candidate’s question ques and private key priv C from a private
channel. The verifiability-test checks whether the candidate actually received
the question published by the exam authority on the bulletin board.
To prove soundness, we annotate the ProVerif process of the exam authority
with the event generated where the questions are generated. Then, ProVerif
checks if the verifiability-test emits the event OK only if the exam authority
actually generated the question received from the candidate, namely ProVerif
checks the following correspondence assertion:
OK〈ques〉  generated〈ques〉
To prove completeness, ProVerif checks that the verifiability-test process
does not emit the event KO when the input data is correct. ProVerif confirms
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let testQV(pkA: pkey, pch: channel) =
in(bba, eques:bitstring);
in(pch, (ques: bitstring, priv_C: skey));
let (ques’:bitstring, sques:bitstring) =
decrypt(eques, priv_C) in
let (ques’’:bitstring,p seudoC:bitstring) =
checksign(sques, pkA) in
if ques’=ques && ques’’=ques’ then event OK
else event KO.
Figure 5.8: The Question Validity individual verifiability-test
the verifiability-test is sound and complete, so we can conclude that Remark! is
question validity verifiable.
Marking Correctness
Remark! is designed to support different forms of questions (e.g., multiple choice,
free-response, etc.), hence there is no universal marking algorithm that can be
used to evaluate the answers. However, we can assume that the exam authority
publishes the table of evaluations that maps an answer to a mark after the exam
concludes. We thus model the exam authority as an honest process in ProVerif
to check Marking Correctness.
The verifiability-test testMC, which is in Figure 5.9, receives the test (ques,
ans) submitted by the candidate, and the mark mark notified to her. The
verifiability-test checks if the mark reported on the table of evaluations and
associated to the candidate’s answer coincides with the mark received from the
candidate.
To prove soundness, we annotate the ProVerif process of the candidate
with the event correct where the candidate receives the mark at notification.
ProVerif checks that if the verifiability-test emits the event OK, then a previous
event correct was emitted. This is formalised as:
OK〈ques, ans,mark〉  correct〈ques, ans,mark〉
ProVerif checks that the verifiability-test does not emit the event KO to prove
completeness.
Thus, assuming an honest exam authority that provides the table of evalu-
ations at end of exam, Remark! is marking correctness verifiable.
Test Integrity
The verifiability-test testTI in Figure 5.10 takes in the test (ques,ans) submit-
ted by the candidate via a private channel, and the receipt of submission eca’
and the notification ema’ published on the bulletin board via a public chan-
nel. The verifiability-test checks if candidate’s submission, the receipt, and the
notification contain the same question, answer, and pseudonym.
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let testMC (pkA: pkey, priv_ch: channel) =
in(priv_ch, (ques: bitstring, ans: bitstring, mark: bitstring));
get correct_ans(=ques,=ans,mark’:bitstring) in
if mark’=mark then
event OK
else KO.
Figure 5.9: The Marking Correctness individual verifiability-test
let testTI (pkA: pkey, priv_ch: channel) =
in(priv_ch, (priv_C: skey, ques: bitstring, ans: bitstring,
pseudo_C: pkey));
in(bbn, (pseudo_E:pkey, he:bitstring, rolet: role,
spseE:bitstring));
in(bba, eca’: bitstring);
in(bba, ema’:bitstring);
(* If the message on the BB is signed by the authority, *)
(* it is considered as part of the relation Accepted. *)
let (ca: bitstring, sca’:bitstring) = decrypt(eca’, priv_C) in
let (ques’: bitstring, ans’: bitstring, pseudo_C’: pkey) =
checksign(sca’, pkA) in
(* If the message on the BB is signed by the examiner, *)
(* it is considered as part of the relation Marked. *)
let (((ques’’: bitstring, ans’’: bitstring, pseudo_C’’: pkey),
sca1: bitstring, mark:bitstring), sma:bitstring) =
decrypt(ema’, priv_C) in
let ((ques’’’: bitstring, ans’’’: bitstring, pseudo_C’’’: pkey),
sca1’: bitstring, mark’:bitstring) =
checksign(sma, pseudo_E) in
if ques’=ques && ans’=ans && pseudo_C’=pseudo_C && ques’’=ques &&
ans’’=ans && pseudo_C’’=pseudo_C && (ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’) =
checksign(sca1,pkA) && ques’’’=ques && ans’’’=ans &&
pseudo_C’’’=pseudo_C && sca1’=sca1 then
event OK
else event KO.
Figure 5.10: The Test Integrity individual verifiability-test
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To prove soundness, we annotate the verifiability-test with the events
accepted and marked that map the corresponding relations. In particular, the
receipt of submission is part of the relation Accepted if it is signed by the exam
authority and encrypted under the pseudonym of the candidate. Similarly, the
notification is part of the relation Marked if it is signed by the examiner and
encrypted under the pseudonym of the candidate. The requirement can be
formalised with the following correspondence assertion:
OK〈id , ques, ans〉  marked〈id , ques, ans〉 ∪ accepted〈id , ques, ans〉
To prove completeness, ProVerif checks that the verifiability-test process
does not emit the event KO when the input data is correct.
ProVerif shows that the verifiability-test for Test Integrity is sound and com-
plete. Note that a corrupted exam authority can publish two different receipts
for the same test on the bulletin board. However, since the bulletin board is
append-only, the candidate notices if the exam authority appends two different
receipts for her submission because only the candidate knows the private key.
Test Markedness
Since Remark! has a sound and complete verifiability-test for Test Integrity, we
can build from this a sound and complete verifiability-test for Test Marked-
ness. It is sufficient to not consider the receipt of submission as input, and just
check whether the candidate’s submission and the data obtained from notifica-
tion contain the same question, answer, and pseudonym. The verifiability-test
testTM is depicted in Figure 5.11. To prove soundness, it is sufficient to prove
the following correspondence assertion:
OK〈id , ques, ans〉  marked〈id , ques, ans〉
Mark Integrity
The verifiability-test testMI in Figure 5.12 takes in the test (ques,ans) submitted
by the candidate via a private channel, and the notification ema’ published by
the exam authority on the bulletin board. The verifiability-test checks if the test
provided by the candidate and the notification on the bulletin board contain the
same question, answer, and pseudonym, and if the examiner’s signature on the
mark is correct.
To check soundness in ProVerif, we annotate the verifiability-test with the
events assigned and marked that map the corresponding relations. The data
on the notification message is part of the relation Assigned if the data is signed
by the exam authority and encrypted under the pseudonym of the candidate.
This data is also part of the relation Marked if it also include the signature of
the examiner. The correspondence assertion to check soundness is:
OK〈id , ques, ans,mark〉  marked〈id , ques, ans,mark〉 ∪
assigned〈id , ques, ans,mark〉
We check completeness as usual, and ProVerif confirms that the verifiability-
test for Mark Integrity is sound and complete.
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let testTM (pkA: pkey, priv_ch: channel) =
in(priv_ch, (priv_C: skey,ques: bitstring, ans: bitstring,
pseudo_C: pkey));
in(bbn, (pseudo_E:pkey, he:bitstring, rolet: role,
spseE:bitstring));
in(bba, ema:bitstring);
(* If the message on the BB is signed by the examiner, *)
(* it is considered as part of the relation Marked. *)
let (((ques’: bitstring, ans’: bitstring, pseudo_C’: pkey),
sca1: bitstring, mark:bitstring), sma:bitstring) =
decrypt(ema, priv_C) in
let ((ques’’: bitstring, ans’’: bitstring, pseudo_C’’: pkey),
sca1’: bitstring, mark’:bitstring) =
checksign(sma, pseudo_E) in
if ques’=ques && ans’=ans && pseudo_C’=pseudo_C &&ques’’= ques &&
ans’’=ans && pseudo_C’’=pseudo_C && (ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’) =
checksign(sca1,pkA) && sca1’=sca1 then
event OK
else event KO.
Figure 5.11: The Test Markedness individual verifiability-test
let testMI (pkA: pkey, priv_ch: channel) =
in(priv_ch, (priv_C: skey,ques: bitstring, ans: bitstring,
pseudo_C: pkey));
in(bbn, (pseudo_E:pkey, he:bitstring, rolet: role,
spseE:bitstring));
in(bba, ema’:bitstring);
(* Assigned is the mark sent by the authority *)
let (((ques’: bitstring, ans’: bitstring, pseudo_C’: pkey),
sca’: bitstring, mark:bitstring), sma:bitstring) =
decrypt(ema’, priv_C) in
(* Marked are the marks signed by the examiner *)
let ((ques’’: bitstring, ans’’: bitstring, pseudo_C’’: pkey),
sca’’: bitstring, mark’: bitstring) =
checksign(sma, pseudo_E) in
if ques’=ques && ans’=ans && pseudo_C’=pseudo_C && ques’’=ques &&
ans’’=ans && pseudo_C’’=pseudo_C && mark=mark’ &&
(ques’, ans’, pseudo_C’)=checksign(sca’,pkA) then
event OK
else KO.
Figure 5.12: The Mark Integrity individual verifiability-test
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let testMNI (pkA: pkey, priv_ch: channel) =
in(priv_ch, (priv_C: skey,mark: bitstring, pseudo_C: pkey,
ema’: bitstring));
in(bba, ema: bitstring);
(* Assigned is the mark sent by the authority *)
let (((ques:bitstring, ans: bitstring, pseudo_C’:pkey),
sca: bitstring, mark’:bitstring), sma:bitstring) =
decrypt(ema, priv_C) in
if (ques,ans,pseudo_C’)=checksign(sca, pkA) &&
pseudo_C’=pseudo_C && mark’=mark then
event OK
else event KO.
Figure 5.13: The Mark Notification Integrity individual verifiability-test
Requirement Soundness Completeness
Question Validity X (EA) X(all)
Test Integrity X X(all)
Test Markedness X X(all)
Marking Correctness X (EA) X(all)
Mark Integrity X X(all)
Mark Notification Integrity X X(all)
Table 5.3: Summary of the analysis of Remark! for I.V. requirements
Mark Notification Integrity
The last individual verifiability definition concerns the check of the integrity
of the notified mark. The verifiability-test testMNI in Figure 5.13 is fed via
a private channel with the mark mark that the candidate received at notifica-
tion. The verifiability-test testMNI also takes in the official notification ema’
published in the bulletin board via a public channel, and checks if the mark
provided in the notification coincides with the one received from the candidate.
Similarly to Mark Integrity, we annotate the verifiability-test testMNI with
the event assigned to prove soundness. ProVerif checks if the verifiability-test
emits the event OK only if the mark notified to the candidate is the same officially
assigned at the end of the exam. This is formalised as:
OK〈id ,mark〉  assigned〈id ,mark〉
Also in this case ProVerif checks that the verifiability-test process does
not emit the event KO when the input data is correct to prove completeness.
ProVerif confirms the verifiability-test is sound and complete, hence Remark! is
mark notification integrity verifiable.
Table 5.3 summarises the results of the individual verifiability analysis of
Remark! and reports the roles required to be honest.
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5.5.2 Universal verifiability
Also for the specification of universal verifiability definitions, we model verifi-
ability-tests as processes that emit the event OK when the verifiability-test suc-
ceeds, and emit the event KO when the verifiability-test fails.
In the case of universal verifiability an auditor runs the verifiability-tests,
namely the auditor plays the role of the verifier. This requires a different ap-
proach to prove soundness compared to the approach used for individual verifia-
bility definitions, in which the candidate plays as verifier. In fact, in the case of
universal verifiability also the candidate can be corrupted, hence it can be hard
to find a ProVerif process that can be annotated with events to check soundness
via correspondence assertions.
The different approach consists of proving soundness of the verifiability-tests
using unreachability of the event KO. The underlying idea is that every time the
verifiability-test succeeds, which means that it emits the event OK, we check if
the decryption of the concerned ciphertext gives the expected plaintext. If not,
the event KO is emitted, thus the verifiability-test is not sound.
As we shall see later, it is however possible to prove the soundness of the
verifiability-test for Registration requirement using correspondence assertions.
This is possible because the NET is assumed to be honest, hence the corre-
sponding ProVerif process can be annotated with an event that is emitted when
registration concludes. We always use unreachability of the event KO to prove
completeness of the verifiability-tests.
Remark. It can be noted that all messages posted by the exam authority on
the bulletin board are encrypted under the pseudonym of either the candidate
or the examiner, hence no public data can be used as it is by the auditor. Can-
didates and examiners hold long-term pairs of public/private keys, and it is im-
plausible that they reveal their private keys for audit purposes. Since the auditor
cannot decrypt a ciphertext message posted on the bulletin board, the auditor
should be rather provided with the corresponding plaintext and pseudonym. In
so doing, the auditor can encrypt the plaintext with the pseudonym and check
if the encryption coincides with the same ciphertext message posted on the bul-
letin board. Since Remark! uses ElGamal encryption, which is probabilistic,
the auditor should be also provided with the random value used to encrypt a
message.
In the following, we specify the data that the exam authority should provide
to the auditor after the exam concludes.
• Registration: the exam authority reveals the signatures inside the receipts
receipt = {SignSKA(H(TC)}PKC posted on the bulletin board and the
random values used to encrypt the receipts.
• Marking Correctness: the exam authority reveals the marked tests inside
the evaluations sma = {SignSKE ,hE (MC)}PKA , the random values used
to encrypt the marked tests, and the table correct ans that maps each
mark to each answer.
• Test Integrity: the exam authority reveals the marked tests inside the
evaluations, the random values used to encrypt the marked tests, plus the
data disclosed for Registration.
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• Test Markedness: the exam authority reveals the same data disclosed for
Test Integrity.
• Mark Integrity: the exam authority reveals the examiners’ signatures on
the marked tests inside the evaluations, and the random values used to
encrypt the notifications notif = {SignSKE ,hE (MC)}PKC before posting
them on the bulletin board.
We anticipate that it is not possible to automatically prove the universal
verifiability requirements in ProVerif. To prove such requirements it is needed
to iterate over all candidates, but ProVerif does not support loops. We thus
prove the base case of each requirement automatically in ProVerif, in which it
is considered only one accepted test or one assigned mark. Then, we provide
manual induction proofs that generalise the ProVerif result to the general case
with an arbitrary number of candidates.
Registration
The verifiability-test testUR, which is depicted in Figure 5.14, takes in from the
bulletin board the pseudonyms of the candidates signed by the mixnet and the
receipts of submissions generated by the exam authority. In so doing, the auditor
can check that the exam authority accepted only tests signed with pseudonyms
posted by the mixnet during preparation.
ProVerif proves that the verifiability-test is complete and sound for the base
case, which considers one accepted test and an unbounded number of candidates.
To prove the general case, namely for an unbounded number of accepted tests
and candidates, it is necessary to show that
testUR(E) = true ⇔ {i : (i, x) ∈ Accepted} ⊆ Ir
holds for an exam execution E that considers any size n of the relation Accepted
and any number m of registered candidates.
Let testURk(·) be the verifiability-test applied to an exam execution that
has k accepted tests; let testURk(·) →∗ OK denote the verifiability-test that
outputs OK (true) after some steps; let E be an exam execution that has m
registered candidates and n accepted tests; let Ej be a version of E that only
considers the jth accepted test, which is submitted by the candidate ij . Since
ProVerif proves that the verifiability-test is complete and sound for one accepted
test and any number of registered candidates, it follows that for soundness we
have
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUR1(Ej)→∗ OK ⇒ ij ∈ Ir
and for completeness we have
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ij ∈ Ir ⇒ testUR1(Ej)→∗ OK.
The verifiability-test testURn(E) checks if each of the accepted tests received
on channels bba1, . . . , bban was submitted by one of the candidates given on
channels bbn1, . . . , bbnn. The verifiability-test ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUR1(Ej) checks
if the jth accepted test received on the channel bbaj was submitted by one of
the candidates given on the channels bbn1, . . . , bbnn.
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let testUR(pkN, pkA, ch1,...,chn, bbn1,...,bbnm, bba1,...,bban)=
in(bbn1, (pseudo_C1, hc, r, NET_sign1));
...
in(bbnm, (pseudo_Cm, hc, r, NET_signm));
in(bba1, receipt1);
...
in(bban, receiptn);
in(ch1, (rcoin1, EA_sign_rcpt1));
...
in(chn, (rcoinn, EA_sign_rcptn));
let (quest1, answ1, pseudo_C’1) =
checksign(EA_sign_rcpt1, pkA) in
...
let (questn, answn, pseudo_C’n) =
checksign(EA_sign_rcptn, pkA) in
(* If the pseudonym on the BB is signed by the NET, *)
(* it is considered as part of the relation Accepted. *)
if (pseudo_C1, hc, r)=checksign(NET_sign1, pkN) && r=C &&
pseudo_C1=pseudo_C’1
||...||
(pseudo_C1, hc, r)=checksign(NET_sign1, pkN) && r=C &&
pseudo_C1=pseudo_C’n
&&...&&
(pseudo_Cm, hc, r)=checksign(NET_signm, pkN) && r=C &&
pseudo_Cm=pseudo_C’1
||...||
(pseudo_Cm, hc, r)=checksign(NET_signm, pkN) && r=C &&
pseudo_Cm=pseudo_C’n then
if receipt1=int_encrypt(((quest1, answ1, pseudo_C’1),
EA_sign_rcpt1), pseudo_C1, rcoin1)
&&...&&
receiptn=int_encrypt(((questn, answn, pseudo_C’n),
EA_sign_rcptn), pseudo_Cm, rcoinn)
then event OK
else event KO
else event KO.
Figure 5.14: The Registration universal verifiability-test
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We have that
testURn(E)→∗ OK
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUR1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓(by ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ij ∈ Ir
⇓
{i : (i, x) ∈ Accepted} ⊆ Ir
Thus, the verifiability-test testUR is sound also for the general case.
{i : (i, x) ∈ Accepted} ⊆ Ir
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ij ∈ Ir
⇓(by ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUR1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓
testURn(E)→∗ OK
Also the verifiability-test testUR is complete for the general case.
Marking Correctness
The verifiability-test testUMC, which is depicted in Figure 5.15, takes as input
from the bulletin board the pseudonym of the examiner signed by the mixnet,
and the mark notifications signed by the examiner and published by the exam
authority. The auditor can obtain the evaluations generated by the examiner
from the mark notifications. Then, the auditor checks if the mark assigned to
the question of each test coincides with the mark associated to the same question
on the table provided by the exam authority. Remark! intuitively ensures this
requirement only if the exam authority is honest as it provides the table at the
conclusion of the exam. For simplicity, we assume that one examiner marks all
the tests.
ProVerif proves soundness and completeness of the verifiability-test assuming
only one marked test, namely the relation Marked has only one entry. To prove
the general case, we should consider an unbounded number of marked test.
Thus, it is necessary to show that
testUMC (E) = true ⇔∀(i, x,m) ∈ Marked, Correct(x) = m
holds for an exam execution E that considers any size n of the relation Marked.
Let MCk (·) be the verifiability-test applied to an exam execution that has
k marked tests; let MCk (·) →∗ OK denote the verifiability-test that outputs
OK (true) after some steps; let E be an exam execution that has n marked
tests; let Ej be a version of E that only considers the j
th marked test, which
was submitted by the candidate ij and evaluated with the mark mj , namely
(ij , (xj),mj) ∈ Marked. Since ProVerif proves that the verifiability-test is com-
plete and sound for one marked test, it follows that for soundness we have
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MC 1(Ej)→∗ OK ⇒ Correct(xj) = mj
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let testUMC (pkN, bbn, ch1,...,chn) =
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, r, spseE));
in(ch1, sma1);
...
in(chn, sman);
let ((ques1, ans1, pseudo_C1), sca1, mark1) =
checksign(sma1, pseudo_E) in
...
let ((quesn, ansn, pseudo_Cn), scan, markn) =
checksign(sman, pseudo_E) in
get correct_ans(ques’1,ans’1,=mark1) in
...
get correct_ans(ques’n,ans’n,=markn) in
if (pseudo_E, he, r) = checksign(spseE, pkN) && r = E then
if (ques1=ques’1 && ans’1=ans1)
&&...&&
(quesn=ques’n && ans’n=ansn)
then event OK
else event KO
else KO.
Figure 5.15: The Marking Correctness universal verifiability-test
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and for completeness we have
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : Correct(xj) = mj ⇒ MC 1(Ej)→∗ OK.
The verifiability-test MCn(E) obtains the mark evaluations from channels
ch1, . . . , chn, and checks if all the tests that are contained in evaluation are
marked correctly. The verifiability-test ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MC 1(Ej) checks if the jth
test, whose evaluation is obtained from the channel chj, is marked correctly.
Thus, it follows that
MCn(E)→∗ OK
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MC 1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓(by ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : Correct(xj) = mj
⇓
∀(i, (q, a),m) ∈ Marked, Correct(x) = m
Thus, the verifiability-test testUMC is sound also for the general case.
∀(i, x,m) ∈ Marked, Correct(x) = m
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : Correct(xj) = mj
⇓(by ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : MC 1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓
MCn(E)→∗ OK
Also the verifiability-test testUMC is complete for the general case.
Test Integrity
The verifiability-test testUTI (Figure 5.16) takes as input from the bulletin
board the pseudonyms of the candidates signed by the mixnet and the receipts
of submissions plus the mark notifications generated by the exam authority.
The auditor can obtain the evaluations generated by the examiner from the
mark notifications. The verifiability-test then checks if the submitted tests were
marked without any modification. Similarly to Marking Correctness, we assume
that one examiner marks all the tests for simplicity.
ProVerif can prove that the verifiability-test is complete and sound when
one accepted test and one marked test are considered. To prove the general
case that considers an unbounded number of accepted tests, it is necessary to
show that
testUTI (E) = true ⇔ Accepted = {(i, x) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked}
holds for an exam execution E that considers any size of the relations Accepted
and Marked.
It can be assumed that the size of the relation Accepted is equal to the
relation Marked. In fact, by looking at the bulletin board, the auditor can check
that the number of the receipts of submissions coincides with the number of
mark notifications.
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let testUTI(pkN, pkA, bba1,..., bban, bbn, ch1,...,chn)=
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, re, spseE));
in(ch1,((rcoin1, sca1, pseudo_C1),(rcoinA1, smaA1, pseudo_CA1)));
...
in(chn,((rcoinn, scan, pseudo_Cn),(rcoinAn, smaAn, pseudo_CAn)));
in(bba1, (receipt1, notif1));
...
in(bban, (receiptn, notifn));
let (quest1, answ1, pseudo_C’1) = checksign(sca1, pkA) in
...
let (questn, answn, pseudo_C’n) = checksign(scan, pkA) in
let ((quest’1, answ’1, pseudo_C’’1), sca’1, mark1) =
checksign(smaA1, pseudo_E) in
...
let ((quest’n, answ’n, pseudo_C’’n), sca’n, markn) =
checksign(smaAn, pseudo_E) in
if (receipt1=int_encrypt(((quest1, answ1, pseudo_C’1), sca1),
pseudo_C1, rcoin1) &&
notif1=int_encrypt((((quest’1, answ’1, pseudo_C’’1), sca’1,
mark1), smaA1), pseudo_CA1, rcoinA1) &&
sca’1=sca1)
&&...&&
(receiptn=int_encrypt(((questn, answn, pseudo_C’n), scan),
pseudo_Cn, rcoinn)&&
notifn=int_encrypt((((quest’n, answ’n, pseudo_C’’n), sca’n,
markn), smaAn), pseudo_CAn, rcoinAn) &&
sca’n=scan)
then
if (pseudo_C1=pseudo_CA1 && pseudo_CA1=pseudo_C’1 &&
pseudo_C’1=pseudo_C’’1 && quest1=quest’1 && answ1=answ’1)
&&...&&
(pseudo_Cn=pseudo_CAn && pseudo_CAn=pseudo_C’n &&
pseudo_C’n=pseudo_C’’n && questn=quest’n && answn=answ’n)
then event OK
else KO
else KO.
Figure 5.16: The Test Integrity universal verifiability-test
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Let testUTIk (·) be the Test Integrity verifiability-test applied to an exam
execution that has k accepted tests and k marked tests; let testUTIk (·)→∗ OK
denote the verifiability-test that outputs OK (true) after some steps; let E be
an exam execution that has n accepted tests and n marked tests; let us assume
that the tests are marked in the same order as they were accepted; let Ej be
a version of E that only considers the jth accepted test xj submitted by the
candidate ij , and the j
th marked test x′j associated to the candidate i
′
j .
Since ProVerif proves that the verifiability-test is complete and sound for
one accepted test and one marked test, it follows that for soundness we have
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUTI1 (Ej)→∗ OK ⇒ (ij , (qj , aj)) = (i′j , (q′j , a′j))
and for completeness we have
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij , (qj , aj)) = (i′j , (q′j , a′j))⇒ testUTI1 (Ej)→∗ OK.
The verifiability-test testUTIn(E) checks if each pair of accepted and marked
tests obtained from channels bba1, . . . , bban has the same pseudonym, question,
and answer. Similarly, the verifiability-test ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUTI1 (Ej) checks if
the jth accepted and marked tests obtained from the channel bbaj are identical.
Thus, it follows that
testUTIn(E)→∗ OK
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUTI1 (Ej)→∗ OK
⇓(by ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij , xj) = (i′j , x′j)
⇓
Accepted = {(i, x) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked}
Thus, the verifiability-test testUTI is sound also for the general case.
Accepted = {(i, x) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked}
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij , xj) = (i′j , x′j)
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUTI1 (Ej)→∗ OK
⇓
testUTI n(E)→∗ OK
Also the verifiability-test testUTI is complete for the general case.
Test Markedness
Since Remark! is test integrity universally verifiable, it is also test markedness
universally verifiable. The proof strategy is the same outlined above for Test
Integrity. However, it is not necessary to assume that the size of the relation
Accepted is equal to the relation Marked, since Test Markedness does not require
strict equality of the two multisets.
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let testUMI (bbn, bba1,...,bban) =
in(bbn, (pseudo_E, he, re, spseE));
in(bba1, (notif1,rcoin1, sma1));
...
in(bban, (notifn,rcoinn, sman));
let ((quest1, answ1, pseudo_C1), sca’1, mark1) =
checksign(sma1, pseudo_E) in
...
let ((questn, answn, pseudo_Cn), sca’n, markn) =
checksign(sman, pseudo_E) in
if notif1=int_encrypt((((quest1, answ1, pseudo_C1),sca’1, mark1),
sma1), pseudo_C1, rcoin1)
&&...&&
notifn=int_encrypt((((questn, answn, pseudo_Cn),sca’n, markn),
sman), pseudo_Cn, rcoinn)
then event OK
else event KO.
Figure 5.17: The Mark Integrity universal verifiability-test
Mark Integrity
The verifiability-test testUMI, which is in Figure 5.17, is fed with mark notifica-
tions posted on the bulletin board by the exam authority. The auditor obtains
the evaluations generated by the examiner from the mark notifications, and
checks if the marks that the exam authority assigned to the candidates coincide
with the marks that the examiner assigned to the candidates’ tests. Also for
this requirement we assume one examiner who marks all the tests.
In the case that the relations Assigned and Marked contain each one entry,
ProVerif proves that the verifiability-test Mark Integrity is complete and sound.
The general case, which considers an unbounded number of entries, consists on
proving that
testUMI (E) = true ⇔ Assigned = {(i,m) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked}
holds for an exam execution E that considers any size of the relations Assigned
and Marked.
Similarly to Test Integrity, it can be assumed that the size of the relation
Assigned is equal to the relation Marked, as the auditor can check such equality
by looking at the bulletin board.
Let testUMIk (·) be the Mark Integrity verifiability-test applied to an exam
execution that has k marks assigned to the candidates and k marks associated
to the tests; let testUMIk (·)→∗ OK denote the verifiability-test that outputs OK
(true) after some steps; let E be an exam execution that has n marks assigned
to the candidates and n marks associated to the candidates’ tests; let us assume
that the tests are assigned to the candidates in the same order as they were
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Requirement Soundness Completeness
Registration X X(all)
Marking Correctness X (EA) X(all)
Test Integrity X X(all)
Test Markedness X X(all)
Mark Integrity X X(all)
Table 5.4: Summary of the analysis of Remark! for U.V. requirements
marked; let Ej be a version of E that only considers the j
th mark mj assigned
to the candidate ij , and the j
th mark m′j associated to the test of candidate j
′
j .
Since ProVerif proves that the verifiability-test is complete and sound for
one entry, it follows that for soundness we have
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUMI 1(Ej)→∗ OK ⇒ (ij ,mj) = (i′j ,m′j)
and for completeness we have
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij ,mj) = (i′j ,m′j)⇒ testUMI 1(Ej)→∗ OK.
The verifiability-test testUMI n(E) receives from the channels bba1, . . . ,
bban the notifications of the exam authority, and checks if the pseudonyms
and marks obtained from the notifications coincide with the ones obtained from
the evaluations of the examiner. Similarly, the verifiability-test ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n :
testUMI 1(Ej) checks if the j
th pseudonym and mark obtained from the evalu-
ation and notification on channel bbaj are identical. Thus, it follows that
testUMI n(E)→∗ OK
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUMI 1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓(by ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij ,mj) = (i′j ,m′j)
⇓
{(i,m) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked} = Assigned
Thus, the verifiability-test testUMI is sound also for the general case.
{(i,m) : (i, x,m) ∈ Marked} = Assigned
⇓
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : (ij ,mj) = (i′j ,m′j)
⇓(by ProV erif)
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : testUMI 1(Ej)→∗ OK
⇓
testUMI n(E)→∗ OK
Thus, the verifiability-test testUMI is complete also for the general case.
Table 5.4 summarises the results of the universal verifiability analysis of
Remark! and reports the roles required to be honest.
94 CHAPTER 5. THE REMARK! INTERNET-BASED EXAM PROTOCOL
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents Remark!, a protocol for Internet-based exam that guaran-
tees authentication, privacy, and verifiability with minimal trust assumptions.
Remark! meets its requirements in most of the cases by assuming only one
honest server among the servers that compose the exponentiation mixnet. Ac-
cording to each requirement, Remark! can resist against collusion of candidate
and exam authority (e.g., Anonymous Examiner), exam authority and exam-
iner (e.g., Anonymous Marking), or candidate and examiner (e.g., Question
Indistinguishability) without the presence of a trusted third party.
A formal analysis in ProVerif confirms that Remark! ensures all the authen-
tication and privacy requirements proposed in chapter 3. Notably, thanks to
this formal analysis, we found and solved an issue on an earlier version of the
protocol.
Remark! proves to be fully verifiable, according the individual and universal
verifiability definitions proposed in chapter 4. ProVerif automatically proves
all the individual verifiability requirements. Assuming an honest mixnet, all
the requirements but Question Validity and Marking Correctness can be proved
assuming corrupted candidates, examiners, and exam authority. Question Valid-
ity and Marking Correctness still require an honest exam authority. Concerning
the universal verifiability requirements, ProVerif cannot deal with the general
cases, thus we completed the analysis with manual proofs. It turns out that
Remark! ensures all the requirements but Marking Correctness assuming cor-
rupted candidates, examiners, and exam authority. Also in this case, Marking
Correctness can be proved assuming an honest exam authority. However, it is
also assumed that the exam authority provides the auditor with some additional
data at the conclusion of the exam, since all the messages posted on the bulletin
board are encrypted.
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Chapter 6
Computer-assisted Exam
Protocols
According to Definition 2 proposed in chapter 2, a protocol belongs to the
category of computer-assisted exams if at least one if its phases receives some
level of assistance from computers. We argued that the levels of detail and
abstraction of the protocol specification determine whether a protocol belongs
to traditional or to computer-assisted exams.
In this chapter, we focus on some specifications of computer-assisted exam
protocols that share traditional testing, namely testing takes place by pen and
paper. These protocols however have different functional requirements and
threat models: one considers local tasks, such as notification of marks, and
no TTP; some others consider remote tasks, such as remote registration, but
assume TTP; one achieves remote tasks without TTP.
In a way, Remark! already achieves remote registration and remote notifi-
cation with minimal reliance on trusted parties. As Remark! belongs to the
class of Internet-based exams, it requires candidate and exam authority to use
computers at testing in order to sign and encrypt the tests. Therefore, test-
ing cannot take place by pen and paper. Moreover, Remark! assumes at least
one honest mix server. As we shall see later, we propose a computer-assisted
exam protocol that ensures the same authentication and privacy requirements
of Remark! though relying neither on mixnet nor on TTP.
Either testing is carried out traditionally or remotely is a key aspect for
security. Remote testing is supported with computers, which intuitively intro-
duce more security risks, but facilitate the design of the other remote phases.
In contrast, traditional testing is less risky but complicates such remote design.
The major security risks introduced by remote testing are due to remote invig-
ilation and computer devices required at testing. Normally, it is better not to
allow such devices at testing because they can promote candidate cheating. For
instance, Migicovsky et al. [MDRH14] have recently shown how to outsmart in-
vigilation using a smart watch. The difference between traditional testing and
remote testing, namely between computer-assisted exams and Internet-based
exams, finds its analogue in voting: the former is comparable to paper-based
electronic voting systems, while the latter is the analogous of Internet-voting
systems.
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In this chapter, we focus on a family of computer-assisted exam protocols
called WATA. The original versions of WATA progressively introduce more
computer assistance in their design still keeping traditional testing and assum-
ing TTP. We then propose a novel protocol, WATA IV, which includes the
lightweight participation of a TTP, opens up also for computer-based exams,
and ensures more security requirements despite a stronger threat model. WATA
IV is further reconceived to completely remove the TTP. The underlying idea
is to combine oblivious transfer and visual cryptography to allow candidate and
examiner to jointly generate a pseudonym that anonymises the candidate’s test.
The pseudonym is revealed only to the candidate at the beginning of testing.
We analyse the protocol formally in ProVerif and prove that it satisfies all the
stated security requirements.
Outline of the chapter. Section 6.1 discusses the related work about secure
protocols for computer-assisted exams. Section 6.2 describes the original WATA
II & III protocols and their informal analyses. Section 6.3 introduces WATA
IV according the four phases of an exam and points up the novelties respect
to the original WATA schemes. Section 6.4 contains a new exam protocol that
redesigns parts of WATA IV and removes the TTP. This section also introduces
the formalisation of dispute resolution, and provides the formal analysis of the
new exam protocol in ProVerif. Section 6.5 discusses future work and ends the
chapter.
6.1 Related Work
Nowadays, most of the exams employed in public competitions are computer-
assisted or even computer-based. ETS and Pearson Vue develop various Com-
puter-assisted exams for skill and professional certifications [ETS15, Pea15].
The European Union adopts computer-based exams for the selection of EU
personnel [Off13]. The specification of such exams is not publicly available,
and their security fully relies on the developers, who have the prominent role of
TTP during the exam execution. This choice has not prevented frauds on the
administered exams [Wat14].
Different exam protocols have been proposed to ensure anonymous marking.
INFOSAFE [INF15] is an anonymous marking system for computer-assisted
exam with traditional testing, and is adopted in university exams. Candidates
write down their personal details on top of a tamper-evident paper, and hide
them with a flap which is bent and glued over. After marking, the personal
details are disclosed by tearing off the flap. Systems following a “double enve-
lope” strategy, often used in public tenders, make use of two envelops to separate
the identification details from the offers. The personal details are assumed to
be read after marking. Many European universities, such as Dublin City Uni-
versity and University of Sheffield, use their own anonymous marking systems
[Uni15, oS15]. So do top USA academies, such as Stanford and Harvard Law
School [Sch15, Lev04]. The latter relies on the Blind Grading Number system
which assigns candidates with numerical pseudonyms until the marking period
ends. Nemo Scan [Neo15] uses a patented anonymity paper cover [Mou09] con-
sisting of two parts: one with the covered candidate details, the other with a
CHAPTER 6. COMPUTER-ASSISTED EXAM PROTOCOLS 97
section where to type the marks. At notification, a scanner with a proprietary
software reads the paper with the candidate details and assigns her the mark.
All the systems outlined above assume a trusted authority to ensure Anony-
mous Marking. Moreover, it is not clear how such systems scale up to other
security requirements. In this chapter, we discuss how to progressively remove
trusted authorities from the design of the protocols, and consider the exam
authority corrupted to various extents.
6.2 The WATA Exam Protocols
The acronym WATA stands for Written Authenticated Though Anonymous
exams, and refer to a family of exams originally developed at the University of
Catania. Historically, WATA exams have two main goals. The first goal is to
mechanise the double envelope technique in a software. The second goal is to
ensure authentication and anonymity despite a corrupted examiner.
The first two versions of the system are conceptually identical and only
differ in the implementations: WATA I was written in Visual Basic and was
only available for Microsoft Windows; WATA II [BCR10] was implemented in
Java, hence more efficient and portable. In this chapter, we only consider the
second version.
WATA III [BCCKR11] redesigns completely the exam system to offer remote
management and remote notification, features not available in the previous ver-
sions. However, the new design introduces a TTP that participates in all the
phases of the exam. We first propose WATA IV, a new version that minimises
the involvement of such TTP, and then we show how to remove it completely
from the design. Every version considers candidates free of long-term public
keys, and contemplates either traditional testing or computer-based exams, but
not remote testing.
The WATA exams were originally incepted as software rather than protocols.
In the first two versions, the software ran locally into the examiner’s computer,
while in WATA III the software ran into a remote machine. We provide a differ-
ent prospective of the WATA exams by originally describing them as protocols.
Notification Request Authentication
The WATA exam was originally conceived for university exams, and in some
universities nowadays candidates can take the exam up to a fixed number of
times. However, if the candidate withdraws, it is not counted towards the
number of attempts. Other universities have a policy that does not allow the
candidate to resit a failed exam the next session, unless the candidate withdraws
from the exam before notification. Thus, WATA exams consider the additional
requirement of Notification Request Authentication. It says that a mark should
be associated with the candidate only if she requests to learn her mark.
To formalise this requirement in the applied pi-calculus, we need to define
two new events that extend the list proposed in chapter 3.
• requested〈id c, id test〉 means that the candidate id c accepts to learn
the mark associated to the test id test . The event is inserted into the
process of the candidate at the location where the request is sent to the
notifier.
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• stored〈id c,mark〉 means that the authority officially considers the can-
didate id c associated with mark . The event is inserted into the process of
the authority at the location where it registers the mark to the candidate.
The requirement can be specified as follows:
Definition 42 (Notification Request Authentication) An exam protocol
ensures Notification Request Authentication if for every exam process EP
stored〈id c,mark〉  injrequested〈id c, id test〉
on every execution trace.
We use the specification above to formally analyse the protocol described in
Section 6.4.
6.2.1 WATA II
WATA II considers the roles of examiner, invigilator, and candidate. The ex-
aminer, in addition to the usual tasks assigned to its role, runs tasks normally
ascribed to other authorities, such as the question committee, the recorder and
the notifier. The invigilator distributes the tests to the candidates, and collects
them at the end of testing. Every phase of the exam is executed locally, and
testing takes place traditionally by pen and paper.
The examiner maintains data in three tables: the history table DBh records
the performances of the candidate over the past exam; the mark table DBm
stores the mark assigned to each test; The question table DBq stores the ques-
tions.
In the following, we describe the protocol and refer to the message sequence
chart depicted in Figure 6.1.
Preparation
The examiner randomly extracts a list of questions quest from the question ta-
ble, and generates a random test identifier id test of predetermined size n using
the alphabet Σ. The test identifier is stored in the mark table next to an empty
mark. The examiner then prints out the test, which contains the following
information: the test identifier id test, an authentication form auth form, an-
other occurrence of the test identifier, the questions, and a form for the answers
answ form. To facilitate the mechanical reading, both occurrences of the test
identifier are encoded as a barcode. The test has a precise layout, notably with
test identifier and authentication form framed at the top-left corner of the sheet
through a dotted line; this can be seen in Figure 6.2. The examiner signs inside
this frame across test identifier and authentication form and possibly reinforces
the signature with the stamp of the exam organisation. It is assumed that
this association is tamper-proof. This produces testsigned, which the exam-
iner hands to the invigilator (step 1). This phase is repeated as many times as
the number of registered candidates, so that the invigilator gets a pile of tests
pre-signed by the examiner.
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quest ←R DBq
id test ←R Σn
DBm ← 〈id test , 〉
test← print aside(id test , auth form, id test , quest , answ form)
testsigned ← bio sign(M, test)
-1: pile of(testsigned)
- -2: testsignedrandom
testauth filled ← fill auth form(testsigned)
ff3:combine(id doc, hide id test(testauth filled))
check validity(id doc)
check(id doc, reg list)
check(id doc, hide id test(testauth filled)))
-4:combine(id doc, hide id test(testauth filled))
testfilled ←fill answ form(testauth filled)
[token, a test]← split (testfilled)
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ff 6: pile of(a test)
DBm ←id test 〈·,mark〉
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ff 7: token
〈·,mark〉 ←id test DBm
DBh ←id 〈·, course,mark〉
-8: mark
Figure 6.1: The WATA II exam protocol
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Figure 6.2: Fragment of a test in WATA II
Testing
The invigilator leaves the pile of tests on a desk at the exam venue. Then, the
candidate picks a test randomly (step 2), and is assigned a seat. At her seat,
the candidate fills out the authentication form with her personal details, and
temporarily hides the test identifier prior to hand the test combined with her
identity document to the invigilator for authentication (step 3). The hiding
could be achieved, for example, by folding the top corners in. In so doing, the
invigilator cannot learn the test identifier while authenticating the candidate.
The invigilator checks whether the identity document is the candidate’s valid
one, whether the candidate identity matches an entry in the list of registered
candidates and the details written on the authentication form. If so, the invigi-
lator hands identity document and test back to the candidate (step 4), who can
fill out the answer section.
When the testing time is over, the candidate tears the test in two pieces
of papers of different sizes. The smaller one, which we term token, contains
the filled authentication form and the test identifier. The larger piece of paper,
which we term a test , contains questions, test identifier, and answers. The
candidate keeps the token, and leaves the anonymous test in a random position
through the current pile of tests (step 5).
Marking
The invigilator collects the pile of anonymous tests and distributes them to the
examiners (step 6). It also removes the records of the mark table that refer to
undistributed tests.
The examiner evaluates the answers and assigns a mark to the anonymous
test. The examiner then scans the barcode to get the corresponding test iden-
tifier, and enters the mark in the mark table, precisely in the record identified
by the test identifier.
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Notification
The candidate who wants to know her mark brings her token at the venue
announced to host the notification. There the candidate hands the token to
the examiner (step 7), who checks signature and personal details, and scans the
barcode to get the corresponding test identifier. The examiner finds the record
identified by the test identifier on the mark table, and obtains the corresponding
mark. Finally, the examiner stores the mark into the history table, and notifies
the mark to the candidate (step 8).
Discussion
Except for the preparation of the tests, the presence of computers in WATA
II is minimal. Most of the tasks are run by humans, and the security of the
protocol mostly relies on the physical properties of paper.
We consider the requirements proposed in chapter 3. It can be observed that
WATA II trivially ensures Test Authenticity but not Anonymous Examiner be-
cause the protocol considers only one examiner. Candidate Authorisation is
met because the invigilator authorises the candidate to take the exam only if
the personal details reported on the identity document match an entry in the
list of eligible candidates. Also Answer Authenticity is met because the invigi-
lator verifies that the candidate wrote the personal details on the authentication
form. Moreover, the examiner’s signature on the tests ensures their authentic-
ity. It follows that WATA II also ensures Test Origin Authentication. Mark
Authenticity is met because the examiner inserts the mark into the mark table,
exactly in the record identified by the random test identifier reported into the
test. At notification, the examiner notifies the candidate with this mark, which
is also stored in the history table. However, a malicious examiner may tell a
different mark after the candidate hands him the token. The novel requirement
of Notification Request Authentication is met because only the candidate holds
the token. A malicious examiner cannot generate a forged token because it
would need to be signed by the candidate. In fact, the candidate is the sole
entity who can establish the link between her identity and her test.
Concerning privacy requirements, WATA II guarantees Question Indistin-
guishability provided that the candidate does not collude either with the exam-
iner or the invigilator. In fact, the examiner hands the tests to the invigilator
prior testing. However, if the questions that appear into a test are randomly
chosen, it becomes harder for a candidate to learn which questions she will be
assigned. Anonymous Marking is met because only the candidate knows the
test identifier associated to her. Moreover, the candidate submits the test in a
random position of the pile of anonymous tests. WATA II ensures Mark Privacy
because the notification is face-to-face. The examiner notifies the mark to the
corresponding candidate after a successful authentication, and only if she hands
a valid token. Since Mark Privacy is met, it follows that also Mark Anonymity
is met.
Although WATA II ensures authentication and privacy without TTP, it has
the major limitation that notification requires candidates to meet in person the
examiner.
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6.2.2 WATA III
WATA III allows remote notification and involves a major level of computer
assistance than the previous version. The protocol considers the participation
of the WATA Server in addition to candidate, examiner, and invigilator roles.
The WATA Server runs most of the tasks of preparation and notification, while
the tasks of the examiner are now limited to the marking phase.
The WATA Server maintains data in four tables. The history, mark, and
question tables have the same functionalities of the previous protocol. WATA
III introduces the sharec table DBc that stores the partial information about
the test identifier, which now is called pseudonym.
The pseudonym is associated also to the candidate rather than only to the
test. The idea is to split the pseudonym in two shares, print them on the test,
and give one to the candidate and the other to the examiner. The latter can
associate a test to its author only if the candidate reveals its share.
WATA III assumes that a list of registered candidates for the exam is avail-
able to the invigilator, and secure TLS communications between the WATA
Server and the other principals. The WATA Server authenticates invigilator
and candidate via login and password. Every communication between invigi-
lator and candidate is face-to-face, while communications to the WATA Server
are always remote. Remote communications are highlighted with dashed lines
in the message sequence chart in Figure 6.3.
Remark. We found a security issue in the original specification of WATA
III [BCCKR11]. In a nutshell, the specification allowed a corrupted candidate
to be assigned with the mark of the test submitted by another candidate, hence
violating Mark Authenticity. The corrupted candidate could generate a fake
pseudonym such that at notification she could convince the examiner that the
pseudonym should associated with her identity. This was possible because the
original specification contemplates a weak generation of the pseudonym that
reveals key information. We fix this issue by hide such information via hashing.
In the remainder, we only describe the fixed version.
Preparation
At exam venue, the candidate approaches the invigilator’s desk and hands her
identity document id doc (step 1). The invigilator checks whether the personal
details of the candidate id appears in the registered candidate list, and if so, logs
in the WATA Server and sends id via secure channel (step 2). The WATA Server
randomly extracts the questions from the question table. Then, it generates
a random value sharek, whose length matches the id augmented with some
randomness id rnd. Thus, it generates (sharec) that is the result of the one-time
pad of sharek with id rnd. The WATA Server stores sharec in the database and
finally generates the layout of the test. The sharek is placed on the top left of
the printout, while the hashed version of sharec is placed on the top right of
the printout, close to the answer section answ form. Both sharek and hashed
sharec are represented in the form of barcode. The test thus consists of two
parts: the token, which contains sharek and the candidate’s personal details id ;
the anonymous test a test, which contains the hash of sharec, questions, and
answer section.
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WATA Server Invigilator
Examiner
Candidate
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ff 1: id doc
check validity(id doc)
check(id doc, reg list)
ff 2: [id ]logged inv
quest ←R DBq
rnd ←R Σn
id rnd ← id |rnd
sharek ←R Σid rnd
sharec ← sharek ⊕ id rnd
DBc ← sharec
test ← print aside(sharek , id ,
h(sharec), quest , answ form)
-3: [test]logged printer
delete sharek , id rnd , rnd testfilled ←fill answ form(test)
[token, a test]← split(testfilled)
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ff6:[h(sharec),mark]logged E
DBm ←sharec 〈·,mark〉
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ff 7: [id , sharek ]logged C
sharec ← DBc
id , rnd ← sharec ⊕ sharek
〈·,mark〉 ←sharec DBm
DBh ←id 〈·, course,mark〉
-8: [mark]logged C
Figure 6.3: The WATA III exam protocol
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Testing
The WATA Server sends the test via a secure channel to a printer, which is
available at the exam venue. The candidate approaches the printer and takes
its test (step 3). Then, the WATA Server deletes all the data it used but the
one stored in the tables, namely it removes sharek, id rnd, and the randomness.
At her sit, the candidate fills out the answer section with the answers. When
the time is over, the candidate splits the test, and takes the token at home
while inserts the anonymous test a test into a random position of the pile of
anonymous tests (step 4).
Marking
The invigilator collects the pile of anonymous tests and hands them to the exam-
iner (step 5), who evaluates the answers and assigns a mark to each anonymous
test. For each test, the examiner scans the barcode and gets the corresponding
hash of sharec. The examiner then logs into WATA Server and uploads the pair
of hashed sharec and mark via a secure channel (step 6). The WATA Server
can find the corresponding sharec by hashing each entry of DBc. In so doing,
it can store the mark in the entry identified by sharec in the mark table.
Notification
The candidate who wants to know her mark scans the barcode printed in the
token and gets sharek, which she sends to the WATA Server via a secure chan-
nel, after she logged in (step 7). The WATA Server XOR-es sharek with each
sharec stored in the database until it decrypts a valid id concatenated with some
randomness. It then retrieves the record identified by the sharec from the mark
table, and obtains the corresponding mark. Finally, the WATA Server stores
the mark into the history table, and notifies it to the candidate (step 8).
Discussion
It is clear that WATA III cannot be deemed secure assuming a corrupted WATA
Server. This role is ubiquitous in the design and is in charge of the critical steps.
Therefore, the WATA Server should be considered as an honest-but-curious role,
which follows the protocol honestly but tries to learn as much as possible.
A critical part of the protocol is the deletion of data performed by the WATA
Server. Although this practice is found in other protocols [EKOT14], it may be
impractical to force a party to delete data. However, it can be still possible to
verify that the party actually deletes the data [HCZ15].
Concerning the authentication requirements, WATA III ensures Candidate
Authorisation since the invigilator authorises the candidate to take the exam
only if the candidate’s personal details reported on the valid identity document
match an entry in the list of eligible candidates. The invigilator has to ensure
that the correct candidate takes the test generated for her from the printer.
This avoids that corrupted candidates swap their tests before sitting for the
exam. In fact, the protocol does not require that the candidate writes her
personal details down into the test as provided for the previous version. Thus,
the invigilator does not need to check the test once the candidate sits for the
exam. Answer Authenticity is met because candidates are invigilated. If a
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corrupted candidate introduces an illegal test, she will not be able to receive a
mark because the examiner would upload a forged hash of sharec that the WATA
Server could not retrieve in the database. It follows that WATA III ensures Test
Origin Authentication. Similarly to WATA II, Test Authenticity is met but not
Anonymous Examiner since the protocol considers only one examiner. Mark
Authenticity is met because both candidate and examiner know only the hash of
sharec until notification. WATA III ensures Notification request authentication
because only the candidate knows the sharek after testing.
Concerning privacy requirements, Question Indistinguishability is met be-
cause the WATA Server generates the test with the questions. Each test is
printed at testing and taken by the candidate directly, so the invigilator learns
the question only when testing concludes. Although the WATA Server deletes
some data at testing, we observe that it can violate Anonymous Marking. At
preparation, a corrupted WATA Server can associate the candidate id with the
corresponding sharec. At testing, the WATA Server receives from the examiner
the mark associated with the hash of the sharec. Therefore, the WATA Server
can learn the author of a test without the knowledge of sharek. Note that this
attack is possible even considering an honest-but-curious threat model because
it does not require that the WATA Server deviates from the protocol, but re-
sorts solely on the knowledge of the WATA Server. Finally, Mark Privacy is
met because the WATA Server notifies the mark to the candidate only, after
receiving a correct sharek. It follows that WATA III ensures Mark Anonymity
as well.
WATA III allows for remote notification but assigns most of its critical tasks
to a TTP. It turns out that considering an honest-but-curious WATA Server,
WATA III fails to ensure Anonymous Marking.
6.3 WATA IV
In this section, we advance WATA IV, a new exam protocol that overcomes the
limitations of WATA III. We design the protocol without the ubiquitous WATA
Server and introduce the anonymiser role, whose participation is confined to
preparation only. Similar to the WATA Server, the anonymiser is honest-but-
curious but its duties are drastically reduced. In WATA IV most of the critical
tasks are run by a possibly corrupted examiner. Moreover, WATA IV opens
for remote preparation and requires no printers at testing. We anticipate that
WATA IV meets the same security requirements as WATA III does, though
augmented with Anonymous Marking and the two individual verifiability re-
quirements of Mark Integrity and Mark Notification Integrity.
The main novelty of the design of WATA IV is the use visual cryptography.
The idea consists of encoding the pseudonym into two visual cryptographic
shares: one share is given to the candidate, and the other is given to the exam-
iner. Neither the candidate nor the examiner knows the pseudonym until they
meet at testing, when the candidate learns it by overlapping the examiner’s
share with hers.
Thanks to visual cryptography, the candidate can do a cryptographic opera-
tion at testing without the assistance of any computer device. In the following,
we briefly discuss visual cryptography and commitment scheme, namely the
cryptographic primitives used in WATA IV.
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Figure 6.4: Representation of bits 0 and 1 using visual cryptography
Visual Cryptography
It is a secret sharing scheme, devised by Naor and Shamir [NS95], that allows
a visual decryption of a ciphertext. A secret image is “encrypted” by splitting
it into a number of image shares. The basic version of the scheme is the 2-
out-of-2 secret sharing system, in which a secret image is split into two shares
shareA and shareB . The shares are printed on transparency sheets, which reveal
the secret image when the shares are overlapped. This scheme is information-
theoretic secure, namely each share leaks no information about the secret image.
In fact, it emulates the XOR operation though the visual decryption is actually
equivalent to the OR operation. The scheme is information-theoretic secure
because either a black or a white pixel, mapped respectively to 0 and 1, can
originate by any of the sub-pixels shown in Figure 6.4.
Many schemes for visual cryptography have been proposed over the years.
Although we consider the Naor and Shamir scheme for WATA IV, we conjec-
ture that other visual scheme can be used as well, but with different security
guarantees.
Commitment Scheme
A commitment scheme is used to bind a committer to a secret value. The
committer publishes a commitment that hides the value, which remains secret
until he reveals it. Should the committer reveal a different value, this would be
noticed because it cannot be mapped to the published commitment. WATA IV
uses the Pedersen commitment scheme [Ped92], which guarantees unconditional
hiding, namely the value remains secret despite a computational unbounded
attacker. The scheme consists of the algorithms of commitment, in which the
value is chosen, hidden, and bound to the committer, and of disclosure, in
which the value is publicly revealed. The commitment algorithm takes in two
given public generators g, h ∈ Gq, the secret value v, and a random value r ∈R
Z∗q . The algorithm outputs the commitment gvhr denoted with Cr(v). The
disclosure algorithm takes in the commitment Cr(v), the values v and r, and
outputs true if the commitment is correct or false otherwise.
WATA IV adopts the Pedersen commitment scheme at notification. The
examiner generates a commitment of the mark of the candidate. Once the can-
didate reveals her identity to know the mark, she can verify the examiner notifies
her the committed mark. This deters the examiner to notify the candidate with
a mark that is different than the one assigned to candidate’s test.
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-1 : [id , ex ]logged E
pid ←R Σt×u
shareA ←R Σt×u
shareB ← pid ⊕ shareA
dataA ← id , ex , shareA
dataB ← id , ex , shareB
transp ← dataA,SignSSKAn (dataA)
paper ← dataB ,SignSSKAn (dataB )
ff 2 : transp
-3 : paper
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ff 5 : id doc
check validity(id doc)
check(id doc, reg list)
-6 : transp, test
pid ←overlap(transp, paper)
testpid ←fill pid form(test)
testfilled ←fill answ form(testpid)
ff 7 : testfilled
8 : testfilledff
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ff 10 : [SignSSKAn (dataB)]loggedC
pid ← shareA ⊕ shareB
-11 : [SignSSKE (pid,mark,Cr(mark), r)]loggedC
Figure 6.5: The WATA IV exam protocol
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6.3.1 Description
WATA IV relies on a append-only bulletin board in which the examiner pub-
lishes the pseudonyms and the commitment of the marks. Each session is iden-
tified with a unique exam code ex . In the following we describe the protocol
and refer to the message sequence chart depicted in Figure 6.5.
Preparation
The examiner checks the candidate eligible for the exam ex and, if so, enters
the candidate details id in the dedicated list reg list. After that, the examiner
sends the candidate’s details and the exam code to the anonymiser via a secure
channel (step 1).
The anonymiser generates the pseudonym pid that consists of a visual repre-
sentation of a random alphanumeric string, and a random visual cryptographic
image, shareA. Then, the anonymiser generates the second visual cryptographic
image, shareB , such that overlapping shareA and shareB results in the image
representing of the pseudonym. Let dataA denote the triplet of id, ex and
shareA. The anonymiser signs dataA, and generates the corresponding signa-
ture as follows. First, the plaintexts dataA and dataB are encoded in Base64
and signed with the signing key of the anonymiser SSKAn . Then, the signa-
tures are encoded in Base64 again, and included in two QR codes with the
corresponding encoded plaintext. To facilitate the printing, the anonymiser in-
cludes such information in the digital versions of an A4 paper sheet, respectively
transp and paper , which layout is outlined in Figure 6.6. The signatures printed
on the bottom of the sheets self contain the data reported on each sheet plus the
corresponding signature. The anonymiser emails transp to the examiner (step
2) and paper to the candidate (step 3). We assume that the attacker is out of
control of the email infrastructure, hence he cannot learn the contents. However
secure emailing techniques, such as S/MIME [RT10] or MIME over OpenPGP
[EDTLR01], can be used to ensure confidentiality of the content of the emails.
For each candidate, the examiner stores the signed dataA into the database,
and prints each transp on a transparency sheet. Similarly, each candidate prints
her paper on a common A4 paper sheet.
Testing
The examiner hands the transparency sheet to the invigilator (step 4). The
candidate takes a seat at exam venue, and hands a valid identity document
id doc to the invigilator for authentication (step 5). The invigilator checks that
the candidate is in the list of those registered for the exam. Then, the invigilator
finds the transparency sheet transp that reports the candidate’s details, and
hands it to her along with a test (step 6). If some registered candidates fail
to show up, the invigilator puts the corresponding transparency sheets and the
excess tests aside.
Once the invigilator delivers the transparency sheets to all candidates, the
candidate can overlap her paper sheet with the corresponding transparency
sheet and can read the pseudonym. The candidate writes down the pseudonym
into the test and begins to answer the questions. When the testing time is over,
the candidate submits her test (step 7), and takes the paper and transparency
sheets back with her. The candidate can place her test anywhere in the pile
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Candidate Share
 
                +                                                                                                                          +
                +                                                                                                                          +
 
Name: Alice Liddell
ENRL Number: 391706166
Exam Date: 2015-06-03
Exam Number: EX004 - IT-SECURITY
 
 
Instruction: At the examination venue, overlap the Examiner Share with the Candidate Share.
Then, write the appeared token code on the Exam Sheet.
 
Figure 6.6: The candidate paper sheet in WATA IV
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of already submitted tests. The invigilator collects the pile of tests when all
candidates have submitted their tests.
Marking
The invigilator hands all the tests (step 8) and the remaining transparency
sheets to the examiner. The examiner evaluates the test, generates a com-
mitment of the mark, signs the pair of pseudonym and mark (pid, mark) and
publishes the signature on the public append-only bulletin board (step 9). This
allows the candidate to verify whether her test has been marked though ignoring
the mark.
Notification
The examiner runs notification for a fixed time frame. The candidate who wants
to know her mark sends the signed dataB to the examiner via a secure channel
(step 10). The examiner verifies the signature, and overlaps shareB with its
shareA to get the pseudonym pid. Notably, this procedure can be implemented,
hence requires no human involvement. The examiner thus retrieves the mark
associated with the pseudonym, and finally sends to the candidate the signature
of pseudonym, mark, commitment, and commitment random value (step 11).
6.3.2 Discussion
WATA IV ensures all the security requirements as WATA III does plus a few
more. Concerning authentication, Test Authenticity is trivially met while
Anonymous Examiner is not because the protocol assumes only one examiner.
Candidate Authorisation is met because the invigilator checks that the candi-
date is in the list of those registered for the exam. Answer Authenticity is met
because the invigilator gives to the candidate the transparency sheet that has
her details. If a corrupted candidate prints a different visual crypto image on
her paper sheet, she cannot read any intelligible pseudonym by overlapping the
paper sheet with the transparency sheet. The same applies if any two corrupted
candidates swap their paper sheets before testing. As we shall see later, a dispute
resolution procedure guarantees that a corrupted candidate cannot even claim
that no pseudonym appears because the examiner misprinted the transparency
sheet. Still, a corrupted candidate could write a random pseudonym into the
test, but at notification the candidate would not be able to send a valid dataB .
Since WATA IV ensures Candidate Authorisation and Answer Authenticity, it
also ensures Test Origin Authentication. Mark Authenticity is met because the
examiner posts on the bulletin board the signature of the pseudonym associated
with a commitment of the mark. Notification request authentication is also met
because only the candidate holds her shareB .
Concerning privacy, Question Indistinguishability is met by the assumptions
on the origin of tests, in which the examiner generates the tests. WATA IV
guarantees Anonymous Marking because the examiner cannot associate a test
with a candidate until notification. Anonymous Marking can last forever, even
if examiner and the invigilator collude, provided that the candidate chooses not
to get her mark. Mark Privacy is met because the examiner notifies the mark to
the candidate only if the latter sends a valid shareB . Thus each candidate can
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get only their corresponding mark. Notably, the anonymiser cannot associate a
candidate with a mark, because the examiner only publishes the commitment
of the mark on the bulletin board. It follows that also Mark Anonymity is met.
Concerning the individual verifiability requirements, Mark Integrity is met
because the candidates can verify that the examiner registered the same mark
whose commitment was published on the bulletin board. Similarly, Mark Noti-
fication Integrity is met because the candidate can verify that the mark notified
by the examiner is the same committed on the bulletin board.
Dispute resolution
An interesting feature of WATA IV is the support for dispute resolution during
testing. In fact, the combination of signatures and visual cryptography guar-
antees an easy procedure to find the culprit if the candidate or the examiner
misbehave. Therefore, Dispute Resolution is an accountability requirement as
it allow a judge to blame the principal who misbehave in the execution of the
protocol.
In WATA IV the judge is the invigilator, and the dispute originates if no
intelligible pseudonym can be read when the candidate overlaps the paper sheet
with the transparency sheet. Should such a dispute arise, the invigilator could
then quickly resolve it as follows. First, he scans the QR code printed on the
candidate’s paper sheet and checks the correctness of the signature. Then, he
checks if the candidate’s details revealed by the signature match the ones written
on the candidate’s paper sheet. If so, the invigilator overlaps the visual crypto
image revealed by the signature with the transparency sheet provided by the
examiner. If this reveals no intelligible pseudonym then the examiner misprinted
the corresponding transparency sheet. Otherwise the candidate misprinted hers.
The outcome of the dispute can be double checked by repeating the procedure
with the QR code printed on the transparency sheet of the examiner.
Comparison with WATA III
WATA IV brings along significant improvements compared to WATA III. In
particular:
• WATA IV meets the same security requirements of WATA III augmented
with Anonymous Marking and the two individual verifiability require-
ments of Mark Integrity and Mark Notification Integrity.
• WATA IV meets the security requirements despite a more realistic threat
model as it drastically limits the tasks assigned to honest-but-curious roles.
• WATA IV can support both computer-based and computer-assisted ex-
ams, while WATA III supports only computer-assisted exams with tradi-
tional testing. This is possible because test and pseudonym are generated
independently in WATA IV. At testing, the candidate chooses one of the
computer devices provided at exam venue, and enters the pseudonym re-
trieved from the paper sheets. Of course, the use of computers at testing
raises similar security of Internet-based exam, as discussed in chapter 5
for Remark!.
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• In WATA IV the candidate receives part of the pseudonym by mail rather
than at the exam venue.
• In WATA IV the examiner cannot register a different mark to the candi-
date after he learns the corresponding test, because he commits the mark
at marking.
• In WATA IV any dispute between the candidate and the examiner can be
solved with no efforts at testing: if an intelligible pseudonym appears, the
candidate received the correct transparency sheet. If not, the signatures
on the sheets reveal who misbehaved.
In the next section we propose an enhancement that removes the need of
the honest-but-curios anonymiser in the design of the protocol. Moreover, we
corroborate the results of the informal security analysis outlined above, with
the automated verification of the enhanced protocol in ProVerif.
6.4 Removing the Need of Trusted Parties
The major limitation of WATA IV is that it requires an honest-but-curious
anonymiser. Although its lightweight participation, relying on a trusted third
party in the design of a security protocol introduces obvious risks. The risks
can be mitigated by distributing the trust across several parties, as we did for
Remark! in chapter 5, but it still requires at least one party to be trustworthy.
In the domain of exams this is critical because parties typically have conflicting
interests, and it may be hard to find an entity who can play the role of a TTP,
as recent exam scandals confirm.
In this section, we propose a new protocol that guarantees several secu-
rity properties without the need of a TTP. The protocol combines oblivious
transfer and visual cryptography to allow candidate and examiner to jointly
generate a pseudonym that anonymises the candidates test without the need of
the anonymiser. The pseudonym is revealed only to the candidate at testing.
We analyse the protocol formally in ProVerif and prove that it satisfies the same
security requirements stated for WATA IV.
We minimise the roles used in this protocol to candidate and examiner. The
latter also runs the tasks associated to the roles of anonymiser and invigilator
in WATA IV. As we consider a corrupted examiner who can deviate from any of
its assigned tasks, it follows that any of its sub-roles can be corrupted as well.
Oblivious transfer
This protocol uses oblivious transfer to avoid the participation of the honest-
but-curious anonymiser. Oblivious transfer schemes allow a chooser to pick some
pieces of information from a set that a sender offers him, in such a way that
(a) the sender does not learn which pieces of information the choosers picks,
and (b) the chooser learns no more than the pieces of information he picks.
Our enhanced protocol adopts Tzeng’s oblivious transfer scheme [Tze04]. In
Tzeng’s scheme, the chooser commits to some elements from a set, and sends
the commitments to the sender. This, in turn, obfuscates all the set’s elements,
and the chooser will be able to de-obfuscate only the elements he has committed
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to. Tzeng’s scheme guarantees unconditional security for the receiver’s choice,
and it is efficient since it works with the sender and receiver’s exchanging only
two messages.
6.4.1 Description
In this protocol, we mainly revise the preparation phase, while the design of the
other phases are similar to the design of WATA IV. Candidate and examiner
jointly generate the pseudonym pid as a pair of visual cryptography shares, by
means of an oblivious transfer scheme rather than via the anonymiser. Notably,
also the procedure for dispute resolution requires some modification since it
cannot rely on the anonymiser’s signatures.
We describe the protocol in reference to the four exam phases. We assume
that all remote communications are via a secure channel. Figure 6.7 illustrates
preparation in the Alice-Bob notation; Figure 6.8 describes testing; Figure 6.9
describes the protocol’s steps that concern both marking and notification.
In the description we assume the following public parameters:
n length of the candidate’s pseudonym
Σ = {s1, . . . , sk} alphabet of pseudonym’s characters
cj ∈ {0, 1}t×u, j = 1, . . . , k (t× u)-pixel representation of a character
idC candidate ID
ex exam code
SPKE signing key of the examiner
M set of possible marks
g, h ∈R Gq generators for bit-commitments
Preparation
The goal of preparation is to generate a candidate’s pseudonym, which is a
string of n characters taken from the alphabet Σ, and to encode it into two
visual cryptographic shares. Both candidate and examiner cannot know the
pseudonym until they meet at testing, when the candidate learns her pseudonym
by overlapping the examiner’s share with hers. The underlying idea is that the
candidate provides a commitment to an index into an array. The examiner fills
the array with a secret permutation of the characters, and only when the two
secrets are brought together is the selection of a character determined.
Part of this phase is inspired by one of the schemes used to print a secret,
proposed by Essex et al. [ECHA09]. We tailor the scheme in such a way to be
able to generate a pseudonym and to support the dispute resolution algorithm.
More precisely, the main technical differences between preparation and their
scheme are: (a) a modified oblivious transfer protocol that copes with several
secret messages in only one protocol run; (b) the generation of signatures that
will be used for accountability in the resolution of disputes.
In the following we refer to the steps outlined in Figure 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9. The
protocol begins with the candidate providing a sequence of l commitments yi to
an index into an array of length k. (steps 1-2). More precisely, the parameter l,
is chosen so that the l − n elements can be later used for a cut-and-choose au-
dit. The examiner can challenge the candidate to check whether the committed
choices are in fact in the interval [1, k]. Otherwise, the examiner generates a
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1. C calculates yi = g
xihγi where:
- xi ∈R Z∗q .
- γi ∈R [1, k].
- i = 1, 2, . . . , l with l > n.
2. C→E : y1, y2, . . . , yl.
3. E calculates βij ←piR (αi ⊕ cj), ωij = 〈aij , bij〉 ← 〈grij , βij
(
yi
hj
)rij 〉,
com = hs
l∏
i=1
gi
αi , and sign1 = SignSSKE (idC , ex , com) where:
- αi ∈R [0, 1]t×u.
- s, rij ∈R Z∗q .
- gi ∈R Gq.
- i = 1, 2, . . . , l.
- j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
or runs the challenge procedure against y1, y2, . . . , yl.
4. E→C : (ω11, . . . , ω1k), . . . (ωl1, . . . , ωlk) and sign1 .
5. C calculates χi ∈ [1, l] and σj ∈ [1, l] where:
- i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
6. C→E : χ1, χ2, . . . , χm and σ1, σ2, . . . , σn.
7. E calculates evχi = 〈αχi , (βχi1, βχi2, . . . , βχik), (rχi1, rχi2, . . . , rχik)〉 and
sign2 = SignSSKE (idC , ex , (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn)) where
- i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
- j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
and prints transp = 〈(ασ1 , ασ2 , . . . , ασn), idC , ex , QR3〉 where
- QR3 = idC , ex , (α1, α2, . . . , αl, s).
8. E→C : evχ1 , evχ2 , . . . , evχm and sign2 .
9. C checks evχi , calculates βσj =
bσjγj
(aσjγj )
xσj
where
- i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
- j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
and prints paper = 〈(βσ1 , βσ2 , . . . , βσn), idC , ex , QR1, QR2〉 where
- QR1 = idC , ex , sign1 .
- QR2 = idC , ex , sign2 .
Figure 6.7: Preparation phase
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10. C
hands−−−−→E : id doc
11. E checks id doc
12. E
hands−−−−→C : transp, test
13. C calculates pid = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ⊕ (β1, β2, . . . , βn) and writes
testfilled = (answers, pid)
or runs the Dispute Resolution algorithm if no pseudonym appears.
14. C
hands−−−−→E : testfilled
Figure 6.8: Testing phase
15. E calculates c = gvhmark and sign3 = SignSSKE (pid , c) where:
- v ∈R Z∗q .
- mark ∈M .
16. E→ BB: sign3
17. C→E :(β1, β2, . . . , βn), sign1 , sign2 , sign3
18. E calculates sign4 = SignSSKE (idC , ex , pid,mark , v)
19. E→C : sign4
Figure 6.9: Marking and Notification phases
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sequence of randomly chosen t× u images, indicated as α1, . . . , αl in Figure 6.7.
A sequence of k images, (βi1, . . . , βik), are generated from αi and each possible
character cj . The sequence is randomly permuted and repeated for all i, result-
ing in l sequences of (β11, . . . , β1k), . . . , (βl1, . . . , βlk). The secret permutation
and the commitment allow that the selection of character is determined only
when the two secrets are brought together.
The examiner then generates the obfuscation ωij from each βij and a com-
mitment on each αi, indicated as com (step 3), which is signed and sent with
the sequences of obfuscations (ω11, . . . , ω1k),. . . , (ωl1, . . . , ωlk) to the candidate
(step 4). The obfuscation allows the candidate to retrieve only the elements
whose indexes correspond to the choices she committed in step 1 (yi).
The candidate performs a cut-and-choose audit, selecting a random set of
l − n sequences amongst the ω. In so doing, she can check whether the ex-
aminer generated the sequence of images correctly. The remaining substitu-
tions σ1, σ2, . . . , σn select the indexes of the images that make the pseudonym.
Thus, the visual share of the examiner consists of the concatenated images
(ασ1 , . . . , ασn) (step 5-6).
The examiner then generates the proofs for the cut-and-choose audit, and
prints the visual share and the candidate’s details in the transparency printout
transp. This also include all the elements α1, . . . , αl and the value used for their
commitment (step 7), which are stored in the form of QR code. The examiner
then sends the proofs and the signed substitutions σ to the candidate (step 8).
In turn, the candidate checks the proofs, de-obfuscates the elements ω, and re-
trieves the visual share consisting of the concatenated image (βσ1 , βσ2 , . . . , βσn).
She finally prints the share, together with the two signatures, on a paper print-
out (step 9). At this point, both candidate and examiner have a visual share,
which once overlapped reveal an intelligible sequence of characters that serves
as pseudonym.
The candidate’s paper printout includes two QR codes (QR1, and QR2 )
while the examiner’s transparency only one (QR3 ). All the three QR codes share
the same candidate identity idC and exam identifier ex . The QR codes QR1 and
QR2 encode the two signatures of the examiner, respectively on commitment of
the elements α and on the substitutions σ, while QR3 encodes the elements α.
Testing
The candidate brings the paper printout at exam venue, while the examiner
brings the transparencies. The examiner authenticates the candidate by check-
ing her identity document (step 10-11). He then gives the candidate her corre-
sponding transparency and the test (step 12). The candidate overlaps her paper
printout with the transparency and learns her pseudonym, which she writes on
the test (step 13). If no pseudonym appears, then this may happen only if
the candidate or the examiner misprinted their printouts, and the Dispute Res-
olution outlined in Algorithm 1 reveals the party that is accountable for the
misbehaviour. At the end of the phase, the candidate returns the filled test
anywhere in the pile of tests (step 14), and takes both transparency and paper
printouts home.
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Marking and Notification
At marking, the examiner evaluates the answers and generates a commitment
on the assigned mark (step 15). Then, he signs both mark and pseudonym
found in the answer sheet, and publishes the signature on the bulletin board
(step 16).
Notification opens for a fixed time, during which the candidate can remotely
request to learn and register her mark. She has to send the ordered sequences
of β1, . . . , βn and all the signatures so far she collected to the examiner (step
17). The examiner checks the signatures, overlaps the given sequence with the
corresponding sequences of α1, . . . , αn, and learns the pseudonym. Again, if
no registered pseudonym appears, Dispute Resolution can reveal the party who
misbehaved. The examiner signs the mark and the secret parameter used to
commit the mark (step 18), and sends the signature to the candidate (step 19).
In so doing, the candidate can verify the correctness of the mark by looking at
the bulletin board.
Data: Public parameters: (C, n, gi, h, idC ,SPKE)
- paper = ((βσ1 , βσ2 , . . . , βσn), idC
′, ex ′, sign1 , sign2 ) where:
- sign1 = SignSSKE (idC
′′, ex ′′, com)
- sign2 = SignSSKE (idC
′′′, ex ′′′, (σ′1, σ
′
2, . . . , σ
′
n))
- transp = (ασ′′1 , ασ′′2 , . . . , ασ′′n ), idC
′, ex ′, (α′1, α
′
2, . . . , α
′
l, s).
Result: Corrupted principal
if sign1 is verifiable with SPKE and sign2 is verifiable with SPKE and
idC = idC ′ = idC ′′ = idC ′′′ and ex = ex ′ = ex ′′ = ex ′′′ then
if com 6= hs
l∏
i=1
gi
α′i or pid=(α′σ′1 , α
′
σ′2
, . . . , α′σ′n)⊕ (βσ1 , βσ2 , . . . , βσn)
then
return Examiner
else
return Candidate
else
return Candidate
Algorithm 1: Dispute resolution
Dispute resolution
The Algorithm 1 provides an efficient way to resolve a dispute if the candidate
retrieves no intelligible pseudonyms when she overlaps the visual shares. We
assume that at exam venue it is available an electronic device with a camera,
such as a smart phone or tablet, which stores the public key of the examiner. The
input of the Algorithm are the two QR codes printed on the paper printout (QR1
and QR2) and the QR code printed on the transparency (QR3), all scanned with
the camera of the electronic device.
First, the algorithm checks the correctness of the signatures encoded in QR1
and QR2. It also checks whether the candidate identity and the exam identifier
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Primitive Equation
Probabilistic symmetric enc. sdec(senc(m, k, r), k) = m
Signature
getmess(sign(m, ssk)) = m
checksign(sign(m, ssk), spk(ssk)) = m
Visual cryptography
overlap(share, gen share(m, share)) = m
overlap(share, share) = share
Oblivious transfer deobf (obf (r,m, sel, commit(r′, sel)), r′) = m
Table 6.1: Equational theory to model the enhanced protocol
reported on the paper printout match the ones in QR1 and QR2. If any one of
the checks fails then the candidate misprinted her paper printout thus she is the
culprit. Otherwise, the algorithm uses the data in QR3 to check the correctness
of the examiner’s commitment and that no pseudonym appears using the α
elements indexed with the σ substitutions encoded in QR3. If any one of these
checks fails then the examiner misprinted the transparency and thus he is guilty,
otherwise the candidate is the culprit.
6.4.2 Formal Analysis
We analyse the protocol in ProVerif. In the remainder, we first presents the
formal model, and then the results of the analysis of authentication, privacy,
verifiability, and accountability requirements.
Model choices
We model TLS and face-to-face communications between the roles using the
cryptographic primitive of probabilistic symmetric encryption rather than using
ProVerif’s private channels. This choice is motivated because the attacker can-
not monitor communications via ProVerif’s private channels, and cannot even
know if any communication happens. We think this is a too strong assumption
that may miss attacks. By renouncing to private channels, we achieve stronger
security guarantees for the analysis of the protocol. Moreover, our choice has a
triple advantage: it allows the attacker to learn when a candidate registers for
the exam or is notified with a mark; it allows modelling either corrupted candi-
date or examiner by just sharing the private key with the attacker; it increases
the chance that verification in ProVerif terminates. Also, the attacker has more
discretional power because he can observe when a candidate is given the test
and when she submits the answers.
We use the equational theory illustrated in Table 6.1 to model the crypto-
graphic primitives of the protocol. The theory for probabilistic symmetric key
consists of two functions senc and sdec. A message encrypted with a private key
can only be decrypted using the same private key. Note that the randomness
r on the encryption algorithm causes that the same message encrypted several
times outputs different ciphertexts. The equational theory for signature is the
same used in the other protocols considered in this dissertation.
We introduce a novel theory in ProVerif to model oblivious transfer and
visual cryptography. The function obf allows the examiner to obfuscate the
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elements β1, . . . , βi, while the function deobf returns the correct element βsel
to the candidate, depending on the choice she committed. We also provide
the theory for the Pedersen commitment scheme with the function commit .
Finally, we model the generation of a visual cryptography share with gen share,
and their overlapping with the function overlap.
The process of the candidate is modelled in Figure 6.10; the process of the
examiner is in Figure 6.11; the exam process is depicted in Figure 6.12. In
addition, we also model an unbounded number of corrupted candidates who
can register for the exam as in Figure 6.13. All the processes are augmented
with the events that allow the verification of authentication requirements. We
verify Anonymous Marking in presence of a corrupted examiner and corrupted
co-candidates. The corresponding ProVerif process is depicted in Figure 6.14.
We add the process collector that simulates the desk where candidates leave
their tests (Figure 6.15). To verify Question Indistinguishability, we consider
corrupted candidates, while for both Mark Privacy and Mark Anonymity we
consider corrupted eligible candidates who can register for the exam but cannot
participate at testing.
Data: Public parameters: (g, h,SPKE)
- sign3 = SignSSKE (pid , c)
- idC , pid ′,mark , v.
Result: Whether the candidate was notified with the mark assigned to
her test.
if pid = pid ′ and c = gvhmark then
return true
else
return false
Algorithm 2: The verifiability-test for Mark Integrity I.V.
Modelling Verifiability. The individual verifiability definition of Mark In-
tegrity can be modelled with Algorithm 2, which defines the verifiability-test
testMI. The corresponding ProVerif model is depicted in Figure 6.16.
The verifiability-test testMI takes in the pseudonym pid, the randomness
value of the commitment, and the mark notified to the candidate via a private
channel. It also takes as input the notification sign3 signed by the examiner
from the bulletin board. The verifiability-test checks if the examiner’s signature
is correct and the disclosure of the commitment contained on the notification
reveals the mark provided by the candidate. Since this requirement is interesting
in presence of corrupted co-candidates and a corrupted examiner, we model
the bulletin board as a ProVerif process to check soundness. In so doing, we
can annotate the process of the bulletin board with the event marked in the
location where it publishes the notification. We also annotate the process of the
candidate with the event assigned in the location where the process receives
the notification. We then use the following correspondence assertion to check
soundness:
OK〈id , pid ,mark〉  marked〈pid〉 ∪ assigned〈id , pid ,mark〉
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let C (idC: host, k: key, dvk: key, answer: bitstring,
choiceC: bitstring, spkE: pkey) =
(*Preparation*)
out(ch, idC);
(* commitment on choices *)
new x: rand;
let commitC= commit(x, choiceC) in
out(ch, senc((commitC, idC),k));
(* sign1 *)
in(ch, encomega: bitstring);
let (omega1: bitstring, omega2: bitstring, sign1: bitstring)=
sdec(encomega,k) in
let (=idC, =spkE, com: bitstring)=checksign(sign1, spkE) in
(* cut-and-choose & retrieve beta *)
in(ch, encsign2: bitstring);
let (sign2: bitstring)=sdec(encsign2,k) in
let (=idC,=spkE,alpha:bitstring,beta1:bitstring,beta2:bitstring)=
checksign(sign2, spkE) in
if ((code1=overlap(c0,alpha,beta1) &&
code2=overlap(c0,alpha,beta2)) ||
(code2=overlap(c0,alpha,beta1) &&
code1=overlap(c0,alpha,beta2))) then
if beta1= deobf(omega1,x) then
Ctesting(dvk, k, answer, beta1, idC,spkE,sign2,sign1)
else if beta2= deobf(omega2,x) then
Ctesting(dvk, k, answer, beta2, idC,spkE,sign2,sign1).
let Ctesting(dvk: key, k:key, answer: bitstring, beta: bitstring,
idC: host, SPKe: pkey, sign2: bitstring,
sign1: bitstring) =
(*Testing*)
in(ch, dvtransp: bitstring);
let (question: bitstring, alpha’: bitstring, =idC, =SPKe) =
sdec(dvtransp, dvk) in
let pid=overlap(c0,alpha’,beta) in
if pid=code1 || pid=code2 then (*otherwise dispute resolution*)
event submitted(idC, SPKe , question, answer,pid);
out(ch, senc((answer, pid, question),dvk));
(*Marking*)
in(ch, sign3: bitstring);
let (=pid, commitM: commitment)=checksign(sign3, SPKe) in
(*Notification*)
(* request to learn her mark *)
event requested(idC, pid);
out(ch, senc( (beta, sign1, sign2, sign3, pid),k));
in(ch, encsign4: bitstring);
let sign4=sdec(encsign4,k) in
let (=idC, =pid, =SPKe, mark: bitstring, v: rand) =
checksign(sign4, SPKe) in
if commitM=commit(v, mark) then
event notified(idC, mark,pid).
Figure 6.10: The process of the candidate
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let E (sskE:skey, question: bitstring, idX: host) =
new perm_ch: channel;
(
(
(*Preparation*)
get sslkey(=idX,k) in (* check if the host is eligible *)
in(ch, enccommit: bitstring);
let (commitX: commitment, =idX)=sdec(enccommit,k) in
new alpha: bitstring;
in(ch, (c’: bitstring, c’’:bitstring)); (* calculate beta *)
let beta1=share(c’,alpha) in
let beta2=share(c’’,alpha) in
new r1: rand; new r2: rand; (* obfuscate the betas *)
let omega1=obf(r1, beta1, s1, commitX) in
let omega2=obf(r2, beta2, s2, commitX) in
new s: rand; (*commitment on alphas *)
let com=commit(s, alpha) in
let sign1=sign( (idX, spk(sskE), com), sskE) in
out(ch, senc( (omega1, omega2, sign1), k));(*cut-and-choose*)
let sign2=sign( (idX, spk(sskE), alpha, beta1, beta2), sskE) in
out(ch, senc(sign2, k) );(* Print the transparency *)
let dvtransp=(question, alpha, idX, spk(sskE)) in
event registered(idX);
(*Testing*)
(* de visu authentication *)
(* get the key to emulate de visu scenario at testing *)
get dvkey(=idX, dvk) in
out(ch, senc(dvtransp,dvk)); (* hand the transparency *)
in(ch, enctest: bitstring); (* get the filled test *)
let (answer: bitstring, pid: bitstring, =question) =
sdec(enctest, dvk) in
if (pid=code1 || pid=code2) then
event collected(idX, spk(sskE), question, answer,pid);
event distributed(idX,question, answer,pid);
(*otherwise dispute resolution*)
(*Marking*)
new v: rand; new mark: bitstring;
let commitM= commit(v, mark) in
let sign3= sign( (pid, commitM), sskE) in
(* publish the commitment of the mark *)
event marked(question,answer,mark,pid);
out(ch, sign3);
(*Notification*)
in(ch, encnotif: bitstring);
let (beta: bitstring, =sign1, =sign2, =sign3, =pid)=
sdec(encnotif, k) in
if pid=overlap(c0,alpha,beta) then (* is the correct beta? *)
event stored(idX, mark,pid); (* notify the candidate *)
out(ch, senc(sign((idX, pid, spk(sskE), mark, v), sskE), k))
) |
(out(perm_ch, (code1,code2)) | out(perm_ch, (code2,code1)))
).
Figure 6.11: The process of the examiner
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process
!(
new sskE: skey; let spkE = spk(sskE) in out (ch, spkE);
(!in(ch, idhost: host); new questions:bitstring;
E(sskE, questions, idhost)) |
(!processA) |
(! (new answer: bitstring; new k: key; insert sslkey(CA, k);
new dvk:key; insert dvkey(CA, dvk);
C(CA, k, dvk, answer, s1, spkE))
)
)
Figure 6.12: The exam process
let processA =
in(ch, (h: host, kX: key, dvkX: key));
if h<>CA then
insert sslkey(h,kX).
insert dvkey(h,dvkX).
Figure 6.13: The process of corrupted candidate
process
!(
new sskE: skey; let spkE = spk(sskE) in out (ch,(sskE, spkE));
new coll_key: key;
(!processA) | (!collector(coll_key)) |
(new idC: host; new k: key; insert sslkey(idC, k);
(* The examiner is corrupted so the attacker knows the keys *)
new dvk:key; insert dvkey(idC, k); out(ch, k); out(ch, dvk);
C(idC, k, dvk, choice[ansA,ansB], coll_key, s1, spkE)
) |
(new idC: host; new k: key; insert sslkey(idC, k);
(* The examiner is corrupted so the attacker knows the keys *)
new dvk:key; insert dvkey(idC, k); out(ch, k); out(ch, dvk);
C(idC, k, dvk, choice[ansB,ansA], coll_key, s2, spkE) )
)
Figure 6.14: The exam process to analyse Anonymous Marking
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let collector (coll_key: key) =
in(ch, (encA: bitstring, idcA: bitstring));
in(ch, (encB: bitstring, idcB: bitstring));
let (answerA: bitstring, codeA: bitstring, =idcA) =
sdec(encA, coll_key) in
let (answerB: bitstring, codeB: bitstring, =idcB) =
sdec(encB, coll_key) in
if idcA<>idcB && codeA<>codeB then
(* A candidate cannot submit a test twice *)
let tA= (answerA,codeA) in
let tB= (answerB,codeB) in
out(ch,choice[tA,tB]);
out(ch,choice[tB,tA]).
Figure 6.15: The collector process
let testMI(spkE: pkey, priv_ch: channel, bbpk: pkey) =
in(ch, signsign_bb:bitstring);
in(priv_ch, (idX:host, pid’:bitstring, mark:bitstring, v:rand));
let (sign_bb:bitstring)=checksign(signsign_bb, bbpk) in
let (pid: bitstring, commitM: commitment) =
checksign(sign_bb, spkE) in
if pid=pid’ && commitM=commit(v, mark) then
event OK
else KO.
Figure 6.16: The ProVerif process of the verifiability-test testMI
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let dispute(spkE: pkey, dvk: key) =
in(ch, transppaper: bitstring);
let ((q: bitstring, alpha: bitstring, idhost: host, =spkE,
alpha’: bitstring, s: rand),
(beta: bitstring, idhost: host, =spkE, sign1: bitstring,
sign2: bitstring)) = sdec(transppaper, dvk) in
let (idX: host, ex’: pkey, com: commitment) =
checksign(sign1, spkE) in
let (idX’: host, ex’’: pkey, alpha’’: bitstring,
beta1: bitstring, beta2: bitstring) =
checksign(sign2, spkE) in
if idX=idX’ && idX=idhost && ex’=ex’’ && ex’=spkE then
if com<>commit(s, alpha’) || code1=overlap(c0,alpha’,beta) ||
code2=overlap(c0,alpha’,beta) || alpha’<>alpha’’ then
event Eguilty
else event Cguilty
else event Cguilty.
Figure 6.17: The ProVerif process of dispute
To prove completeness, ProVerif checks that the verifiability-test process does
not emit the event KO when the input data is correct.
It can be observed that Mark Notification Integrity I.V. can be modelled
with the same test used to check of Mark Integrity I.V. In fact, the candidate
checks if the commitment associated to her pseudonym contains the same mark
that the examiner notified to her.
Modelling Dispute Resolution. We introduce the first formalisation of ac-
countability requirement for exams, namely Dispute Resolution. Accountability
allows us to identify which principal is responsible for a protocol failure. In
the case of exam, a candidate should be able to submit a test and receive the
corresponding mark. If she fails in any of these, Dispute Resolution prescribes
that the participant who caused such failure can be identified. We formally
model Dispute Resolution with a similar approach advanced for individual ver-
ifiability, with two differences: first, we resort to unreachability of an event to
prove soundness; second, we check that the exam process does not execute the
algorithm of Dispute Resolution to prove completeness.
The process dispute is illustrated in Figure 6.17. The process takes in the
examiner’s transparency and the candidate’s paper, and outputs the corrupted
principal according to Algorithm 1 specified in section 6.4.1. It is annotated with
the event Cguilty, which the process emits when the candidate is considered
to be the culprit. The process is also annotated with the event Eguilty, which
is emitted when the examiner is considered to be the culprit.
If the protocol executes the process dispute, then either the examiner or
the candidate is corrupted. Thus, regarding soundness, the idea is to check that
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dispute cannot return an honest principal instead of the corrupted one. This
is captured by the following definitions.
Definition 43 (Soundness (corrupted examiner)) The process dispute is
sound with respect to a corrupted examiner and honest candidate if the event
Cguilty is emitted in no execution trace of the exam protocol.
Definition 44 (Soundness (corrupted candidate)) The process dispute is
sound with respect to a corrupted candidate and honest examiner if the event
Eguilty is emitted in no execution trace of the exam protocol.
To prove completeness, we check that the exam protocol never runs the
process dispute, hence both events Cguilty and Eguilty are not emitted. This
is captured by the following definition.
Definition 45 (Completeness (exam process)) The exam protocol is com-
plete respect to Dispute Resolution if neither the event Eguilty nor Cguilty
are emitted in any execution trace of the protocol with honest roles.
We thus can say that the exam protocol ensures Dispute Resolution if
dispute is sound and the exam protocol complete.
Limitations
A limitation of the formal model is the specification of the cut-and-choose audit
due to the powerful ProVerif’s attacker model. In fact, if the attacker plays
the cutter’s role, he might cut the set of elements such that the subset audited
by the chooser is correct, while the other subset not. Although in reality the
probability of success of this attack for a large set of elements is small, it is a
valid attack in ProVerif irrespective of the number of elements. In our case,
the chooser is the candidate and the cutter the examiner. We thus have a false
attack when the examiner is corrupted, namely controlled by the attacker. In
this case, we avoid this situation by allowing the candidate to check all the
elements of the set. This is sound because the candidate plays the role of the
chooser, thus she is honest and follows the protocol although she knows the
extra information.
Results
Table 6.2 outlines the results of our analysis. ProVerif confirms that the protocol
guarantees all the authentication requirements despite allowing an unbounded
number of corrupted eligible co-candidates. Thus, the exam protocol ensures
authentication although the attacker can register to the exam.
Concerning privacy properties, ProVerif proves that the exam protocol guar-
antees all the privacy requirements. We do not consider Anonymous Examiner
since we assume only one examiner, hence the protocol trivially fails to meet
the requirement.
ProVerif confirms the verifiability-test testMI is sound and complete, thus
the exam protocol is Mark Integrity I.V. and Mark Notification Integrity I.V.
verifiable.
Finally, the exam protocol ensures Dispute Resolution: ProVerif shows that
the protocol does not blame honest principals when the dispute algorithm is
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Requirement Result Time
Candidate Authorisation X 8 s
Answer Authenticity X 7 s
Test Origin Authentication X 7 s
Test Authenticity X 8 s
Mark Authenticity X 8 s
Notification Request Auth. X 8s
Question Indistinguishability X <1 s
Anonymous Marking X 27 s
Mark Privacy X 28 m 41 s
Mark Anonymity X 52 m 12 s
Mark Integrity I.V. X <1s
Dispute Resolution X <1s
Table 6.2: Summary of the analysis of the enhanced protocol
executed (soundness), and that does not run the algorithm when both examiner
and candidate are honest (completeness).
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter draws its motivation by observing that exam security has a major
role in the widespread acceptance of computer-assisted exams. It focuses on a
family of computer-assisted exams called WATA, and shows how to gradually
remove the need of trusted third party in their design, though ensuring more
security requirements.
This chapter provides a new outlook of WATA II and WATA III, which
originally were conceived as software running into the examiner’s machine, by
re-engineering them as exam protocols. It discusses their security properties,
trust assumptions, and both security and functional limitations. Then, it ad-
vances WATA IV, a novel exam protocol that allows both remote registration
and remote notification. WATA IV reduces significantly the participation
of TTP respect to the previous versions, while guaranteeing more security re-
quirements. Moreover, WATA IV supports both computer-based exam and
traditional testing.
WATA IV is further enhanced resulting in a new protocol that meets the
same security requirements of WATA IV but without the need of a TTP. The
underlying idea is to combine oblivious transfer and visual cryptography to
generate a pseudonym that anonymises the test for the marking. A formal
analysis in ProVerif confirms that the enhanced protocol ensures all the stated
requirements.
Finally, this chapter advances the accountability requirement of Dispute Res-
olution and its formal specification. Using ProVerif, we prove that the enhanced
protocol also meets such requirement without the need of a TTP.
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Chapter 7
Formal Analysis of
Certificate Validation in
SEB and Modern Browsers
Computer-assisted exams often include some remote tasks, such as remote reg-
istration or remote notification of candidates, which normally take place by
means of a browser. Internet-based exams also require that candidates take
the exam via software, possibly a browser [SBL+12] [Com15, Fid15]. Although
these browsers are customised to prevent unauthorised access to resources dur-
ing the exam, they still appeal on TLS to meet authentication and privacy. In
the design of secure exam protocols, as well as in many security protocols, it is
often assumed that an implementation of TLS channel is available to secure the
communications among the principals.
While we can reasonably assume that TLS provides privacy and integrity as
it uses robust cryptographic schemes, we should be more careful in assuming the
same for authentication. The authentication of a website depends, to various
degrees, on trust. One element of trust comes either from the web-of-trust
concept [Zim92] or from the public-key infrastructure (PKI) [CSF+08]. Either
way, the authentication of a website works through the emission of certificates.
A certificate binds an identity with a public key, and contains other pieces of
information that the verifier, also known as authenticator or trustor, needs to
check to accept the certificate. The verifier is a software, normally the browser
of the user who accesses a website. The browser verifies that the identity on the
certificate corresponds to the identity on the website, and that the certificate
is signed by a trusted authority. Thus, an authentication that succeeds seems
to depend mostly on the browser than on the user. But when the validation
fails, browsers usually resort on the choices of users. In this case, the user is the
ultimate responsible for the website’s authentication.
Invalid certificates are not rare. For example, exam authorities and insti-
tutions often self-issue their own certificates rather than purchase them from
accredited certification authorities. Self-issuing a certificate is in fact cheaper.
But, even if institutions purchase their certificates from a recognised authority,
they may still use the certificate beyond its expiration date or abuse it to cer-
tify different domains and sub-domains that are not actually provided for the
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certificate. With a security take, an invalid certificate may originate from a net-
work attacker who attempts a man-in-the-middle attack, namely the attacker
replaces the server’s certificate with his own.
We do not intend to contribute to the long-established debate on the inter-
pretation of the technical meaning of authentication [Gol96]. We rather observe
that browser’s security is critical for exams, and we expect to substantiate our
observation that server authentication goes beyond the technical certification
path validation algorithm as described in the standard X.509 [CSF+08]. The
validation of a certificate is in fact socio-technical as modern browsers consider
user’s choices and support the validation with novel technologies, such as HSTS.
Thus, with certificate validation we refer to the extended protocol that browsers
customise with user’s involvement and additional security mechanisms.
We note that the way the certificate validation is accomplished varies consid-
erably among browsers. This variety motivates a number of research questions:
• What are the differences in terms of user involvement in how modern
browsers implement server authentication?
• Which browsers reduce the security risks for users when a certificate is
invalid?
• Can browsers improve their security by involving the user more profitably
than they do at present?
This list of questions, purposely truncated to length three here, arises when
server authentication, and certificate validation in particular, is assessed from a
socio-technical standpoint.
This work complements traditional human-computer interaction studies by
advancing what seems to be the first formal analysis of browser’s certificate
validation that is not only logically conditioned on the technology but also on
user actions.
In this chapter, we consider six browsers. One is Secure Exam Browser
(SEB), which specifically addresses the security of remote testing of Internet-
based exams. The others are Firefox, Chrome, Safari, Internet Explorer, and
Opera Mini, which are the most popular browsers and may support the remote
tasks of an exam. We also consider the analysis of private browsing mode, and
the interleaving of classic and private browsing for the browsers that support it.
We introduce five socio-technical requirements each binding elements like TLS
session, certificates and, notably, user choices. The mix of browsers, modes, and
requirements allows for the analysis of 60 different scenarios. We anticipate that
the results of the analysis turn out to be interesting, from which we are able
to state four recommendations. Notably, the results of our analysis include two
bugs that concern Safari. We reported the bugs to Apple, and were replied that
a fix would be available in the upcoming versions of Safari for iOS and OS X.
The contribution of this chapter exceeds the formal analysis of the 60 sce-
narios. This formal analysis was not carried out using a known approach. By
contrast, it was not obvious how to represent (portions of) the functioning of
a browser in order for the analyser to quickly get to grasps with its properties
without reading long prose. Various graphical notations were tried out, and fi-
nally we found Unified Modelling Language (UML) activity diagrams [OMG11]
to bear the necessary flexibility. Building these diagrams is a major hallmark
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in our understanding of the technicalities of the browsers. However, they are
only semi-formal and not directly executable; a formal model is needed for a
fully automatic analysis. We therefore translate our UML diagram models to
models in the CSP process algebra [Hoa78]. The model is then extended with
an Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) specification of the requirements of interest.
Each extended model forms the input to the Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT)
model checker [SLDP09].
Outline of the chapter. Section 7.1 discusses the related work about formal
approaches for the security analysis of browsers and certificate validation, and
related studies of human aspects. Section 7.2 details the different aspects of cer-
tificate validation. Section 7.3 describes the SEB kiosk exam browser. Section
7.4 describes the five most popular general-purpose browsers. Section 7.5 details
the browsers’ certificate validation ceremonies using UML Activity Diagrams.
Section 7.6 concerns the analysis of the five socio-technical requirements on the
browser’s ceremonies with the PAT model checker. Section 7.7 discusses the
results of the analysis. Section 7.8 explores some implications and concludes
the chapter.
7.1 Related Work
A few works have developed formal verification techniques to model and analyse
web browsers. Akhawe et al. [ABL+10] introduce a formal model of web secu-
rity. They define the main components of the web, namely Non-Linear Time,
Browser, Servers, and the Network as Web Concepts. They consider a spectrum
of threats that span from a malicious web server to a more advanced attacker
who is able to inject contents into an honest web server. Finally, they analyse
two security requirements, i.e., security invariants and session integrity, in five
web security mechanisms. The considered mechanisms include neither TLS nor
certificate validation, and the formal model assumes the user correctly interprets
the browser’s security indicators. Our work focuses on certificate validation and
considers users who may not correctly understand security indicators. Groß et
al. [GPS05] propose a formal framework to model a web browser and the be-
haviour of a user who interacts with the browser. They validate their framework
by analysing the security of password-based user authentication. Contrary to
modelling an ideal browser, we analyse the actual implementation of modern
browsers. It would be interesting to merge our approach with their model of
web browser. Formal verification techniques have been used to analyse Human-
Automation Interaction [BBS13]. They mostly focus on cognitive aspects of
users rather than on the technical systems they interact with. We consider user
choices, which do depend on human cognitive factors, but our focus is more on
the technical part, namely on the web browsers.
There are many studies that conduct a security analysis of certificate vali-
dation. Georgiev et al. [GIJ+12] analyse certificate validation in the context of
TLS for different web applications, such as shopping carts, cloud storage, and
payment gateways. They find that several APIs perform certificate validations
that do not follow any standard. The authors show how such customisation
leads to security vulnerabilities. Differently to our automated approach, they
detect attacks by visual inspection of the source code; moreover, the analysed
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applications involve no browsers. Kaminsky et al. [KPS10] discuss different
attacks against the certificate infrastructure. They point out that certificate
issuers and browsers may differently interpret the subject name in an X.509
certificate. Such a lack of standardisation makes the subject name vulnerable
to injection attacks. A recent update to the X.509 standard [Yee13] aims to fix
the issue. Clark and Van Oorschot [CvO13] provide a comparative evaluation of
enhancements implemented into browsers for certificate validation. They argue
that it is becoming more common that attackers own valid certificates for a
website. Attackers’ attention focuses on certificate infrastructure because of its
reliance on human factors. We share their view that certificate validation goes
beyond the mere binding between a domain name and a public key.
Different solutions have been proposed to modify the structural flaws of the
certificate infrastructure [Mar15, MP13] [HS12], but they also require dedicated
modifications to the protocols that use certificates to achieve authentication. For
example, the Certificate Transparency project [LLK13] suggests an improvement
to the current TLS certificate system by providing supplemental monitoring and
auditing services via certificate logs. The technique requires a different server
implementation to accommodate a TLS extension. Structural solutions such
as TLS extensions may take a long time before being implemented extensively,
because both browser and server need to support the extension. We also end up
with a similar proposition, but it requires a modification of the browser only,
with no change required on the server and on the TLS protocol.
The human aspect of certificate validation has recently been analysed via
different empirical studies. Akhawe and Porter Felt [AF13] make an empiric
analysis to assess the effectiveness of browser security warnings. In particular,
they measure the users’ click-through rates on certificate and malware warn-
ings. They find that users tend to ignore warnings as they click through the
Chrome certificate warnings. Such finding led Google to redesign Chrome’s
certificate warnings. Similarly, Flinn and Lumsden [FL05] conduct a survey
to assess whether users are aware of the security risk they face online. They
find that users have different interpretations of the term “secure website” and
are generally unaware that TLS provides server authentication. By contrast,
our formal analysis does not pertain to user perception, but investigates the
various ways in which user’s choices influence server authentication. Jøsang
et al. [JVRK12] point out that web browsers can only do syntactic server au-
thentication, as TLS cannot provide semantic server authentication. Thus, the
attacker can exploit semantic attacks to trick the user. They advocate the need
of a framework to determine the assurance level of server authentication. Our
approach aims at analysing how web browsers help users to avoid such server
authentication attacks. Gajek et al. [GMSS08] propose a new authentication
protocol that consists of a mix between the Password Authentication Key Ex-
change (PAKE) and TLS protocols without relying on a PKI. They formalise a
user as a probabilistic machine. The user’s behaviour can recognise the so-called
human-perceptible indicators like pictures and sounds. In contrast, we are not
interested in the cognitive aspects, and make minimal assumptions about the
user capabilities. Akhawe et al. [AAVS13] produce a taxonomy of certificate val-
idation warnings and collect data over more 10 billion TLS connections that are
not under MITM attacks. Thus, they calculate the false positive rate of showing
warnings and present a number of recommendations to improve browser design
decisions. Conversely, our approach considers MITM attacks.
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The security of browsers has been studied variously, for example to avoid the
user’s oversight of warning messages [SEA+09], or to improve the readability of
their contents [BvOP+09]. These works are positioned over the cognitive aspects
of human-computer interaction with the browsers. To position our work, it is
useful to note that we see the socio-technical system consisting of a web server, a
computer network, a browser, a user and possibly an intruder as a ceremony in
the sense of Ellison [Ell07]. The various technical and social layers of a ceremony
have been recently identified [BCK12], with a practically useful suggestion that
certain layers can be neglected, namely virtually compressed, during the analysis
to sharpen the analyser’s focus on other layers.
7.2 Basics
This section clarifies a few technical notions and sets the terminology used
throughout the chapter. First it details the constituents of a web certificate
and explains how their validation works or can fail. Then, it discusses the
regulations that specifies the path validation of a web certificate, and observes
how the standard eventually leaves the interpretation of certificate validation
to browser manufacturers. In consequence, certificate validation becomes a mix
of user’s choices and technical security mechanisms, from which it emerges that
certificate validation in modern browsers is a socio-technical process. The sequel
of this Section outlines a few basic concepts needed later.
Web certificates
A web certificate binds an identity to a public key. The X.509 standard [CSF+08]
specifies the structure of a certificate by listing a set of mandatory and optional
fields. Among the mandatory fields, four are fundamental to understand the
authentication purpose of a certificate: subject, which specifies the certificate
owner’s identity; subject public key, which specifies the public key associated
to the subject; issuer, which specifies the entity who verified that the public
key belongs to the owner described in the subject; certificate signature, which
specifies the digital signature generated by the issuer on subject and public key.
Other typical mandatory fields are the following: version, which specifies
whether optional fields are expected to be used; serial number, which is unique
among the certificates generated by the issuer; and validity, which specifies the
time interval during which the issuer maintains information about the status of
the certificate.
Certificate validation
The algorithm for the path validation of a certificate checks whether the certifi-
cate is valid. It consists in verifying that the signature is correct provided that
the verifier trusts the issuer. In this case the public key can be used to com-
municate with its owner. However, even if the signature is correct, the verifier
may not trust the issuer. In this case the issuer, which is known as intermediate
authority, needs itself to be certified. This forms a chain of intermediate au-
thorities called certification path. The certification path always chains up to a
root called certification authority (CA), whose certificate is self-signed, namely
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the issuer and the subject coincide. The verifier is assumed to trust the public
key of the CA. Thus, the validation of a certificate path is to check the fields of
each certificate up to a trustful root certificate. The standard X.509 details a
certification path validation algorithm, but verifiers are free to implement their
own algorithms, provided they offer equivalent functionality [CSF+08].
Invalid certificates
If the path validation of the certificate succeeds then the certificate is valid,
namely the certificate binds correctly the identity with the public key. However,
the validation may fail due to a number of errors:
Unknown or untrusted certificate issuer. The certificate path chains
up to a certification authority that is not in the list of CAs the verifier
trusts. Verifiers may trust different certification authorities, since there is
no universally trusted list of CAs.
Possible reasons. A certificate may be invalid because entities, such as web
servers, may prefer to self issue a certificate rather than purchase expensive
certificates by commercial CAs. This choice may be even necessary when
a single entity owns many different domains that need to be certified.
Self-issuing a certificate is a quick procedure and has no costs. Self-issued
certificates are widespread through a large number of public institutions,
such as universities, or the US Army [U.S15].
Expired certificate. A certificate expires after a specific time interval. Specif-
ically this happens because the validity field contains a past date.
Possible reasons. Entities may forget to renew their certificates before
they expire. According to a recent survey [AAVS13], expired certificates
are the most common form of benign (i.e., false positives) certification
path validation failures.
Revoked certificate. A certification authority may revoke the certificate
due to either administrative or security reasons. For example, if an entity
believes that an attacker has learned the private key, it may ask the CA
to revoke the certificate.
Possible reasons. Again, verifiers may trust different certificate authori-
ties, thus revocation also depends on the specific CA store used by the
verifier. Moreover, certificate revocation is a protocol by itself: CRL,
OCSP, and CRLSets are three common protocols to revoke and check
certificates [Yee13, SMA+13] [Goo12], and verifiers may use any of these.
Mismatched certificate subject. The subject expected by the verifier mis-
matches the one shown in the certificate. According to a large-scale survey
on certificates [VFBH13], mismatched certificate subject is a frequent case
of certificate path validation failure.
Possible reasons. False positives may occur because an entity needs to se-
cure its own sub-domain (e.g., www.sub1.entity.com), but, to save costs,
the entity does not purchase a certificate for each sub-domain.
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The X.509 standard says that if any one of the checks of the certification
path validation fail, the algorithm terminates, returning a failure indication to
the concerned protocol. The TLS protocol uses X.509 certificates to support
authentication, and browsers implement TLS over HTTP to provide confiden-
tiality, integrity, and authentication on the communications with web servers.
Since authentication is an optional TLS requirement, the corresponding RFC
standard [DR08] outsources the certificate validation to the browsers: “How to
interpret the authentication certificates exchanged is left to the judgement of the
designers and implementors of protocols that run on top of TLS”. Moreover,
the HTTP over TLS standard [Res00] advocates the involvement of the user
when the certification path validation fails: “User oriented clients MUST either
notify the user (clients MAY give the user the opportunity to continue with the
connection in any case) or terminate the connection.”. Ultimately, browsers can
implement differently the certificate validation, which becomes socio-technical
when the technical approach, namely the certification path validation, fails.
Socio-Technical aspects of certificate validation
Browsers communicate with the user through different ways, such as text warn-
ings, pop-up windows, open or closed padlocks, and coloured address bars. The
main component that browsers use to interact with the user is the viewport,
which is depicted in Figure 7.1
The user can choose any of the options proposed in the browser’s viewport:
a cautious user may close the browsing session, while a curious one may click
through a warning. Users who interact with a browser may be variously skilled
and educated. They are influenced by a huge variety of local or global cultural
values. Malicious websites nowadays can use scripts to gain major control on
browser’s viewport and deceive user’s [CvO13] on security warnings. Although
the design of browser’s security indicators has improved over the years [YSA05],
a number of studies have shown that users tend to click through a warning
without paying attention [Lan12] [AAVS13, SEA+09]. These social factors make
the problem of certificate validation harder than it seems, namely a security
problem that cannot be solved by purely technical means.
A few proposals have been recently advanced to minimise the participa-
tion of users in certificate validation and make security less reliant on user’s
choice [The11] [HJB12]. Different browsers have adopted HSTS [HJB12], a se-
curity mechanism originally conceived to thwart TLS stripping attacks [Mar09b,
Mar09a]. In a TLS stripping attack, the attacker forces the user to communi-
cate via an HTTP connection although the web server supports HTTPS con-
nections. HSTS-compliant browsers prevent “unsecured” HTTP connections
to HSTS-compliant web servers. To do so, the web server sends the browser
an HSTS header during a secured TLS session. Optionally, the HSTS header
may include a list of the only certification authorities allowed to issue the web
server’s certificate. Then, the browser adds an internal policy stating that the
concerned web server must be accessed via HTTPS only, and with a valid cer-
tificate. Thus, once the authentication of the web server succeeded, it shall not
fail in the future.
HSTS avoids user’s participation in favour of a purely technical enforce-
ment of security: if the certificate validation fails for a browser-known HSTS-
complaint web servers, the browser shows the user an error message (not a
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Figure 7.1: The viewport component of a browser
warning) and aborts the connection. Some browsers implement a pre-loaded
whitelist of HSTS-complaint web servers to mitigate bootstrap attacks. How-
ever, similar to the certification path validation, browsers implement HSTS
differently from each other, as we shall see later.
7.3 Safe Exam Browser
Safe Exam Browser (SEB) is a kiosk browser developed at ETH Zurich [SBL+12].
Exam authorities can employ SEB at testing to thwart candidate cheating in
computer-based and Internet-based exams. The main functionalities of SEB
allow the candidate (a) to connect to a remote web-based exam system and (b)
to access to a selection of third party applications and web sites during testing.
SEB prevents the candidate from accessing resources and utilities of the operat-
ing system, switching to undesired applications, quitting the browser any time,
and opening a website not allowed by the authority.
SEB turns the host computer device in a kiosk browser for exams by remov-
ing any other components of a browser but the viewport. It can be installed in
a computer device either provided by the exam authority or personally owned
by the candidate. In the latter scenario, the browser is secured by a signed
and encrypted exam configuration. Moreover, SEB supports remote testing by
means of a SEB Server that provides more security on unmanaged computer
devices thanks to screen recording and logging of all kinds of activities on the
host computer. However, we stress that the threat model considered in this
chapter does not concern malicious candidates or users. Rather, we focus on
the security risks that a malicious observer can pose to the human principal
via the browser. Similarly, screen recording and logs do cause concern about
privacy, but this is a requirement not considered in this chapter.
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Over the 10% of all written exams at ETH Zurich have been carried out using
SEB in 2014. Besides, SEB has already been used for remote testing [SBL+12].
The particular purpose of this browser of minimising the participation of the
user makes interesting to check how this can affect certificate validation.
Since SEB is open source, we studied it by looking at its official documen-
tation and source code. We consider the version 2.0 of the browser.
7.4 Modern Browsers
We also consider the most popular browsers available nowadays. According
to StatCounter [Sta15], the most used browsers are Firefox, Chrome, Internet
Explorer, and Safari. Opera Mini is the most popular platform-independent
browser [Ope14] and is available for many mobile devices. Its analysis is mo-
tivated because nowadays more and more users prefer to browse the Web with
touchscreen mobile devices, and in particular Opera Mini dramatically reduces
the amount of data transferred. In doing so, we aim to evaluate how such
restrictions affect certificate validation.
Firefox. The inception of Mozilla Firefox originates from Netscape Navigator.
According to StatCounter [Sta15], it is the third most popular browser over
desktop, mobile, tablet, and console devices. Among the browsers we consider,
Firefox seems to be the most complete: it supports HSTS, distinguishes two
different certificate stores, and allows users to store server certificates either
permanently or temporarily. Since Firefox is open source, we studied it by
looking at its official documentation and source code. We consider Firefox
version 36.0.4.
Chrome. Although Google Chrome is the youngest browser we consider, it
is the most popular. It was the first browser to support HSTS policies, and
adopts different certificate stores depending on the operating system underlying
the browser. Chrome is based on the Chromium open source code with minor
differences. We analysed Chrome inspecting the Chromium source code and
using empirical tests. This work considers Chrome version 41.0.
Internet Explorer. Microsoft Internet Explorer was the most popular browser
for years, and has been overtaken by Chrome only recently. Currently, it does
not support HSTS, which is however planned to be implemented soon [Mim14].
Internet Explorer is available only for Windows operating systems, and uses
their certificate stores. Since Internet Explorer is closed source, we relied on
empirical tests, also supported by network analysers. The version of Internet
Explorer analysed is 11.0.16.
Safari. Safari is the browser developed by Apple and is popular on the com-
pany devices. It supports a HSTS and, similarly to Firefox, distinguishes two
different certificate stores allowing users to store server certificates. Safari is
available only on Apple’s operating systems and is closed source. We thus anal-
ysed it empirically and assisted by network analysers. We studied Safari 8.0.3.
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Opera Mini. Opera Mini is used by more than 244 million people per month
and is particularly popular in emerging countries, according to the company
data [Ope14]. It aims at being the most lightweight browser for any java-
capable device. To do so, the browser uses Opera proxy servers and compres-
sion technologies to reduce traffic and speed up page display. Thus, although
communications to the proxy server are encrypted, there is no end-to-end TLS
encryption between the browser and the web server. We analysed the (closed-
source) browser empirically, using a java emulator with network analysers. In
this work we consider the version 7.6.4.
7.4.1 Private Browsing
All the browsers we consider in this chapter support private browsing1, which
is a privacy protection mode that disables browser’s history and cache. Private
browsing gives the user no guarantee about Internet privacy as an eavesdropper
can still learn the websites visited by the user. Rather, private browsing protects
user’s privacy only over the data stored in the local machine. Each browser
implements private browsing differently, and this is usually done by inhibiting
different features [ABJB10]. Private browsing is becoming increasingly popular
among users [Bur12], so we consider it in our analysis. In particular, it is
interesting to study how browsers balance security (e.g., HSTS, user’s approved
certificate) with privacy technologies. Concerning certificate validation, one
would expect no differences between private and classic browsing. However, as
we shall see later, this is not true.
Technical notes. We tested the certificate validation in SEB, Firefox, Chrome,
and Internet Explorer using an Intel Core i7 3.0 GHz with 8 GB RAM running
Windows 8.1 on a virtual machine. We tested certificate validation on Opera
Mini inside MicroEmulator, a Java implementation of JavaME, and analysed
certificate validation on Safari on an Apple MacBook Pro Intel Core i5 2.5
GHz with 8 GB RAM running OS X Yosemite 10.10. The network analysers
we used to understand how certificate validation works, especially on closed-
source browsers, are “Wireshark” [Ger15], “mitmproxy” [Ald15], and “Charles”
[Kar15]. They ran on a second virtual machine with Linux Ubuntu 14.04 and
intercepted any traffic between a server and the target browser on the main
virtual machine.
7.5 Modelling Certificate Validation
As seen in Section 7.2, the certificate validation is a protocol rather than an
algorithm, which may involve users. Therefore, we refer to is as a ceremony.
The certificate validation ceremony includes a user, the browser, and the
web server. In this section, we provide a formalisation of the ceremony for each
browser. However, finding the right formalism for the socio-technical analysis
is not easy. The standard notation to describe security protocols is the Alice-
and-Bob notation [LSV15]. Although this notation provides a simple and clear
description, it comes with some limitations: it cannot capture fork, join, and
1SEB supports private browsing sessions only
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branching, which are essential, for example, to model multiple user’s choices
in the certificate validation. Flowcharts offer a graphical description and look
suitable to describe browsers and algorithms in general, but are less appropriate
for the description of protocols: we have the three roles of browser, user, and
server, and we need to detail the messages that the roles exchange. Message
sequence charts extend flowcharts to the domain of protocols, emphasising the
interaction among the roles. Although message sequence charts have been ex-
tended with formal semantics [MR94], they still have the same limitation of the
Alice-and-Bob notation.
Thus, we choose the semi-formal and graphical description of UML Activity
Diagram [OMG11]. An UML activity diagram is a graphical scheme that defines
the activities needed to meet a given functionality. UML activity diagrams are
made of shapes that model choices, interactions, and concurrency. Table 7.1
recalls the main UML activity diagram’s shapes.
The contribution of activity diagrams is threefold. First, they give an intu-
itive representation of a protocol session, highlighting the mechanisms used on
each role. Second, they can represent parallel actions (fork/join) and multiple
choices (branching). Third, they can be easily translated in a fully formal lan-
guage, thanks to their semi-formal semantics [AST13]. In particular, we trans-
late activity diagrams to CSP# [SLDP09], a modelling language that enriches
the high-level operators of CSP (e.g., choices, interleaving, hiding, etc.) with
low-level programming constructs (e.g., arrays, while, etc.). The CSP# code is
then fed to an automatic tool that checks whether the input model guarantees
a set of properties. The code can be found in Appendix A and in [Giu15].
7.5.1 UML Activity Diagrams for Certificate Validation
Shape Description
Activity node
Object (datastore) node
Decision or merge point
Input and output objects of activities
Distinguishing the activities by role
Initial node
Activity final node
Activity final node within a role
Control flow within a role
Control flow among different roles
Object flow from or to an object node
Table 7.1: Description of the shapes defined in UML Activity Diagram.
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We build nine activity diagrams that model the certificate validation cer-
emonies for the browsers both in classic and private browsing. Although we
consider six browsers, we do not model the classic browsing for SEB since it
supports only private browsing, and we do not model the private browsing of
Internet Explorer and Opera Mini because they are identical to the correspond-
ing classic browsing modes.
The UML Activity Diagram for SEB is in Figure 7.2; the diagrams modelling
Firefox in classic and private browsing are respectively in Figure 7.3 and in
Figure 7.4; the diagrams modelling Chrome in classic and private browsing are
respectively in Figure 7.5 and 7.6; the diagrams for Safari are in Figure 7.7
and 7.8; the diagrams for Internet Explorer and Opera Mini are respectively in
Figure 7.9 and 7.10.
The UML activity diagrams include the functionalities limited to describe
how each browser achieves certificate validation. Each activity diagram has four
columns, each representing a communicating role. From left to right we have the
user, the browser user interface, the browser engine, and the server. Each role
begins with a filled dot that points to their first activity. We assume that the
browser bootstraps with the start web page, which is displayed in the browser
user interface. Next, the browser user interface can load a web page because the
user types a URL or clicks on an active link in the currently displayed web page.
A label close to a thick arrow defines the object exchanged between activities.
Activities may need to get access to datastores, which are represented as object
nodes.
Figure 7.2: Activity diagram for certificate validation in SEB
7.5.2 Description of the Main UML Activities
For each role involved in the certificate validation, we describe the principal ac-
tivities and checks that concern their UML activity diagrams. In the remainder,
we denote UML activities in serif and UML decisions in italics.
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Figure 7.3: Activity diagram for certificate validation in Firefox
Figure 7.4: Activity diagram for certificate validation in Firefox in private
browsing
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Figure 7.5: Activity diagram for certificate validation in Chrome
Figure 7.6: Activity diagram for certificate validation in Chrome in private
browsing
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Figure 7.7: Activity diagram for certificate validation in Safari
Figure 7.8: Activity diagram for certificate validation in Safari in private brows-
ing
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Figure 7.9: Activity diagram for certificate validation in Internet Explorer
Figure 7.10: Activity diagram for certificate validation in Opera Mini
User. A user is modelled as a non-deterministic entity. This means that the
user may potentially choose any of the paths of interaction that the browser
offers, namely Type/Click URL or Click Button. It logically follows that this is
the weaker assumption about the user skills: a ceremony that is secure for a
non-deterministic user will be secure for any user. Modelling the user as a non-
deterministic entity is the best approximation that we can envisage at present. A
more elaborate formal model that captures the complexities of user behaviour
is currently an open issue. Moreover, the feasibility of such a model is often
questioned [LMM99].
Browser. The representation of the browser is split into user interface and
engine. The former has the activities of Display Webpage and Display Warning.
The engine normally begins with the activity Resolve URL and then starts the
TLS handshake with the activity Init.TLS. The engine has the fundamental
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check that concerns certificate validation, namely CertificateIsValid . The check
follows the activity Check Certificate, which verifies if the issuer is known, the
certificate is not expired, and the certificate subject matches the intended one.
Moreover, the activity may verify additional information with the assistance of
datastores, such as preloadedHSTSList, which stores the HSTS policy whitelist,
or ServerCert, which stores the user’s approved certificates. Note that the check
CertificateIsRevoked is subject to the revocation protocol implemented by the
browser. If the flow of certificate validation has not been aborted, the engine of
the browser concludes a successful TLS handshake with the activity Finish TLS.
Then, it runs the activity Process DATA to get the data encrypted by the server.
It possibly verifies if the data contains new information about HSTS with the
activity Check Header, which may lead the browser to store a new HSTS policy
with the activity Store HSTS policy.
Server. We purposely consider only two activities of the server. We aim in
fact to focus more on the model of the browser rather than that of the web server.
The server starts the TLS handshake on its side with the activity Init.TLS, and
concludes it with the activity Finish TLS. As we shall see below, a server may
be corrupted by the attacker and may deviate from the supposed activity flow.
Before formally analysing the socio-technical properties on each browser, we
note that the activity diagrams already offer some interesting insights. This
may support the case that graphical models may be more insightful than formal
ones.
As expected, SEB minimises the participation of the user also in certificate
validation. In fact, Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer, and Safari involve the
user more than SEB and Opera Mini. In particular, Firefox and Safari allow
the user to store a server certificate either permanently or temporarily. However
there is a fundamental difference between Firefox and Safari: the first prioritises
the HSTS policy check (i.e., URLHasHSTSpolicy) over user’s choices, the latter
prioritises the user’s stored server certificate (i.e., CertificateIsStored) over the
HSTS policy. Also the activity diagrams of Opera Mini and SEB show a funda-
mental difference, although they look generally similar: in Opera Mini, unless
the certificate is revoked, the certificate validation always leads to a successful
termination of the TLS handshake; in SEB the certificate validation may instead
lead to aborting the handshake according to the check CertificateIsValid .
Some browsers show also differences between their classic and private brows-
ing. Firefox involves the user and implements HSTS differently in private brows-
ing: the user cannot store a server certificate, and HSTS policies stored in ear-
lier sessions are not considered. Also Chrome has a different implementation of
HSTS in private browsing: no new HSTS policies can be permanently stored
while the ones stored in previous classic sessions are considered. More surpris-
ingly, Safari neither permanently stores HSTS policies in private browsing nor
considers the ones previously stored in classic sessions.
This brief informal analysis corroborates the statement that certificate val-
idation differs among browsers. In the next section, we see in depth by means
of a formal approach how these differences affect the socio-technical security
aspect of browser certificate validation.
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7.6 Socio-Technical Formal Analysis
We use model checking to formally analyse certificate validation. We provide a
systematic method to translate the UML activity diagrams to a formalisation
in CSP# that is amenable to automatic validation by means of PAT.
From a security perspective, we define a threat model and specify the socio-
technical properties that concern certificate validation in LTL.
Threat model
We consider a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacker who wants to violate server
authentication. He partially controls the network and can divert the browser’s
Init.TLS request to a corrupted server that the attacker owns. The attacker
can generate a self-issued certificate, namely a new certificate signed by himself.
He may alternatively have a valid certificate, namely signed by a certification
authority, for a server that he controls. The attacker can interpose between the
browser and the honest server that the user requests, and can replace the server
certificate with one of his own. The sole limitation is that the attacker cannot
sign a certificate on behalf of a certification authority.
7.6.1 Socio-Technical Security Requirements
We select five different socio-technical requirements that we deem relevant. They
bind elements that span from TLS session identifiers to user choices. They aim
to demonstrate how the technical mechanisms implemented in browsers inter-
relate the user choices with the overall system security. We first give informal
and intuitive descriptions of the requirements and then express them formally.
Definition 46 (Warning Users) A user whose browser receives an invalid
certificate is warned before the browser completes the session.
This requirement is about a browser’s warning the user that the certificate
of the required server is invalid. As explained in Section 7.2, a certificate can be
invalid for different reasons, each of them being more or less risky for the user.
For example, some circumstances observe a server that self-issues its certificate,
others conceal an attacker who attempts a MITM by injecting a fake certificate
of his own.
Definition 47 (Storing Server Certificates) A user who approves a server
certificate via a browser is protected from man-in-the-middle attacks on future
sessions with the same server via the same browser.
This requirement is about how storing server certificate relates with MITM
protection. When browsers receive an invalid certificate, they may still allow
the user to store it. If the user assumes that a certificate in fact is trustworthy,
one would expect that future sessions with the same server will be protected
from MITM attacks. We shall see in the discussion that follows that this is not
true for all browsers.
Definition 48 (Applying HSTS User Security) A user who accesses a
server via a browser that receives a valid certificate and an HSTS header is pro-
tected from man-in-the-middle attacks on future sessions with the same server
via the same browser.
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This requirement stands on a different scenario from that of the previous one,
although their conclusions are equal. This scenario sees an HSTS-compliant
server who sends a valid certificate to the browser the user is using. However,
it remains to be checked whether the browser is HSTS-compliant too, in which
case it whitelists the server because its certificate is validated once.
Definition 49 (Applying HSTS Bootstrap) A user who accesses a server
that is pre-loaded on the browser’s HSTS list is protected from man-in-the-middle
attacks on future sessions with the same server via the same browser.
This requirement concerns the relation between pre-loaded whitelist and MITM
protection. In particular, we check whether HSTS-complaint browsers correctly
implement the pre-loaded server whitelist to mitigate bootstrap attacks, namely
MITM attacks at the first server visit.
Definition 50 (Learning from Server Certificate History) A user who
completes a TLS session with a server via a browser receiving an invalid cer-
tificate, and then completes another session with the same server via the same
browser receiving a valid certificate is warned by the browser about the risk of
man-in-the-middle attack.
This last requirement aims at checking whether the browser informs the user
that a MITM attack may have occurred in a previous TLS session. For example,
if one considers a session where the browser receives an invalid certificate, then
the browser may warn the user about this (according to Definition 46). If in
a subsequent session the browser receives a valid certificate for the same web
page, it may be the case that the former session experienced a MITM attack,
hence the browser warns the user.
7.6.2 Automated Verification
Our automatic analysis relies on PAT, a model checker for the analysis of con-
current and real-time systems. Its layered design separates modelling languages
from model checking algorithms, thus supporting different languages via dif-
ferent algorithms. It supports a range of application domains that span from
bio-systems to security protocols.
PAT supports an enriched version of CSP, called CSP#. The extensions of
CSP# include low-level constructs that offer a connection between data states
and executable operations. Moreover, PAT supports user defined C# functions
and data types that can be used directly in CSP# code as external libraries.
We take advantage of this by defining an advanced data structure to model the
certificate stores of browsers. PAT can model safety (i.e., bad things do not
happen) and liveness (i.e., good things eventually happen) properties. In PAT,
a requirement can be specified in the same language used to specify the system
model, i.e., CSP, or in a temporal logic language. In our case, we use Linear
Temporal Logic to specify our requirements, and resort on PAT’s model checking
techniques for their verification. PAT supports symbolic and explicit model
checking. Since we specify our requirements in LTL, we rely on the dedicated
temporal-logic model checker of PAT. In particular, we use depth-first-search
as searching strategy algorithm to check whether a property is valid. If the
property turns out not to be valid, we use the breadth-first-search algorithm to
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find the shortest witness trace that falsifies the property. We choose to use PAT
over the more popular refinement checker FDR [Ros97], because PAT supports
low-level constructs written in CSP# and the specification of our requirements
in LTL. However, we expect the same analysis results using another tool such
as FDR.
CSP# Description
Stop deadlock
Skip termination
a→ P event prefixing
c?[b]x→ P input communication
c!e→ P output communication
P [∗]Q external choice
P ;Q sequential composition
P \ A hiding
x := e assignment
if b then P else Q conditional choice
P || Q parallel composition
P ||| Q interleaving
P interrupt Q hiding
Table 7.2: CSP# syntax.
Mapping UML activity diagrams to CSP#. We systematically generate
the CSP# code from UML activity diagrams, and then validate the code with
PAT. Such generation is quite straightforward because we define a map between
the shapes of UML activity diagrams and the CSP# syntax, which is outlined
in Table 7.6.2. More precisely:
• the activity node maps to the CSP# event;
• the object (datastore) node maps to the CSP# array;
• the decision point maps to CSP# conditional choice;
• input and output objects of activities map to the CSP# values of input
and output communications;
• activities roles are distinguished within a CSP# process;
• the beginning of the activity flow is a CSP# event;
• the ending of the activity flow maps to CSP# termination;
• the flow of activities within a role maps to the CSP# event prefixing;
• the flow of activities among different roles maps to CSP# input and output
communications;
• the flow of data of an object node maps to the CSP# assignment.
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Socio-technical requirements in LTL
PAT fully supports the LTL syntax to define a requirement about the system
behaviour. An LTL formula is defined by events, predefined propositions, logical
operators, and modal operators. An LTL formula can be evaluated over an
infinite sequence of truth evaluations and paths. Thus, the assertion is true if
every execution of the system satisfies the formula.
Although LTL defines five different modal operators, our requirements can
be expressed using the combination of two operators only: , whose semantics
is that the formula holds on the current state and the entire subsequent path;
©, whose semantics is that the formula holds at the next state on the path.
The combination© expresses that the formula holds on the entire subsequent
path (not necessarily in the current state).
The propositions of our LTL formulas refer to “choices” (e.g., CertificateIs-
Valid) and to the activities (e.g., Init.TLS) of our UML activity diagrams. In
the following definitions, we employ the same font styles used in the activity
diagrams consistently. Those predicates evaluate true in states, respectively,
where that choice has been selected and where that activity is executed with
success. Also, our requirements include three additional LTL predicates, which
we code in CSP# as macros, and one more event, namely:
• UserWantsS is true when a user wants to visit an honest server, namely
when she types a URL or clicks a link that points to a server not corrupted
by the attacker;
• AuthFail is true when a MITM attack succeeds, namely when the browser
completes the TLS session with the attacker;
• Preloaded is true when an honest server is in the preloaded HSTS list of
the browser;
• ServerFinished.HSTS.Data is true when the server sends that message to
the browser at the end of the TLS handshake.
Assertion 1 (Warning Users)
((FinishTLS ∧ ¬ DisplayWarning) =⇒ CertificateIsValid)
This requirement says that it is always the case that, when the browser
concludes the TLS session without warnings, the certificate must have been
valid.
Assertion 2 (Storing Server Certificates)
((CertificateIsStored ∧UserWantsS ∧ DisplayWebpage ∧ ¬ AuthFail) =⇒
©(UserWantsS =⇒ ¬ AuthFail))
This requirement signifies that it is always the case that if the user visited a
web page whose authentic certificate was stored, then the user can safely visit
the web page in next sessions as the browser precludes MITM attacks.
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Assertion 3 (Applying HSTS User Security)
((CertificateIsValid ∧ ServerFinished.HSTS.Data ∧ UserWantsS) =⇒
©(UserWantsS =⇒ ¬ AuthFail))
This requirement is structured as the previous requirement, and can be in-
terpreted similarly, but it is about the HSTS policy. It says that it is always the
case that if the web page is HSTS complaint, then its certificate is valid and the
user can safely visit the web page in the next sessions as the browser precludes
MITM attacks.
Assertion 4 (Applying HSTS Bootstrap)
(Preloaded =⇒ (UserWantsS =⇒ ¬ AuthFail))
This requirement also relates to the HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
policy. It expresses that it is always the case that if the web page is preloaded
in browser’s HSTS whitelist, then the user can safely visit the web page as the
browser precludes MITM attacks.
Assertion 5 (Learning from Server Certificate History)
((FinishTLS ∧ ¬ CertificateIsValid ∧ UserWantsS) =⇒
©((FinishTLS ∧ CertificateIsValid ∧ UserWantsS) =⇒
DisplayWarning))
Finally, this requirement signifies that it is always the case that if the user
visited a web page whose certificate was invalid, and later she visits again the
same web page but with an associated valid certificate, then the browser warns
the user about the potential past MITM attack.
7.7 Findings
We studied our five requirements on the six browsers by checking the satisfi-
ability of our formulas on the CSP# models of the certificate validation. As
said above, we considered Firefox, Chrome, and Safari in three different modes:
classical browsing, private browsing, and their interleaving. In total, the analy-
sis has considered 60 different scenarios due to the mix of browsers, modes, and
properties.
It was possible to encode most of the scenarios without incurring into state
explosion. We needed to assume no expired certificates to avoid non termination
in four scenarios that turn out to ensure the requirements: Applying HSTS User
Security on classic browsing of Firefox, and Applying HSTS Bootstrap on classic
browsing of Safari, Firefox, and their interleaving.
Over an Intel I7 processor running Ubuntu Linux 14.04 with 8 GB RAM,
PAT 3.5.1 generally terminates the verification of each scenario in just a few
seconds. However, the HSTS-related requirements take minutes on Firefox and
Safari. The longest runtime is for Applying HSTS Bootstrap over Firefox, which
takes 448 seconds. These runtimes show that our approach to socio-technical
requirements is practical and can be usefully boosted further.
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Interpreting the output of the tool required some effort. Table 7.7 sum-
marises the findings. At first glance, it can be seen that the browsers that
verified the highest number of requirements are SEB and Chrome, then come
Internet Explorer and Firefox, and lastly Safari and Opera Mini. As a practical
outcome, it turns out that an exam system that uses Safari or Opera Mini in-
creases the chances that a user might think they are taking a valid exam when
they are not.
As expected, the results of interleaving summarises the failing results of
classical and private browsing: it suffices that a property fails in one of the
modes (i.e., classic or private) to fail also on their interleaving. However, a more
interesting result is that a session in one mode may influence a later session in a
different browsing mode. This is the case of Safari for Applying HSTS Bootstrap.
In the remainder, we comment on each requirement in detail.
Warning Users
The first requirement is found valid over SEB, Chrome, and Internet Explorer.
It is also valid in Firefox in private browsing. By contrast, the model checker
shows traces that falsify it over the other modes for Firefox, Safari, and Opera
Mini. With Firefox and Safari the traces are similar. They report a sequence
of two TLS sessions both with a MITM attack. In the first session, the browser
connects to the corrupted server and warns the user, who chooses to store the
certificate of the attacker anyway. In the second session, the user tries to get
access to the same server, but this time the browser has the attacker server
certificate stored, and completes the session without warning the user. This
is due to the drawbacks of storing server certificates, which Firefox and Safari
allow their users to do. Notably, Firefox in private browsing forbids the user to
store server certificates, hence the requirement turns out to be valid. The trace
that falsifies the property with Opera Mini is rather trivial because the browser
does not involve the user at all. Opera Mini in fact shows a padlock when the
certificate is valid, but even if the certificate is invalid, the browser completes
the TLS session anyway, without informing the user.
Storing Server Certificate
The second property turns out to be the most tricky. It is found that all
browsers verify the property except Firefox and Safari, although the latter are
the only browsers that allow a user to store server certificates. This is because
the property is a logical implication whose precondition is trivially falsified by
the browsers that do no store server certificate. Surprisingly, the property does
not hold on Firefox in classic browsing and on Safari in all modes, as they do
not falsify the precondition. The user can in fact replace a server certificate
as many times as she wishes to, while the browser does not inform the user
that a server certificate was already stored. In support of this, the tool exhibits
the following counterexample. In one session, the user engages with an honest
server that transmits a self-issued certificate; the browser warns the user about
the invalid certificate, but she chooses to store the certificate, thus the browser
successfully concludes the TLS session. In a subsequent session, the user wants
to connect again with the same server, but this time the attacker interposes and
sends a self-issued certificate pretending to be the honest server; the browser
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warns the user about this second invalid certificate, regardless the fact that an-
other certificate was already stored for the same server; the user decides to store
also this certificate and the browser concludes the TLS session.
Applying HSTS User Security
The third requirement is valid on SEB and in classic browsing on Firefox and
Chrome. The requirement does not hold in private browsing because Firefox
and Chrome trade off privacy and security: they prefer to remove HSTS policies
stored during private browsing sessions to protect user’s privacy. In fact an in-
spection of the stored HSTS policies would reveal the HSTS-complaint website
the user visited in private browsing. Surprisingly, the property is not valid on
Safari in any mode. The model checker shows a trace as follows: in the first
session the attacker interposes in the communication, and the user chooses to
store the attacker’s certificate. In a subsequent session, the browser communi-
cates with the honest server, from which it receives the HSTS header. Then,
in a new session, the attacker interposes again in the communication, and the
browser does not abort but concludes with no warnings. This is because a
user’s approved certificate bypasses the HSTS policy in Safari2. As expected,
the property is not valid on browsers that do not support HSTS. However, it
holds on SEB although it does not support HSTS, because the browser aborts
when the certificate is invalid.
Applying HSTS Bootstrap
The fourth property is checked over the browsers that support HSTS. It is
valid on all browsers that support HSTS except on private browsing of Safari,
which does not consider the HSTS pre-loaded whitelist in private browsing3.
Moreover, the interleaving of Safari modes also does not guarantee the property:
since Safari allows the user to permanently store a certificate even in private
browsing, and such storing supersedes the HSTS policy, future sessions with
HSTS-complaint websites are compromised also in classic browsing.
Learning from Server Certificate History
Finally, the fifth requirement holds only on SEB, in which the precondition
(FinishTLS ∧ ¬ CertificateIsValid) is always falsified since SEB aborts the
session when the certificate is invalid. However, the property is not valid in
the other browsers. This denounces the stateless philosophy whereby browsers
do not record warnings they issued in the past, hence browsers cannot leverage
upon them at present.
7.7.1 Recommendations
Upon the basis of our findings, we formulate the four recommendations outlined
below.
2After we filed a bug report to Apple, we received this reply:“The information you’ve
provided will be valuable in our efforts to determine the cause of the issue you reported.”
3We received this reply from Apple:“Your reported issue will be addressed in upcoming
releases. If you are a member of our developer program, you can test our fix in the current
beta release of iOS 9 and OS X 10.11 El Capitan”
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Warning
Users
Storing
Server
Certifi-
cate
Applying
HSTS
User Sec.
Applying
HSTS
Boot-
strap
Learning
from
Cert.
History
SEB co X X X − X
Firefox
cb × × X X ×
pb X X × X ×
in × × × X ×
Chrome
cb X X X X ×
pb X X × X ×
in X X × X ×
IE co X X × − ×
Safari
cb × × × X ×
pb × × × × ×
in × × × × ×
OM co × X × − ×
Note:The term cb indicates classic browsing, pb is for private browsing, and
in is the interleaving of classic and private browsing sessions. The term co
indicates that classic and private browsing activity diagrams coincide. The
symbol X indicates that the property holds; the symbol × indicates that it does
not; the symbol − indicates that the property cannot be checked because the
corresponding browsers do not support HSTS.
Table 7.3: The five socio-technical requirements studied over six browsers.
Recommendation 1 Browsers should trigger users when something wrong
happens rather than when something good happens.
Browsers used to inform users when a TLS connection was going to be em-
ployed. Nowadays, most of the browsers tend to trigger and interrupt the user
when some problems with TLS occur. Of course, browsers also provide positive
feedback such as a locked padlock in the chrome bar, but this does not require
user’s participation. Opera Mini, for the sake of a lightweight implementation,
shows the locked padlock as a positive feedback but does not warn users in case
of problems with TLS.
Recommendation 2 Browsers should consider the preloaded whitelist of
HSTS-complaint servers also in private browsing.
Firefox and Chrome show that it is possible to protect the user and mitigate
bootstrap attacks with HSTS without breaking user’s privacy in private brows-
ing. The choice of Safari not to consider the preloaded whitelist leads to some
weaknesses that when mixed with other features (i.e., user approved server cer-
tificates) may become serious vulnerabilities.
Recommendation 3 HSTS policies should have priority over user’s past
choices.
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Also this recommendation comes from the findings on Safari, which implements
a customised HSTS mechanism. HSTS has been conceived to avoid user’s par-
ticipation on security choices. A server that chooses to be HSTS-complaint
cannot self-issue a certificate. Thus, any check on user’s approved certificates
should be superseded by the HSTS policy stored in the browser.
Recommendation 4 Browsers should keep track of invalid certificate history
to warn users more appropriately.
Users may forget past security warnings, and browsers may help. For example,
browsers could maintain a cache of invalid certificate hashes. In doing so, it
would be possible for browsers to warn users when a different invalid certificate
is presented by a server with which the browser communicated in the past. It is
worth noting that looking at past interactions is the strategy that the Session
Description Protocol [Len06] advances to strengthen the management of self-
issued certificates. Surprisingly, it has not been used in HTTPS.
7.8 Conclusion
Since humans play critical roles in an exam, the security of such protocol should
consider their participation. We observe that browsers are the main component
that nowadays interfaces the user with the network, not only in exam protocols,
but also in many other security protocols.
The socio-technical analysis of the security of browsers is yet to be consid-
ered innovative at present. It combines traditional analysis of the technologies
underlying browsers on the one hand, with elements of user participation on the
other. By doing so, the socio-technical approach is oriented at characterising
security requirements also in terms of what the user may accomplish, with the
ultimate aim of building browsers that are secure in the presence of humans.
This chapter describes our work in this area. It focuses on server authen-
tication with the user via the browser. More specifically, it studies the socio-
technical ceremony of certificate validation in the various circumstances where
this validation can fail, including MITM attacks.
The security analysis of the ceremony of certificate validation from a socio-
technical standpoint inspires a number of research questions, and we concen-
trated on three: the first addresses the differences in terms of user participation
in server authentication; the second concerns the strategies that browsers use
to reduce the security risks for users in the presence of an invalid certificate; the
third relates to how browsers improve the security by involving the users more
profitably than they do at present.
To address these questions we formulated five requirements that tackle how
users are involved in the ceremony of certificate validation. The outcome of our
analysis demonstrates that each browser implements the ceremony of certificate
validation differently, and that this is the origin of a few security problems. In
particular, our analysis shows that HSTS fails on its goal when implemented
in the wide customised process of certificate validation. Microsoft announced
that the next version of Internet Explorer will support HSTS [Mic15]. We argue
that its usefulness will depend on how HSTS is implemented in the browser’s
certificate validation.
CHAPTER 7. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF CERTIFICATE VALIDATION IN SEB
AND MODERN BROWSERS 153
A major hallmark throughout our work is the adoption of UML activity
diagrams as a semi-formal language to represent portions of browser function-
ing compactly, so that the human analyser could quickly get to grasps with
their niceties. However, rigorous security analysis requires a formal approach.
Thus, the diagrams that represent the ceremonies are systematically mapped
into CSP# and validated in the PAT model checker against the LTL specifi-
cation of our five socio-technical requirements. These are the main steps of
our approach to the socio-technical formal analysis of the security of browsers.
The current findings encourage us to develop this approach further, for exam-
ple by automating it fully, and by trying it out on additional socio-technical
requirements.
It is worth to stress that our current choices of formal languages and sup-
porting tools are not meant to be binding; rather, they aim at demonstrating
our approach. Also, we are currently working on reproducing the experiments
described above on different tools. We advocate alternative verification methods
to check other requirements such as privacy, a requirement that cannot be mod-
elled in PAT. While looking at the interleaving of sessions in different browser
modes, we noted that a session in private browsing should not interfere the fol-
lowing sessions in classic browsing. A different approach, possibly a different
model checker such as FDR [Ros97], is required to understand whether this in-
terference may leak information, since PAT cannot verify privacy requirements.
We leave this further development as future work.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
The main argument of this dissertation is that an exam must be designed and
analysed as carefully as security protocols are. Thus, a rigorous understanding
of the security requirements of exams is fundamental to design protocols that
withstand threats coming from malicious candidates and authorities. Moreover,
it is necessary to develop formal approaches that allow one to prove that an
exam protocol meets the stated security requirements. We address these needs
using formal methods for the security analysis of exams, and cryptographic
techniques for their design.
This dissertation has found that secure exam should meet ten fundamental
requirements, five concerning authentication and five concerning privacy. Au-
thentication requirements aim to preserve the association between candidate
identity, mark, and test throughout the entire examination. Privacy require-
ments aim to provide anonymity to both candidates and examiners. This dis-
sertation has also shown that exam should provide verifiability. Similarly to the
end-to-end verifiability requirement in voting, having verifiability in any exam is
fundamental to raise the credibility of the exam process. Thus, we have identi-
fied six individual and five universal verifiability requirements. Exam protocols
should provide enough information to allow candidates and auditors to verify
the correctness of the exam using private and public available information. In
summary, this dissertation has achieved Objective 1, as specified in chapter 1,
by advancing 21 security requirements for exams.
This research work has also provided novel approaches that allow the study
of security requirements for exams. The formal framework for the analysis of
authentication and privacy enables the evaluation of exam protocols, which can
be specified in the applied pi–calculus. The framework is flexible as it supports
various types of exams, namely traditional, computer-assisted, and Internet-
based exams. The formal framework for the analysis of verifiability consists of an
abstract model that supports a wide choice of verification methods based either
on symbolic or on computational models. Both frameworks can be extended
with additional requirements. In fact, we formulate the extra requirements
of Notification Request Authentication and Dispute Resolution. Overall, this
dissertation has introduced two formal frameworks for the analysis of exam
protocols, hence it has met Objective 2.
The scarcity of secure exam protocols in the literature, has led us to pro-
pose three new protocols for traditional, computer-assisted, and Internet-based
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exam. The protocols exploit different cryptographic techniques that span from
exponentiation mixnet to visual cryptography, but share the same design prin-
ciple of minimising the reliance on the trusted third parties. In this vein, we
have proposed two protocol versions of existing exam software (WATA). Using
our formal frameworks, it has been possible to analyse the security of existing
and proposed exam protocols. Some security issues have been found and mod-
ification have been suggested. The three novel protocols and the two protocol
versions of exam software contribute to the achievement of Objective 3.
It has been observed that the human should be also considered for an end-
to-end security analysis of exams. Moreover, browsers are often the main com-
ponents of an exam protocol and are critical to exam security as they interface
users and machines. Thus, this dissertation has advanced a socio-technical anal-
ysis of certificate validation as carried out in a browser for secure exams (SEB).
It has proposed a method that allows us to expand the analysis to the most
popular browsers. The method consists of modelling the certificate validation
ceremonies using UML Activity Diagram, and of the systematic translation of
such diagrams to CSP processes. We have validated the method with the model
checking of five socio-technical requirements that binds TLS session, certificates
and user choices. Thus, this dissertation has achieved Objective 4 by exploring
a socio-technical understanding of the certificate validation in exam and modern
browsers.
This research sees interesting outcomes, and we recall them. One is about the
formal analysis of the existing exam protocols: it is observed that authentica-
tion can fail because of the presence of logic flaws in the design of the protocols,
while privacy can fail because the protocols rely upon inadequate cryptographic
primitives. A second insight is about the relation between exams and similar
domains, such as voting. Although the approaches to design and analysis are
similar, we find that several requirements are different. Another interesting
outcome is the design of cryptographic exam protocols that meet contrasting
requirements without the need of a TTP and in presence of remote and face-to-
face phases. Exams should not rely on TTP and should guarantee some forms
of accountability. One last notable result derives from the socio-technical anal-
ysis of certificate validation ceremonies. It turns out that the security of such
ceremonies varies considerably when implementors customise the ceremonies,
possibly including users in security decisions.
As any research, this work required us to make some choices. One is about
the classes of security requirements. We considered the formalisation of au-
thentication, privacy, and verifiability, but definitions of non-repudiation and
accountability are also relevant for exams. Our formalisation of Dispute Res-
olution goes in that direction. Another choice is about the list of considered
requirements. We deemed the elements of this list highly desirable according to
our experience and discussions with colleagues. However, the list is not meant
to be exhaustive: some exams may demand additional requirements, as is the
case of WATA protocols.
Our analysis inherits the limitations of ProVerif. Although the analysis is
sound, ProVerif implements safe abstractions that might lead to non termination
or false attacks. We overcome some limitations with manual proofs, as in the
case of the analysis of Remark! for universal verifiability.
In summary, this work has identified the security requirements for exams,
developed frameworks for their analysis, and designed new protocols. The re-
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sults of this research offer a promising foundation for the design and analysis of
secure and practical protocols that accommodate any type of exam. The next
section outlines a number of possible research directions for this area.
8.1 Future Work
Future work that continues the work presented in this dissertation can be en-
visaged over different research directions.
Concerning the formal frameworks, it might be possible to extend them with
the specification of new security requirements and to study formally the relation
between the proposed requirements. Also, the analysis of more exam protocols
would help to corroborate the flexibility of the proposed frameworks. In partic-
ular, it is interesting to analyse the verifiability of exams in the computational
model, possibly with the assistance of the CryptoVerif [Bla08] automatic tool.
Another interesting research direction is to study whether our approach in defin-
ing verifiability can be applied to e-voting.
Regarding Remark!, future work includes the extension of open-source plat-
forms like Moodle with our protocol. Another interesting research direction is
to expand Remark! with techniques to detect plagiarism and candidate cheating
at testing. This is a significant point since Remark! is designed to allow candi-
dates to take the exam from home. We envisage that misbehaviour detection
strategies such as data mining used to derive patterns described by Pieczul and
Foley [PF14] can be useful for this purpose. Another research direction includes
the support for collaborative marking, in which the questions are categorised by
subject, and examiners evaluate only the answers that pertain to the examiner
subject area.
Future work can be envisaged also for computer-assisted exam protocols.
One is to extend the proposed protocols to accommodate different exam scenar-
ios. For instance, some scenarios may not require the participation of the candi-
date at notification. To achieve this, we envisage a temporal deanonymization
solution similar to the one specified in chapter 5 for Remark!. We note that Dis-
pute Resolution may conflict with the anonymity of the candidate’s test. Thus
it would be interesting to study how we can get both of them in the design of
exam protocols, and in general how to ensure both accountability and privacy
requirements in the same system.
Another line of research concerns the formal analysis. It might be possible
to study compositional proofs that integrate computational proofs of the cryp-
tographic primitives used in our protocol with the symbolic ones obtained in
ProVerif. A practical research direction is the implementation of a prototype
of the protocol and the verification of whether different visual cryptography
schemes can be used to increase the perceptual security of an exam.
The socio-technical analysis of certification validation shows that SEB is a
promising browser, so it would be interesting to integrate it with Remark! to
achieve secure testing. Finally, the socio-technical analysis approach can be
developed further at least in two directions: one is to fully automate the trans-
lation from UML Activity Diagram to CSP#; the other is to model additional
socio-technical requirements, perhaps considering privacy.
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Appendix A
CSP# Code
A.1 Specification of Common Parts
#import "PAT.Lib.Set";
#import "PAT.Lib.SetMine";
//UML activities’ objects and certificate’s fields
enum {HelloClient, HelloServer, ClientFinished, ServerFinished,
Data, Warning, Webpage, Continue, Abort, StoreCertificate,
Pk, HSTS, No_HSTS, S, I, SignCA, SignS, SignI, expi,
noexpi, revo, norevo};
channel ui 0;
channel network 0;
//UML datastores, certificate, and typed/clicked url
var<Set> dynamicHSTSList;
var<Set> preloadedHSTSList;
var<SetArray> ServerCert;
var cert[3];
var extendedcert[6];
var typed_url: {S..I}=S;
//UML decision points
#define CertificateIsValid cert[0]==typed_url &&
cert[2]==SignCA &&
extendedcert[4]==noexpi;
#define CertificateIsValidNR cert[0]==typed_url &&
cert[2]==SignCA &&
extendedcert[4]==noexpi &&
extendedcert[5]==norevo;
//This used by Safari
#define URLhasHSTSpolicy dynamicHSTSList.Contains(typed_url) ||
preloadedHSTSList.Contains(typed_url);
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#define CertificateIsStored ServerCert.Contains(extendedcert);
//Variables to keep track of some session’s event
var intruder_server=false;
var user_warned=false;
var finishTLS=false;
var preload=false;
//Intruder process chooses which server plays session by session//
Intruder()= ServerI() [] ServerH();
//-----Intruder server process-----//
ServerI() = []header:{HSTS, No_HSTS}@ []url:{S,I}@
[]sk:{SignI,SignCA}@
Init_TLS ->
network?urlx.HelloClient ->
//Intruder cannot sign certificate on behalf of CA
ifa (url==S && sk==SignCA) {
network!HelloServer.url.Pk.SignI -> Skip}
else {network!HelloServer.url.Pk.sk -> Skip};
Finish_TLS ->
network?m ->
ifa (m==ClientFinished) {
INTRUDER_IN{intruder_server=true} ->
network!ServerFinished.header.Data ->Skip
};
Intruder();
//-----Honest server process-----//
ServerH() = []header:{HSTS, No_HSTS}@ []sk:{SignS,SignCA}@
Init_TLS ->
network?urlx.HelloClient ->
network!HelloServer.S.Pk.sk ->
Finish_TLS ->
network?m ->
ifa (m==ClientFinished) {
network!ServerFinished.header.Data ->Skip};
Intruder();
//-----User process-----//
User() = ui?webpage ->
case {
//The user can type or click on either honest’s or
//intruder’s url.
webpage == Webpage: ui!S{typed_url=S} -> User() []
ui!I{typed_url=I} -> User()
webpage == Warning: ui!StoreCertificate -> User()[]
ui!Continue -> User() []
ui!Abort -> User()
default: User()};
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//------Model process-----//
Model = Preloading() [] Begin();
Preloading = PreloadHSTSpolicy->{preloadedHSTSList.Add(S);
preload=true} -> Begin;
Begin = Intruder() ||| User() ||| Browser();
//User who wants to visit the honest server
#define UserwantS typed_url==S;
//Successful MITM attack: User wants to visit the honest server,
//but browser completed with the intruder
#define AuthFail intruder_server && UserwantS;
#define User_warned user_warned;
#define CompleteTLS finishTLS;
#define Preload preload;
///---------Properties--------///
#assert Model deadlockfree;
//Property 1
#assert Model |=[] ((CompleteTLS && !User_warned) ->
CertificateIsValid);
//Property 2
#assert Model |=[]((CertificateIsStored && UserwantS &&
ui.Data && !AuthFail)->
X([](UserwantS -> !AuthFail)));
//Property 3
#assert Model |=[]((CertificateIsValid &&
network.ServerFinished.HSTS.Data && UserwantS)->
X([](UserwantS -> !AuthFail)));
//Property 4
#assert Model |=[] (Preload-> (UserwantS -> !AuthFail));
//Property 5
#assert Model |=[]((CompleteTLS && !CertificateIsValid &&
UserwantS)->
X([]((CompleteTLS && CertificateIsValid &&
UserwantS)->
User_warned)));
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A.2 Specification of Web Browsers
SEB
Browser() = []rev:{revo, norevo}@[]exp:{expi,noexpi}@
Display_Webpage ->
//New session, variables used in macros are reset
ui!Webpage{finishTLS=false; intruder_server=false;
user_warned=false;} ->
ui?url ->
Resolve_URL ->
Init_TLS ->
network!url.HelloClient ->
network?HelloServer.id.pk.sk{cert[0]=id;cert[1]=pk;
cert[2]=sk} ->
Check_Certificate ->
if (rev==revo) {{finishTLS=false} -> Skip}
else {
if (CertificateIsValid) {{finishTLS=true}->Skip}
else { {finishTLS=false} -> Skip }
};
if (!finishTLS)
//The browser informs the server about Abort (sync)
{network!Abort -> Skip}
else {
Finish_TLS ->
network!ClientFinished ->
Process_DATA ->
network?ServerFinished.header.Data ->
Display_Webpage ->
ui!Data -> Skip
};
Browser();
Firefox
Browser() = []rev:{revo, norevo}@[]exp:{expi,noexpi}@
Display_Webpage ->
//New session, variables used in macros are reset
ui!Webpage{finishTLS=false; intruder_server=false;
user_warned=false;} ->
ui?url ->
Resolve_URL ->
Init_TLS ->
network!url.HelloClient ->
network?HelloServer.id.pk.sk{extendedcert[0]=cert[0]=id;
extendedcert[1]=cert[1]=pk;
extendedcert[2]=cert[2]=sk;
extendedcert[3]=url;
extendedcert[4]=exp} ->
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Check_Certificate ->
ifa (CertificateIsValid ) {{finishTLS=true} -> Skip}
else {
ifa (URLhasHSTSpolicy || rev==revo)
{{finishTLS=false} -> Skip}
else {
ifa (CertificateIsStored)
{{finishTLS=true} -> Skip}
else {
DisplayWarning ->
ui!Warning{user_warned=true} ->
ui?userchoice ->
tau{
if (userchoice == Abort)
{finishTLS=false}
else {
finishTLS=true;
if (userchoice == StoreCertificate)
{ServerCert.Add(extendedcert);}
//associates a url to
//the server certificate
}
} -> Skip
}
}
};
ifa (!finishTLS)
//The browser informs the server about Abort (sync)
{network!Abort -> Skip}
else {
Finish_TLS ->
network!ClientFinished ->
Process_DATA ->
network?ServerFinished.header.Data ->
Display_Webpage ->
ui!Data ->
Check_Header ->
ifa (header==HSTS && CertificateIsValid)
{StoreHSTSpolicy->
{dynamicHSTSList.Add(cert[0])} -> Skip}
};
Browser();
Firefox - Private browsing
Browser() = []rev:{revo, norevo}@[]exp:{expi,noexpi}@
Display_Webpage ->
//New session, variables used in macros are reset
ui!Webpage{finishTLS=false; intruder_server=false;
user_warned=false;} ->
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ui?url ->
Resolve_URL ->
Init_TLS ->
network!url.HelloClient ->
network?HelloServer.id.pk.sk{extendedcert[0]=cert[0]=id;
extendedcert[1]=cert[1]=pk;
extendedcert[2]=cert[2]=sk;
extendedcert[3]=url;
extendedcert[4]=exp} ->
Check_Certificate ->
if (CertificateIsValid) {{finishTLS=true} -> Skip}
else {
if (URLhasHSTSpolicy || rev==revo)
{{finishTLS=false} -> Skip}
else {
if (CertificateIsStored)
{{finishTLS=true} -> Skip}
else {
DisplayWarning ->
ui!Warning{user_warned=true} ->
ui?userchoice ->
tau{
if (userchoice == Abort)
{finishTLS=false}
else {
finishTLS=true;
}
} -> Skip
}
}
};
if (!finishTLS)
//The browser informs the server about Abort (sync)
{network!Abort -> Skip}
else {
Finish_TLS ->
network!ClientFinished ->
Process_DATA ->
network?ServerFinished.header.Data ->
Display_Webpage ->
ui!Data -> Skip
};
Browser();
Chrome
Browser() = []rev:{revo, norevo}@[]exp:{expi,noexpi}@
Display_Webpage ->
//New session, variables used in macros are reset
ui!Webpage{finishTLS=false; intruder_server=false;
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user_warned=false;expc=exp} ->
ui?url ->
Resolve_URL ->
Init_TLS ->
network!url.HelloClient ->
network?HelloServer.id.pk.sk{cert[0]=id;cert[1]=pk;
cert[2]=sk} ->
Check_Certificate ->
if (CertificateIsValid) {{finishTLS=true} -> Skip}
else {
if (URLhasHSTSpolicy || rev==revo)
{{finishTLS=false} -> Skip}
else {
DisplayWarning ->
ui!Warning{user_warned=true} ->
ui?userchoice ->
tau{
if (userchoice == Abort)
{finishTLS=false}
else { finishTLS=true; }
} -> Skip
}
};
if (!finishTLS)
//The browser informs the server about Abort (sync)
{network!Abort -> Skip}
else {
Finish_TLS ->
network!ClientFinished ->
Process_DATA ->
network?ServerFinished.header.Data ->
Display_Webpage ->
ui!Data ->
Check_Header ->
if (header==HSTS && CertificateIsValid)
{StoreHSTSpolicy->
{dynamicHSTSList.Add(cert[0])} -> Skip}
};
Browser();
Chrome - Private browsing
Browser() = []rev:{revo, norevo}@[]exp:{expi,noexpi}@
Display_Webpage ->
//New session, variables used in macros are reset
ui!Webpage{finishTLS=false; intruder_server=false;
user_warned=false;expc=exp} ->
ui?url ->
Resolve_URL ->
Init_TLS ->
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network!url.HelloClient ->
network?HelloServer.id.pk.sk{cert[0]=id;cert[1]=pk;
cert[2]=sk} ->
Check_Certificate ->
if (CertificateIsValid) {{finishTLS=true} -> Skip}
else {
if (URLhasHSTSpolicy || rev==revo)
{{finishTLS=false} -> Skip}
else {
DisplayWarning ->
ui!Warning{user_warned=true} ->
ui?userchoice ->
tau{
if (userchoice == Abort)
{finishTLS=false}
else { finishTLS=true; }
} -> Skip
}
};
if (!finishTLS)
//The browser informs the server about Abort (sync)
{network!Abort -> Skip}
else {
Finish_TLS ->
network!ClientFinished ->
Process_DATA ->
network?ServerFinished.header.Data ->
Display_Webpage ->
ui!Data -> Skip
};
Browser();
Safari
Browser() = []rev:{revo, norevo}@[]exp:{expi,noexpi}@
Display_Webpage ->
//New session, variables used in macros are reset
ui!Webpage{finishTLS=false; intruder_server=false;
user_warned=false;} ->
ui?url ->
Resolve_URL ->
Init_TLS ->
network!url.HelloClient ->
network?HelloServer.id.pk.sk{extendedcert[0]=cert[0]=id;
extendedcert[1]=cert[1]=pk;
extendedcert[2]=cert[2]=sk;
extendedcert[3]=url;
extendedcert[4]=exp;
extendedcert[5]=rev} ->
Check_Certificate ->
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if (CertificateIsValidNR || CertificateIsStored)
{{finishTLS=true} -> Skip}
else {
if (URLhasHSTSpolicy || rev==revo)
{{finishTLS=false} -> Skip}
else {
DisplayWarning ->
ui!Warning{user_warned=true} ->
ui?userchoice ->
tau{
if (userchoice == Abort)
{finishTLS=false}
else {
finishTLS=true;
if (userchoice == StoreCertificate)
{ServerCert.Add(extendedcert);}
//associates a url to
//the server certificate
}
} -> Skip
}
};
if (!finishTLS)
//The browser informs the server about Abort (sync)
{network!Abort -> Skip}
else {
Finish_TLS ->
network!ClientFinished ->
Process_DATA ->
network?ServerFinished.header.Data ->
Display_Webpage ->
ui!Data ->
Check_Header ->
if (header==HSTS && CertificateIsValidNR)
{StoreHSTSpolicy->
{HSTSList.Add(cert[0])} -> Skip}
};
Browser();
Safari - Private browsing
Browser() = []rev:{revo, norevo}@[]exp:{expi,noexpi}@
Display_Webpage ->
//New session, variables used in macros are reset
ui!Webpage{finishTLS=false; intruder_server=false;
user_warned=false;} ->
ui?url ->
Resolve_URL ->
Init_TLS ->
network!url.HelloClient ->
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network?HelloServer.id.pk.sk{extendedcert[0]=cert[0]=id;
extendedcert[1]=cert[1]=pk;
extendedcert[2]=cert[2]=sk;
extendedcert[3]=url;
extendedcert[4]=exp;
extendedcert[5]=rev} ->
Check_Certificate ->
if (CertificateIsValidNR || CertificateIsStored)
{{finishTLS=true} -> Skip}
else {
DisplayWarning ->
ui!Warning{user_warned=true} ->
ui?userchoice ->
tau{
if (userchoice == Abort) {finishTLS=false}
else {
finishTLS=true;
if (userchoice == StoreCertificate)
{ServerCert.Add(extendedcert);}
//associates a url to the server certificate
}
} -> Skip
};
if (!finishTLS)
//The browser informs the server about Abort for syncing
{network!Abort -> Skip}
else {
Finish_TLS ->
network!ClientFinished ->
Process_DATA ->
network?ServerFinished.header.Data ->
Display_Webpage ->
ui!Data -> Skip
};
Browser();
Internet Explorer
Browser() = []rev:{revo, norevo}@[]exp:{expi,noexpi}@
Display_Webpage ->
//New session, variables used in macros are reset
ui!Webpage{finishTLS=false; intruder_server=false;
user_warned=false;expc=exp} ->
ui?url ->
Resolve_URL ->
Init_TLS ->
network!url.HelloClient ->
network?HelloServer.id.pk.sk{cert[0]=id;cert[1]=pk;
cert[2]=sk} ->
Check_Certificate ->
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if (rev==revo) {{finishTLS=false} -> Skip}
else {
if (CertificateIsValid) {{finishTLS=true} -> Skip}
else {
DisplayWarning ->
ui!Warning{user_warned=true} ->
ui?userchoice ->
tau{
if (userchoice == Abort) {finishTLS=false}
else {finishTLS=true; }
} -> Skip
}
};
if (!finishTLS)
//The browser informs the server about Abort (sync)
{network!Abort -> Skip}
else {
Finish_TLS ->
network!ClientFinished ->
Process_DATA ->
network?ServerFinished.header.Data ->
Display_Webpage ->
ui!Data -> Skip
};
Browser();
Opera Mini
Browser() = []rev:{revo, norevo}@[]exp:{expi,noexpi}@
Display_Webpage ->
//New session, variables used in macros are reset
ui!Webpage{finishTLS=false; intruder_server=false;
user_warned=false;expc=exp} ->
ui?url ->
Resolve_URL ->
Init_TLS ->
network!url.HelloClient ->
network?HelloServer.id.pk.sk{cert[0]=id;cert[1]=pk;
cert[2]=sk} ->
Check_Certificate ->
if (rev==revo) {{finishTLS=false} -> Skip}
else {{finishTLS=true} -> Skip};
if (!finishTLS)
//The browser informs the server about Abort (sync)
{network!Abort -> Skip}
else {
Finish_TLS ->
network!ClientFinished ->
Process_DATA ->
network?ServerFinished.header.Data ->
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Display_Webpage ->
ui!Data -> Skip
};
Browser();
